

SWEDEN: THE SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY SETTING*

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PLACING SWEDENBORG: THE SWEDBERG FAMILY'S SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY CONTEXT

Emanuel Swedenborg was born in 1688 in Stockholm Sweden on Sunday, January 29, according to the old style Julian calendar in use at that time. He was the third child and second son of Jesper Swedberg (1653–1735) and Sarah Behm (1666–1696). At the time of his birth, his father was a Lutheran priest and Chaplain to the Life Guard Regiment of the king, Karl XI (reigned 1672–1697), as well as a Chaplain to the Court. His status as a priest offered him the possibility of participating in the Priestly Estate of the *riksdag*, the national assembly. The other three Estates were the Nobility, the Burghers, and the Peasants. All the Estates were free subjects of the crown. Swedberg came from a successful mining family in the Swedish heartland of Dalarna, a region of special importance to Sweden because it had been home to King Gustav Vasa (reigned 1523–1560) the leader of Swedish independence and founder of the nation. His mother came from a family of wealthy mine owners near Gafle in the region of Gästrikland, who were descendents of the legendary Vasa line. Her father, Albrecht (died 1679), had been an Assessor at the Royal College of Mines in Stockholm for several years before his death.

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This brief recitation of facts concerning Emanuel Swedenborg, his parents, and their roots places him in the center of Sweden's history as it unfolded in the seventeenth century. Reviewing the key elements of that history supplies the context vital for an understanding of the man. Swedenborg concurred with this need to know his roots. On more than one occasion toward the end of his life, Swedenborg indicated the importance of his history to his mission. In 1768, after years of publishing his religious works anonymously, he signed his work *Amore Conjugali* (Marriage Love) "Emanuel Swedenborg, a Swede." In 1769, upon the request of two of his English readers, Thomas Hartley (1708–1784) and Dr. H. Meissiter (n.d.), he wrote a short biography of his life. It was later published in an English magazine, *Aurora*, in 1800.¹

SWEDISH SOCIETY AND ECONOMY

In 1688, like most of Europe, Sweden was a highly stratified society composed of nobles, clergy, burghers, and peasants. Unlike the continent, however, legal privilege rather than feudalism was the basis of differentiation. Moreover, in addition to the four recognized estates, there were people of standing who were not nobles, and there were occupational categories that did not fit within the political framework. In the seventeenth century Sweden was still very much a rural society with a few small towns. According to Stellan Dahlgren, Stockholm at the end of the century had a population between fifty and sixty thousand (Roberts 1973, 104). The next largest towns, such as the mining town Falun and the western port of Göteborg, were only one tenth the size of Stockholm with populations of approximately five to six thousand. Dahlgren's estimate of the Swedish Finish population during this period is between one and a half and two million people.² Of that number, perhaps 7% lived in towns, with the remaining 93% of the population living in the country. The best estimate is that 95% of that population belonged to the Commonality that

¹ Swedenborg wrote two different version of the letter, posting one to each man. It was the letter to Hartley that was published in *Aurora* II, 1800, 224–228.

² Finland became part of Sweden in the twelfth century.

included peasants, cottagers, servants and others (Roberts 1973, 104). The bulk of the peasants were farmers or cottagers, while some were employed as servants and laborers in the towns. Burghers almost by definition lived in towns and represented 2% of the population, but only one third of the town population were burghers, and in Stockholm that number was considerably smaller; for the most part the others were members of the lower class. The clergy made up only 1 % of the population, and lived primarily in rural parishes. The nobility constituted a tiny fraction of the population, only 0.5% or less than 10,000 people. Whether they lived in the country on estates or in the capital serving as officials of the state, they were major employers of the lower classes including artisans. *Ståndpersoner* (people of rank) made up the remaining 1.5 % of the population. They were individuals with high incomes and educational attainments who did not fall within any particular estate. Over time many of them formed an upper strata among the peasant class, and from time to time they might even be ennobled. With the 1680 reforms of Karl XI that established the *indelningsverk* (division of responsibility), many of these wealthy peasants were freed from military conscription because they agreed to support a cavalry trooper in perpetuity.³ They would provide the horse, equipment, lodging, and employment for the trooper when he was off-duty.

To briefly recap the percentage of the population belonging to the different strata in seventeenth-century Sweden:

Estate/Non-estate	Percentage of Population
Nobles	0.5
Burghers	2.0
Clergy	1.0
Peasants	95.0
<i>Ståndpersoner</i>	1.5

In order to grasp the living conditions and life chances of these different strata of Swedish society, some understanding of the Swedish economy is in order. Again, like most of Europe in the seventeenth century, agricul-

³The *Indelningsverk* will be examined later in this paper.

ture dominated the economy. While climate and culture always impact agricultural production, in Sweden and Finland the extreme northern climate and the primitive farming methods used, particularly in Finland (slash and burn), as well as the low population, affected the yield of grain (Roberts 1973, 62).

Crop choice, manner of cultivation, and type of farm animal used, corresponded one to the other. Rye and barely were grown in Finland and Norrland, where slash and burn techniques were used, and horses were employed for transport over great distances; oats was grown on the west coast of Sweden, where manure cultivation implied the use of cattle and oxen. Wheat, when grown, was confined mostly to noble estates.

The grains grown in Sweden/Finland were insufficient for sustaining the urban populations of the kingdom, particularly Stockholm, and of course the needs of the army, so important throughout much of the seventeenth century. The Baltic provinces contained some fertile regions and when the harvests were good the surplus was a welcome supplement to the homegrown produce. Sven-Erik Åström's report on a 1685 custom account for Stockholm is illustrative. It is reported in *tunna* or *rikstunna* (156 liters per *tunna*):

	<i>tunnor</i> (plural of <i>tunna</i>)
Rye	62,840
Malt	24,350
Oats	10,110
Meal	720
Wheat	150

Grain was not the only commodity imported from the Baltic provinces to Sweden. Meat, dairy products, and salt were also imported. These imports were valued at 235,000 *riksdalar*. When the import of foodstuffs from the rest of the empire were added, the amount more than doubles to 500,000 *riksdalar*. There can be no doubt about the value of the empire to the economy of Sweden; and when the Baltic provinces were lost by Karl XII to Russia, the peace negotiated in Nystad in 1721 permitted Sweden to continue to import annually 50,000 rubbles worth of grain duty free from them (Roberts 1973, 70).

Grain was also not Sweden's only commodity of value. In the age of Mercantilism wealth was measured in population and precious metals. Population was valued primarily to support agriculture and, in Sweden's case, war; but as it has been demonstrated, Sweden's population was small and in many regions sparse. Metals, however, were an important resource for Sweden. Sweden possessed large veins of silver that by the middle of the seventeenth century would soon be exhausted. Copper was another metal that generated wealth for Sweden; she was a major exporter of copper during her Age of Greatness and often had a monopoly on the market. However, supplies of this metal were also diminishing and harder to mine as the seventeenth century progressed. Copper imports from Japan also began to challenge Sweden's dominance in the European market. As the importance of these metals receded in Sweden's financial picture, the role of the baser metal, iron, grew (Roberts 1973).

Iron had long been a valuable resource for Sweden going all the way back to the Iron Age. However, in the modern era, iron mining was stimulated by the arrival of German and Walloon immigrants, who were recruited specifically to bring their advanced mining techniques to Sweden. Specializing in bar iron that was mass-produced, these experts settled all over the *bergslag* or mining region in central Sweden. There was a dramatic increase in production during the second half of the seventeenth century. In 1648 Sweden exported 561 English tons of iron to England, and by 1695 that figure had grown to 12,804 tons, a remarkable twenty-three-fold increase in just under fifty years. During approximately the same timeframe (1637–1685), iron and steel increased from a total of 35.4 % of Swedish exports to 57.0%, a 21% increase; while copper and brass dropped slightly from 27.3% to 23.5% (Roberts 1973, 66).

During the first half of the century, grain was the next largest export at 16.0 %; however, by 1685 it dropped to an insignificant 0.1 % of Sweden's total exports. Wood products and wood took over in third and fourth place, and by 1685 they account for 10.5 % of all exports. At the end of the century, metals and wood products made up over 90 % of Sweden's exports (Roberts 1973, 67).

Iron and wood were transported to overseas markets on Swedish, English, and Dutch vessels. The English and the Dutch brought primarily luxury goods, such as wine, textiles, and home furnishings to Sweden for

the crown, nobles, and burghers. Although they also brought salt, sugar, and tobacco purchased by the elites and to a less extent the common person. The foreign vessels on their return voyages carried: bar iron, planks, pitch, and tar. The cargo of the Swedish vessels simply began with the Swedish produce and picked up the more exotic items in continental ports and brought them back to Sweden (Roberts 1973, 67–68).

Shipping was obviously vital to the Swedish economy. In the first quarter of the seventeenth century the independent Hanse city of Lübeck handled 75 % of Sweden's trade. After the Thirty Years War, Sweden gained control of many Baltic ports and Lübeck lost its centrality to Swedish trade. In the second half of the century the English and the Dutch fought to dominate the Baltic trade to the consternation of the Swedes; they would have preferred that Swedish goods were carried exclusively on Swedish vessels. War in the mid-1670s all but destroyed Sweden's naval fleet, threatening Swedish control of the Baltic and the empire. In the 1680s this led Karl XI to reorganized Sweden's finances, in large part in order to strengthen the military. Creating a strong navy was one of the king's objectives, and as it grew, so did a strong merchant marine fleet. In 1695 Stockholm could boast of seventy-five vessels over 100 *läster* with one *läst* equal to approximately two and one half tons (Roberts 1973, 71). Göteborg had ten ships and Riga was homeport to about twelve. There were also many smaller ships that plied the Baltic owned and operated by Swedes. During this period Sweden had access to the fourth largest fleet in Europe after England, Holland, and France.

Despite this accomplishment, Sweden remained a poor country. This is made abundantly clear by a comparative examination of the sources of Sweden's income and the nature of expenditures in 1633 and again in 1677 as reported by Sven-Erik Åström in *Sweden's Age of Greatness 1632-1718*: total income in 1633 from all sources was 3,263,452 *riksdaler*; and in 1677 just before Karl XI's major restructuring of Sweden's finances, it was 5,319,365. France provided a subsidy in both years, but without the subsidy in 1677 Sweden would have had a deficit of 680,00 *riksdaler*. Over the more than forty-year period, court, military, and war costs had grown exponentially, while the new sources of income were episodic in nature, particularly those listed as "loans" which could entail future expenditures (Roberts 1973, 82–83).

The nobility

On the surface, Sweden in the seventeenth century was viewed not only as a "Great Power," but the ever-increasing aristocracy acted as if the appearance was the reality. Ennoblement was used increasingly as a recruiting tool or reward system for various forms of civil and national service. In the process, the crown gave away or "alienated" much of its own wealth in a society where payment in kind, not cash, was the rule rather than the exception. In 1654, at the height of land transfer under Queen Christina, the nobility owned 63% of the available land in Sweden and Finland (Nilsson 1988, 23). These estates were exempt from taxes. Thus, despite the fact that Sweden was a poor country, over the course of the century Swedish nobles began to emulate the life-style of central Europe's elite, building great houses furnished with luxury items from abroad, traveling in style, and wearing imported finery. Åström illustrates this shift in behavior with the following observation:

When the great chancellor Axel Oxenstierna made his peregrination at the close of the previous century, he had been accompanied by a handful of followers, and had even moved from one European university to another on foot. His son Johan, proceeding in his great carriage with a numerous escort, was treated wherever he went as a prince. (Roberts 1973, 86)

The peasants

This shift not only alienated land; it alienated the peasant class, which now not only confronted the on-going burden of military conscription, but shouldered a greater percentage of the taxes. Swedish peasantry in the seventeenth century was not a uniform stratum. There were classes or layers within the peasantry: freeholders, crown peasants, and noble peasants. Freeholders owned their own land. Crown peasants were tenant farmers on crown land, and noble peasants were tenant farmers on noble holdings. Sven Nilsson makes the case that the tax burden in the form of extraordinary taxes fell more strongly on the tenant farmers than on the free-holders, and that over the course of the century tenant farmers "saw their relative position deteriorate" leading to "difficulty in making ends

meet” (Nilsson 1988, 25). In addition, the number of landless peasants also increased during the century. They became servants, miners, forge or charcoal workers, or lived off the land hunting and fishing. Their lives were, of course, insecure and they could end up as beggars or worse.

Descriptions of peasant life during this era are not easy to find. It is known that good harvests were much less frequent than were mediocre to poor ones that brought with them famine and “periods of crushing want” (Lockhart, 2004, 5). Much of the literature remarks on the brutality and violence of rural life in Sweden and that Swedish soldiers were viewed as extraordinarily tough because in their every day life they were constantly subject to deprivation and hardship. Lockhart quotes Georg Friedrich von Waldeck to illustrate this point: “The Swedes are a hungry people, and hence they are dangerous and hard-hearted” (Lockhart 2004, 5). They needed to be tough because when the harvests failed or epidemics raged there was no real social safety net. Ordinances were passed requesting local parishes to aid the poor, but there was no real enforcement, leaving genuine help a matter of individual or private initiative.

The burghers

The growth of towns and industry over the course of the century led to the gradual increase of the burgher class. Politically they were generally willing to side with the peasant estate against the nobles, particularly when it came to the *reduction*.⁴ A variety of occupational categories fit within the scope of the burgher Estate: merchants, entrepreneurs, craftsmen, and civil servants. The personal wealth of members of this Estate varied greatly. Some burghers were wealthy ship owners living in Stockholm or Göteborg with ample resources to also start foundries, provide loans to others, or with funds to invest in trading companies. These men would often buy landed estates either as a safe investment or as a means to raise their social status. They could loan money to the crown, or arrange credit when necessary from their contacts abroad. After Karl XI’s policy of *reduction*, the records of the state bank indicates that they took over the important role of financiers from the nobility (Roberts 1973, 111).

⁴ The “reduction” was another element of Karl XI’s financial reorganization to be explained later in this paper.

Despite their increasingly important role in society, they did not develop a consciousness of class with their own life-style. They chose instead to imitate the nobility as much as their resources would allow and laws against luxury would permit. They also actively pursued ennoblement when possible, although its achievement was relatively rare. When it was achieved, they might find themselves at odds with their old colleagues and as unwelcome up-starts among their new peers (Roberts 1973, 113).

In reality, the number of very wealthy burghers was quiet small. Most burghers were petty retailers, small entrepreneurs, or craftsmen with interests often at cross-purposes with the great wholesalers. Burghers also served as officials and magistrates in Swedish towns. However, toward the end of the century, the crown through the agency of the provincial governors filled the positions of burgomasters and town councilors with individuals with legal and or academic training. This practice bypassed the burghers and frequently created conflicts with them. When this occurred, the burghers sought remedies from their own representatives beyond the control of the magistrates (Roberts 1973, 113–14).

Craftsmen certainly formed the largest percentage of the burghers. They had lower social status than even the magistrates, and had little political influence. The crafts as in much of Europe were formed into guilds. Membership in the guild was guarded by the masters and entry required apprenticeships, demonstration of ability, payment of a fee, and a donation to the poor. Craftsmen who worked outside of the guild framework were constantly faced with harassment.

As the century wore on, foreigners joined indigenous craftsmen of Sweden; however, they entered Sweden as *ståndspersoner* and did not fit into the Burgher Estate at all. Some of these men came to Sweden to work on the homes and estates of the nobility in the capacity of architects, painters, and sculptors. Some of them were subsequently ennobled and became members of the council of State and the Court. Similar patterns emerged in the fields of textiles and metallurgy. Immigrants from the continent brought both capital and expertise to these industries, and were often rewarded by the crown for their enterprise and endeavors (Roberts 1973, 115).

The clergy

Of all the estates, perhaps the clergy had the most complex role to fill. They were the most educated members of Swedish society, and served as teachers in gymnasia and universities. Swedish priests lived in their parishes almost without exception. They were servants of the church who lived among the common people and knew their struggles and their living conditions. For the average parish priest, his fate was bound up in the fate of those he served. If they prospered, most likely so would he. If he did well by them, he could collect his stipends, tithe, and fees without worry. As long as the priest had the confidence of his parishioners, they saw him as their agent in both spiritual and worldly matters.

However, the clergy were also servants of the state, recording all the vital statistics of their parishioners for the crown. These records were used for tax assessment and conscription. Implicit in this dual role was the possibility of tensions between the clergy and the peasant both locally and nationally. Locally they might squeeze the peasants unreasonably in order to get what they believed was due them rather than let them give what they could afford. Nationally, they might support the interests of the crown rather than acting as an advocate of their parishioners.

However, in relationship to the nobility whether locally or nationally, the clergy and the peasants frequently formed a common alliance based on a common hostility. The nobility could threaten the clergy through proposing another cleric to fill the pulpit; by maintaining priests as domestic chaplains or tutors; and economically by personally withholding tithes, and other church fees, and by refusing to allow the peasants on their estates to make their contributions either. On the national level, the clergy, the peasants, and the burghers often formed a common front against the nobility. In fact their combined opposition to the nobility in 1680 made it much easier for King Karl XI to institute *reduktion* and his other reforms.

Not all the clergy were hostile to the nobility, particularly within the ranks of the more senior clergymen and the bishops. They often socialized in aristocratic circles, and the status and life style of the bishops, in particular, was similar to the nobility. While they could not be ennobled themselves, the possibility existed for their children. In fact, Bishop Jesper

Swedberg's children, including Emanuel, were ennobled by Queen Ulrika Eleonora in May of 1719, along with one hundred and forty others (Sigstedt 1952, 58). After receiving this honor, Swedenborg, as the eldest surviving son, took his seat in the House of Nobles and actively participated in its business. The status differential between the higher and lower clergy created tensions within the Clerical Estate and generated resentment on the part of the less elevated clergy. The aristocracy could also be mindful of their own more exalted status, and could treat the clergy of whatever rank with disdain. This did not mean, however, that they could be completely dismissive of the clergy or their power.

The relationship between the monarchy and the clergy was, on the whole, mutually supportive. However, there was widespread resentment on the part of the clergy of Karl XI's usurpation of the role of the consistory when he implemented the 1686 Church Law. He, as the monarch, assumed the role as head of the church, with complete episcopal authority. Karl XI acknowledged the belief that religious unity was the backbone of an ordered society, and therefore he desired one law. Thus, he mandated that offenses against church law could initially be tried in ecclesiastical courts; however, decisions made there could be appealed to secular courts (Upton 1998, 110–11). Under this system, Swedish subjects were held accountable under one uniform code of conduct.

Not all churchmen opposed the king and his understanding of his role and the need for a uniform code of law. Jesper Swedberg was one such man. He was outspoken and a staunch supporter of the king. Needless to say, not all of his colleagues were sympathetic to his point of view.

This review of the economy and the social structure of Sweden shows Sweden to be a poor but dynamic society. While the vast majority of Swedes were peasants, the peasantry was itself not uniform, nor were the other strata. There appeared to be a fair amount of fluidity within strata and between strata. One's lot in life, although perhaps difficult to change, was not immutably fixed. Life in Sweden during the Age of Greatness was no doubt harsh, almost regardless of what strata one belonged to, but it was also pregnant with possibility.

SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY IMPERIAL SWEDEN

At the time of Swedenborg's birth, Sweden had been a co-guarantor of the Peace of Westphalia (1648) for forty years and was considered one of Europe's great powers. King Karl XI reigned as absolute monarch over a vast geographical empire gained through the spoils of war. During the first eighty-eight years of the seventeenth century, Sweden had been at war with multiple adversaries for fifty-seven years. Sweden fought with Poland, Moscovy, Denmark, Holland, and various German principalities over strategic and economic control of the Baltic, and during the Thirty Years War for the sake of the Protestant cause. The territory under Swedish control grew over 70%, from approximately 662,772 square kilometers in 1600, to over 946,437 in 1688.

While the population also grew, more than doubling during this same time frame, it still remained small in comparison to the other nations in Europe, and in comparison with some of her enemies. For example, Russia in 1660 had a population of approximately five to six million and had in the field at that time an army of 100,000 (Velikanov, 2008). The Swedish population in 1600 was perhaps 1.2 million: 900,000 Swedes and 325,000 Finns. The figure for the empire toward the end of the century was in the neighborhood of 2.7 million. During the same period, the population of the other two co-guarantors of the Peace of Westphalia that were considered great powers were much larger. France had a population of 21 million, almost ten times that of the Swedish empire, and the territory of the Habsburgs contained a population of 11 million, nearly five times that of Sweden.

The empire was large, spread over non-contiguous territory, and thinly populated. Yet it required continual vigilance and a constant supply of economic resources to defend it. Acquired piecemeal, it was neither integrated nor centrally administered. Upon liberation from the yoke of Denmark-Norway in 1523, the quest for security based on conquest became the driving force of Sweden's foreign policy. This was the approach of Gustav Vasa, and his line until the abdication of Christina in 1654. This perspective is well illustrated by the following comment of Gustav II Adolf (reigned 1611–1632), known as the Protestant "lion of the north." He argued: it "was better that we tether our horse in the enemy's homestead

that he in ours.”⁵ Queen Christina’s cousin and successor Karl X (1654–1660) took this policy as far as it could go. The high point of imperial Sweden occurred just prior to his death in 1660.

Formation of the empire

Finland had been part of Sweden since the twelfth century, Estonia became a protectorate in 1561, and Kexholm and Ingria were won from Moscovy in 1617 at the Peace of Stolbova under the banner of Gustav II Adolph. Livonia was secured in 1629 through the Peace of Altmark that settled the war between Poland-Lithuania and Sweden. In 1645 at the Peace of Brömsebro, Sweden gained Jämtland, Härjedalen, and Halland from Denmark-Norway, geographically expanding the area of Sweden proper. Sweden was also granted the Baltic Island of Ösel near Estonia and Livonia, and the largest of all the Baltic Islands, Gotland. Three years later, at the conclusion of the Thirty Years war in 1648, Sweden was granted control over the German regions of Pomerania and Bremen Verden. And finally after a war with Denmark, the 1658 treaty of Roskilde awarded Böhuslän, Blekinge, and Skåne to Sweden, along with the Norwegian city of Trondheim, and the Baltic island of Bornholm. These last two areas were recovered by Denmark in 1660 as a result of the Peace of Copenhagen. The last war that Sweden participated in during the seventeenth century began in 1674 when France demanded that Sweden live up to her role as a guarantor of Peace in Europe. The war involved the north German states, Denmark, and Holland. The war in Germany did not go well for Sweden and her armies retreated; however, they were successful in retaking Skåne from the Danish at the battle of Lund. At the settlement in 1679, France ensured that Sweden retained most of her German territory. In the past, France had supported Sweden and had even provided subsidies for the army. The recent war, however, demonstrated Sweden’s complete dependence on French subsidies, and the resulting inability of Sweden to have an independent foreign policy focused on Swedish security rather than

⁵ Quoted by Robert I. Frost in *The Northern Wars: War, State and Society in Northeastern Europe, 1558–1721*, New York: Longman, 2000, 315.

French interests. In fact, this reality and Sweden's "secret" problem had been bubbling below the surface throughout the regency of Karl XI.

Background—the reign of Karl X Gustav

Karl X Gustav died in 1660 after a brief reign of only six years. He had assumed the crown upon the abdication of Christina (reigned 1644-1654).⁶ The daughter of Gustav II Adolf, the king who was the very symbol of the Protestant cause, surrendered the throne in 1654 to become a Catholic. Karl X Gustav (1654-1660) was personally selected by Christina to be her successor. He was her cousin and well trained in the art of war. He, too, was a descendant of Gustav Vasa, and his reign began the royal house of Pfalz-Zweibrücken in Sweden. Long groomed for power, he had participated in the military campaigns and diplomatic successes in Germany in the late 1640s that benefited Sweden. The transition of power went smoothly because the new king was well liked by the power-brokers in the aristocracy. He was prepared to rule. He was well educated, a gifted orator, and had administrative experience. The council and the new king had a common view of the dangers currently confronting Sweden and they had a shared understanding that war could resolve them.

In 1654, war had broken out again between Russia and Poland. This threatened Sweden's holdings in the eastern Baltic. Russia was the greater threat, but Poland was a longstanding enemy. Sweden chose to ally herself with Russia against Poland. In 1655 Sweden attacked Poland and achieved a brilliant victory. This success, however, quickly wakened fear and resentment among neighboring states, particularly Austria. In addition, Swedish excesses stimulated popular opposition in Poland. Soon, even Russia, Sweden's ally, turned on her and invaded the empire along their common border, waging war in Ingria, Kexholm, Estonia, and Livonia; and despite Sweden's strong defenses, the Russians took the Livonian city of Dorpat before they finally withdrew exhausted. While Sweden was able

⁶ Upon the death of Gustav II Adolf in 1632, the Council under the leadership of Axel Oxenstjerna (1583–1654) became regents for Christina until she assumed her majority in 1644.

to hold her own in her own territory, she began to withdraw from Poland, having achieved as much as possible in a very negative geopolitical climate. The withdrawal was not merely defensive, because it is also true that Karl X Gustav had discovered in Denmark another even more attractive objective. The Danes, however, struck first.

Emboldened by Austria's move against Sweden in Poland, Denmark declared war on Sweden. In 1657, she attacked Swedish holdings in Bremen and in the provinces of Jämtland and Västergötland on the border with Norway. This war proved to be Denmark's undoing. Unusual weather conditions played a significant role. Poor weather during the fall reduced the effectiveness of the Danish fleet, and the extreme cold of the winter froze both the "little belt" and the "big belt," the waterways connecting the islands of the Danish kingdom. This enabled Karl X Gustav to cross the ice with his army on two separate occasions, surprising the disoriented and weakly fortified Danish defenses. These bold moves on the part of the king panicked the Danes and forced them to surrender. The treaty of Roskilde was a great victory for Sweden and a disaster for Denmark. Sweden gained Halland as a permanent possession, and also won the fertile provinces of Skåne and Blekinge, as well as Böhuslän. This settlement broke forever the Danish hold on the sound, and their control of the Baltic.

Karl X Gustav did not stop for long to enjoy the fruits of victory, but almost immediately seized the opportunity to destroy the Danish threat once and for all. The initial success of the Swedish thrust into Denmark was short lived. Sweden's bellicosity had aroused strong concern and could no longer be ignored by Europe. Total control of the sound by a powerful Sweden was an unwelcome prospect to the many nations involved in Baltic trade. The English saw no advantage in helping Sweden, and the Dutch fleet came to the aid of the Danes, as did the armies of Brandenburg and Poland. Toward the end of 1659, Swedish forces were in retreat in Prussia and bottled up in Denmark with no means of escape. In the midst of these serious difficulties, Karl X Gustav became ill during a trip to Sweden and died on February 23, 1660, leaving the kingdom in the hands of his five-year old son, and his regents. Stunned by this turn of events, the Royal Council immediately sued for peace.

The three peace settlements that ensued, Oliva (1660), Copenhagen (1660), and Kardis (1661), were surprisingly generous to Sweden. The treaty of Oliva was signed by Sweden, Poland, Austria, and Brandenburg. It returned Sweden to her pre-1655 status, recognized Sweden's claim to Livonia, and stipulated that Poland renounce its claim to the Swedish throne; the treaty of Copenhagen between Sweden and Denmark returned Bornholm and Trondheim to Denmark, but otherwise the peace of Roskilde held; and the treaty of Kardis signed by Sweden and Russia returned the territories taken by Moscow in 1656.

The short reign of Karl X Gustav was remarkable. Paul D. Lockhart describes his achievements in *Sweden in the Seventeenth Century*:

He was the last successful conqueror-king in Sweden's history, and through his wars with Poland, Russia, and Denmark brought the Swedish empire to its greatest territorial extent. Although he did not live to witness Denmark's humiliation at Copenhagen in 1660, he was directly responsible for Sweden's usurpation of the Dane's former *dominium maris Baltici* and Sweden's finest moments on the battlefield. He managed to accomplish all this, moreover, without sacrificing harmony and stability at home. Under Karl X Gustav's direction, cooperation between king and Council reached its high point, with little constitutional confrontation between king and aristocracy, despite the unremitting demands of war. In short, Karl X Gustav's governance represents the apogee, in terms of external expansion and constitutional functionality, of the Swedish empire. (92)

The price of these achievements, however, was overextension, over-taxation, and over-dependence on France in order to maintain military commitments. In addition, the long regency that was to follow left control of the nation in the hands of the aristocracy who took the opportunity to govern with their own welfare in mind rather than the welfare of the state. This exacerbated the problem of the fiscal solvency of the nation. The demands on the state were simply greater than its income, and any genuine resolution of this problem would strike at the interests of the aristocracy.

The second great unresolved problem during the regency was linked to the first: it was the continuing issue of Swedish foreign policy, particularly Sweden's obligations as one of the co-guarantors of Westphalia. The faction associated with the Chancellor, Magnus De la Gardie (1622–1686), sought to maintain an alliance with France, while the opposition party favored an alliance of Sweden with the Maritime Powers of the Dutch and the English. The French alliance was sweetened by the hope of French subsidies, but entailed a much higher risk of war. The chief architect of the alliance, Magnus De la Gardie, may have been a paid agent of the French (Roberts 1973, 215). Shifts in European allegiances such as England's alignment with France and Brandenburg's reaching out to Holland, as well as the successful recruitment of members of the opposition by De la Gardie, ultimately led to the conclusion of an agreement with France. Almost immediately war broke out. Sweden's attempt to mediate was unsuccessful and soon Sweden was ineluctably drawn into the war. France would not pay (subsidize) the Swedish army unless she attacked Brandenburg, now a part of the anti-French coalition. As Michael Roberts writes:

... at the end of 1674: the Swedish commander in Germany found himself forced to invade Brandenburg territory because he could no longer support his troops in Swedish Pomerania. It was an act which marked the bankruptcy of Swedish policy. When in the autumn of 1675 the *riksdag* met for Karl XI's coronation, the country was at war, not only with Brandenburg, but also with Austria, Holland and Denmark (Roberts 1973, 215).

Karl XI—the man and the policies

Karl XI was a youth of only twenty years when he was crowned in 1675. The only child of the widowed queen mother, he was a lonely, shy, and intensely private individual. Mother and son had a close relationship throughout their lives. Somewhat sickly as a child, his mother discouraged his tutors from putting too much pressure on him. He apparently had learning difficulties, was a slow reader, and did not like speaking in public. Perhaps, because his mother understood his shortcomings, she

was more than happy to encourage his genuine love of a vigorous, physical outdoor life. He was a superb horseman, and according to an Italian observer, he was a changed man when mounted on a horse. Indoors he averted eye contact, and had an air of uncertainty about him. However, according to L. Magalotti: “When he sits on a horse, he seems an entirely different person, and then he really looks like a king . . . is lively in expression and freed from all the oppression that sometimes hangs over him indoors” (Upton 1998, 20). In fact, it was noted by the Royal Chaplain, Haqvin Spengel, that during a particularly difficult week in 1676, when the war was not going well, “the king took the day off with his horses,” in order to restore his spirits (Upton 1998, 20).

He was proud of the martial heritage of his family, and throughout his life, when not actually at war, he engaged in hunting, field exercises, and war games. These games often had serious and fatal consequences. The king was injured on more than one occasion, had his horse shot from under him, and some participants died as a result of the real live action, as bridges collapsed or a powder boat exploded.

In most respects he was a typical young Swedish noble, and he surrounded himself with young men with similar interests. The regents and royal council, made up mostly of older men, and even his mother, were alarmed at these activities. She attempted to interest him in the pleasures and entertainments of court life, but to no avail.

In addition to, or perhaps a complement of his passion for the marital life, was his devotion to Lutheran piety. This animated his worldview and his action. He deeply believed in the transitory nature of this world; he saw it as a proving ground for the faithful. He was sincere in his belief that it was the duty of kings not only to set an example of righteous behavior, but to enforce it also. In his *Almanack*, he attributed the victory at the battle of Lund to “God’s assistance,” and He should be “eternally honored and thanked for it” (Upton 1998, 21). Chastity in youth and faithfulness in marriage were integral to his vision of the true servant of God. This confounded his contemporaries; and thus, despite the fact that after his marriage in 1680, the Queen, Ulrika Eleonora, was almost continually pregnant, he was thought to be disinterested in sex. It was assumed that he believed that sex apart from procreation was a sin, because he confined his sexual activity within his marriage (Upton 1998, 22).

Karl XI's deep faith shaped not only his attitudes on the battlefield and the details of his intimate personal life, but it also "constructed his conception of his kingly function" (Upton 1998, 22).

In 1680 Karl XI seized the power of the state for the crown not so much because absolutism was in the air, but because it was necessary: "his kingship was a trust from God. His personal salvation lay in the conscientious fulfillment of that trust and it was eternal" (Upton 1998, 22). In a letter he penned himself, he wrote in 1687:

I desire nothing more here in the world than to get a blessed relief from this wearisome world, since after all everything done here is vain, for which I pray daily to God; at the same time to set the kingdom entrusted to me from God in the condition, that my successors and loyal subjects may have from it enjoyment and security.⁷

Karl XI, who had come of age in 1672, and who had led the army to victory at Lund (1676), seized the power of the state in 1680 for the crown in order to restore Sweden's ability to provide for and protect herself. A generous series of peace treaties negotiated in 1679 by the agents of Louis XIV restored almost all of Sweden's German territories to her except for a small part of Pomerania; and the Danes for all their loss and pains got nothing. A successful but shaken Sweden was confronted with the necessity of change. The policies of the past, as Roberts so clearly stated, were bankrupt. In an age of absolutism, it is not surprising that Karl XI would choose this path, but the way had been laid down by the irresponsible policies of the regents supported by the *riksdag*. While in the past provisioning and protection has been accomplished through a policy of military expansion, Karl XI attempted to achieve the same ends in a state of peace. By 1688 in his attempt to strengthen the empire, as the absolute Monarch he had instituted reforms in almost every area of Sweden's life: political, economic, and religious.

⁷ As quoted from a letter to Nils Bielke in Andrew F. Upton, *Charles XI and Swedish Absolutism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, 23.

Political

From the time of its independence from the Kalmar Union (1523) with Denmark and Norway, Sweden's history had its share of strong monarchs, but none were absolutists—they ruled with the consent of the council. The council in Sweden was a longstanding traditional institution that served to limit the power of the king. It was discussed in the 1350 *landslag* codified by Magus Eriksson, and over the years it had different names: it was sometimes called the “king's council,” sometimes the “nation's council,” and once it was even called the “government's council.” Generally drawn from the higher aristocracy and clergy, the number and composition of the members varied, but it always served as a check on royal power (Scott 1988, 93).

Not only did Sweden have an ancient tradition of council, but it also had a heritage of a free peasantry thanks to the adoption of Christianity and the building of towns; and it had a tradition of a national assembly of representatives from the four estates, known as the *riksdag*. The *riksdag* was not a forum independent of the king. It was up to him to call the estates to assemble and he then presented it with an agenda for which he desired advice. Each estate discussed the agenda items on its own, and then the views of the different estates would be brought together and a consensus was reached. When the *riksdag's* advice was confirmed by the king, it became an official Resolution of the *riksdag* (Upton 1998, 31).

Thus, Karl XI used the royal prerogative to call the *riksdag* in the autumn of 1680. Even the council was aware of the dire straits of Sweden's financial crisis, and made no attempt to have the Diet postponed. One of the king's harshest critics stated: “no one can know better than the king himself if the business can bear any delay” (Upton, 1998, 31). The *riksdag* was called for on October 1 and the Propositions from the king were read on October 5. There were four of them: national security, strengthening the navy and the army, the problem of the resources necessary to do this, and the standardization of administration. The Marshal declared: “We must be thinking of such resources as can put the kingdom in the position that it can subsist of itself, and rather finds its security within itself than with others” (Upton 1998, 33).

No one could argue with the aim of independence—rebuilding the navy and reorganizing the army. The question was: how to achieve it? And clearly the most immediate concern was the sorry state of the national finances. That, too, had been discussed for many years: first, there was the need for a Tribunal of the Regents who had governed the kingdom during the king's minority; this had been discussed by the *riksdag* since 1675 and the Commission charged with investigating the matter was ready to report; second, there was the question of the *Reduktion*. This policy was begun by Karl X in 1655, but it was neglected after his death.

In simple terms, *reduktion* was a policy through which the state could reclaim crown property it had awarded to members of the nobility and other individuals who had given loyal service to the state, particularly in times of war. Awarding these properties was a policy that suited a nation that was land rich but cash poor. Often these awards were the only form of payment men received for their service. Once they were awarded, many of these properties became "tax free" and no longer were a source of revenue for the crown.

It is estimated that over the course of the seventeenth century from 1600 to 1680, two thirds of the crown lands had been alienated. In 1600, two thirds of the peasant farms were on crown lands, with the remaining one third in the hands of the nobles. Eighty years later, those figures were reversed; the crown owned one third of the land and the nobility controlled the rest (Upton 1998, 66–67). While the peasant farmers on crown lands were required to pay taxes, most often the nobles were exempt. Thus, the more land that belonged to the nobility, the lower the revenue to the state. There was some attempt to pursue a *reduktion* in 1655 but, for far too long, those who benefited most from not rigorously continuing this policy, were in control of the state.

Those called to the *riksdag* in 1680 knew that the situation could not go on like this. The Clergy and the Burghers had little to fear from *reduktion*, and the peasants preferred it to increased taxation. Those in the House of Nobles knew that somehow they were going to have to pay, but who would pay, how much, and in what form? Recent historical research suggests that they, too, had to choose between *reduktion* and taxation. Should they choose taxation, however, they would, of course, lose their

exemption from it affirmed in the Privileges of 1611, and the very thing that made them socially distinct.

It should be pointed out that during the seventeenth century, the role of the nobility in Swedish society had begun to shift. They were less and less a group independent from the crown, and more and more they assumed the role of state employees. As Upton observes: “In 1600 the Swedish nobility had been a small, exclusive elite of hereditary landowners, some of whom pursued careers in the public service. By 1700 it was a much larger, professionalized service nobility . . . ” (Upton 1998, 69). Reward under these changed conditions was in the form of a stable salary rather than land, securing loyalty quite clearly to the crown.

In the end, after much wrangling and discussion, the king’s programs were confirmed: The Great Commission to investigate the regency was launched, drawing its members from all four estates. The Tribunal would begin to hand down indictments the following year, and the process of *reduktion* was confirmed. According to Lockhart:

It is important to note that the 1680 *reduktion* was not in reality a full *reduktion*. Lands given to the titled nobility would be given back to the crown, as would all other donations of land made after 1632, with the exception of lands valued at less than 600 *riksdalers* in annual income. The nobility also stipulated that this reduction was permanent and final; it could not be amended or extended, and was not open to further discussion (Lockhart 2004, 128).

Before concluding in December of 1680, the *riksdag* affirmed the authority of the king. In its Declaration, it stated that “the king was wholly sovereign, answerable only to God; the Council was not a separate estate, and not a mediator between king and subjects, for a sovereign king had no need of such mediation” (Lockhart 2004, 128).

One might have expected some public outcry or protest about the transformation of the Swedish state, particularly from the members of the Council and the members of the House of Nobles. While there was some protest by a few disgruntled individuals, and evidence in diaries and letters of some private grumbling, there was no revolution, and nothing resembling even a moderate demonstration. What accounts for the fact

that, as Upton states, “a well established nobility submitted peacefully to a massive attack on its income and property rights” (Upton 1998, 68)? His answer suggests that they did so, because the king commanded it and it was legal. Although the *landslag* was not without ambiguities, the general interpretation of it supported the basic principle that public land legally belonged to the crown. Thus, it was widely believed that the king’s programs were fully within his rights.

According to Lockhart’s summary of royal supremacy in Sweden:

The 1634 Form of Government stood largely unchanged; the basic institutions of governance—the Council and the *Riksdag*—remained; and Karl XI and his protagonists did not feel compelled to compose an absolutist *credo*. The Swedish aristocracy was, in self-perception as well as in fact, a service class without the same kind of pretensions to constitutional supremacy that characterized their Danish cousins. The shift in power within the Swedish polity required no formal justification or written constitution, for it was not a violation of Swedish constitutions, . . . which assigned primacy in policy making to the king. In 1680 Karl XI was simply asserting that present conditions required that he exercise his traditional prerogatives to its fullest. (Lockhart 2004, 125)

Before discussing the impact of the *reduktion* on Sweden, it should be reemphasized that *reduktion* was only one of the financial mechanisms to fund the reorganization of the state and the naval and armed forces. The crown also secured revenue by the Tribunal that levied reparations from the guilty members of the Regency; and there were new tax assessments on both commoners and the nobility. In fact, these new taxes marked the end of the tax exemption for the nobility.

In 1682 Karl XI again called the *riksdag* and an additional plan of reduction was put before the estates, despite the fact that the last Resolution regarding *reduktion* was not to be amended. The new program was to include properties granted before 1632, and the lower limit of the donation was to be eliminated. The debate was heated, but in the end, the program was supported. The effect on the nobility was far reaching: by the end of the century they had returned half of their land holdings to the crown. In the Baltic provinces the proportion returned to the crown was much

higher, perhaps as much as 100% in Estonia by 1700, and 72% in Livonia. During the period of *reduktion* there were stories of terrible hardship endured by now impoverished noble families. For example, Jesper Swedberg, Swedenborg's father, reported that at a dinner with a wealthy family, he heard bitter words spoken by guests when they "began during the meal to talk about the *reduktion* and the liquidation proceedings and such like which gave the children no positive ideas about the king" (Upton 1998, 69). Pamphlets were also written based on rumors, such as a weeping Swedish noble's family following five carts of their last worldly possession to auction. Upton makes the case that although individual families might have severely suffered, "most managed to adapt and survive, retaining a tolerable style of life" (Upton 1998, 223). In addition, a study of the *reduktion* in Uppland suggests that the average noble family in that region was only moderately impacted by the loss of land to the crown. The average family lost only nine farms, while three magnate families lost almost 600 between them (Upton 1998, 67). Since most nobles retained at least some of their land, what was perhaps more problematic for them was the increasing sense of insecurity surrounding ownership of property. Such insecurity can be a volatile political force under certain circumstances. For many Swedish nobles, however, this insecurity was at least partially mitigated by the regular payment of salaries earned in service to the state. Karl XI had orchestrated these enormous changes for the survival and well-being of Sweden; to a large extent those who bore the brunt of the changes adapted with loyalty and grace.

Precisely how much this process benefited the state is not completely clear. It can be said, however, that the budget was balanced for the first time in 1686, and that by 1693, there were significant budget surpluses (Upton, 1998, 158). This is a remarkable achievement, because there were heavy investments in the defensive capabilities of Sweden during this same timeframe. For example, at the level of personnel, the salaries of bureaucrats and members of the military were being paid in full for the first time in years. In addition, from 1681 to 1697 there was an eighty percent reduction of the national debt (Lockhart 2004, 133).

The financial reorganization of Sweden was not an end in itself, but was the underpinning of major administrative changes, such as the *Indelningsverk*, and the rebuilding of the navy. The administrative changes

kept the Forms of Government developed by Axel Oxenstierna in 1634, and the administrative Colleges established at that time, including the College of Mines where Emanuel Swedenborg, later in his life, was an assessor for over twenty years. These governmental innovations were quite remarkable and gave Sweden a professional and stable governing structure that was superior to those in continental Europe. In fact, the collegial system was adopted by Peter the Great when he reformed Russian administrative structure in the eighteenth century. The 1634 Forms of Government initiated four major administrative improvements: 1. It marked the beginning of the professionalization of administration. 2. It permanently located the administration in Stockholm, and required officials in the colleges to seek permission to be absent. 3. The colleges were organized around specific competencies, i.e. war, commerce, mining. 4. The Forms assigned authority to the "office," not the person (Lockhart 2004, 59-60). Karl XI kept and expanded these characteristics of rational administration, particularly in providing regularly paid salaries to the office holders, increasing the professionalism of the bureaucracy as well as the convergence of interests of the nobles and the state. At the same time, he took greater control over the machinery of government—he was very much a hands-on administrator.

Indelningsverk

Karl XI's passion to provide for the security of Sweden was realized in the carefully thought-out meticulous details of the *Indelningsverk*. It identified the means through which public expenses were linked to permanent sources of revenue. While such systems were used in other European nations, what made the *indelningsverk* unique was the scope of the projects to be supported and the rationality and consistency of the support.

Karl XI's reform of the military was his legacy to Sweden. The system he put in place lasted essentially unchanged for two hundred years. Karl XI wanted a strong well-trained native army with regiments that could be rapidly mobilized if necessary and transported anywhere in the empire by a large effective navy. The strategy was deterrent in nature with fortifications manned by mercenaries as the first line of defense protecting the outer limits of Swedish territory. When mustered, mobilized, and trans-

ported the native units were trained to deliver a quick offensive blow to the aggressor. Karl XI devised tactics based on the principle that the best defense is a good offense, because he knew that Sweden could not endure a long drawn out war. By 1697 the field army was fully prepared but the costly fortifications were not all in place.

The *Indelningsverk*, the *rusthåll*, and the *Knektehåll* resolved two fundamental problems: how to sustain a standing army in a poor nation; and how to do so within the framework of a non-cash economy. The *indelningsverk* used the land and farms recovered by the crown to provide support for the officers and non-commissioned officers for each territorially-organized regiment. Suitable farms were identified for every member of the officer corps in accord with their rank and status. The farms became their permanent residence and were the source of their income as long as they served. Service gave them landlord status, and they were required to live there in order to train and exercise the men under their command, who also lived in the area.

Under the old system cavalry troops were conscripted, but under the new plan they were supported by wealthy crown tenants. These tenants were tax-paying freehold peasants who agreed to permanently supply a trooper with his horse and equipment in exchange for a tax exemption. These *rusthåll* tenants supplied accommodations and wages for their trooper and could employ him when he was off duty. In time these *rusthåll* peasant farmers became a recognized elite in the countryside. Throughout the country, a royal commission was used to determine which farms were eligible to take on the support of the cavalry. Choosing them was a long and lengthy process that was only completed in 1687. Frequently the king himself was involved in these determinations, and on one occasion he gave a hunting lodge to the *indelningsverk* with the comment that a “well-endowed cavalry farm” was of more use to the kingdom “than a hunting lodge for vain appetites and pleasures” (Upton 1998, 72).

The infantrymen previously had also been conscripted, and the nobility would have preferred to keep it that way, because they felt it gave them control over the peasants. The *knektehåll* system had been developed in the sparsely populated northern provinces at the beginning of the century where it was possible to contract the recruitment of soldiers. In this system, several local farmers would agree to jointly provide for a soldier at

their own expense. The Peasant Estate very much favored this system, as did the king. Using this system, noble peasants would now be considered equal participants. In every area where it was tried, it was so much preferred by the peasants to conscription that the nobility in those regions agreed to allow their peasants to join. Conscription was detested because it created an additional insecurity in lives that were already burdened by uncertainty and lack of control. *Knektehåll* did not eliminate responsibility, but it did provide more control. One "file" called a *rota* contracted to provide for one infantry soldier in perpetuity. A *rota* was usually composed of two "full-value" farms. It paid the soldier's enlistment money, and wages. The wealthier of the two farms also provided a dwelling, ordinary clothing, and economic support for him and his family. The crown supplied his uniform, military equipment, and wages while he was serving. When off-duty the soldier was required to work on the farm where he lived. If he died or deserted, the *rota* assumed the cost to replace him. Those who financially supported either cavalry or infantry soldiers were not liable to serve and were exempt from taxes.

While there is no doubt that this system was an additional burden to the peasants, it freed them all from the lottery involved in conscription, and in the process, it created an army of men who consciously chose to serve. In this way the king could count on having a standing army at minimal cost to the nation (Upton, 1998, 74). Negotiating the contracts in the various provinces took several years, and while the overall structure of the system was universal, allowances for local situations were permitted. In each parish the contracts were recorded in a "*militiebok*" listing the assigned properties, the assignment, and precise obligations involved. Copies were held in a centralized location.

The army regiments were territorially organized because the king wanted the officers, non-commissioned officers, the cavalry, and the infantry to live together to ensure that the officers would know their men and that they would receive proper training by engaging in exercises together on a regular basis (Upton 1998, 71). Training took place monthly, and the whole regiment did exercises and maneuvers during the summer, and every third year they were inspected by the king. The king took the oversight of the army very seriously, and devoted both time and energy in

order to ensure its preparedness. He was meticulous in his inspections, and even the smallest detail did not escape his attention.

While he could become angry over negligence and sloppiness, he also gave prizes for the demonstration of superior skill. In addition he wanted to maintain a high morale among his troops and at the end of maneuvers he would gather the soldiers and listen to their complaints. If the complaint was verified, the king would take action necessary to right the injustice. For example, if an officer took advantage of his men and used them as unpaid labor, the offending officer would immediately be dismissed.

The reforms of Karl XI worked because they were rational. They resulted in an army that was a superior fighting force. It was financially supported, it was well organized, and constantly trained and tested in exercises that were real simulations in which the king often participated, sometimes leading to injury to himself and others. It was a native volunteer army under native officers that were not only instructed in the art of arms, but in the way of faith. Karl XI expected his army to be godly and God-fearing. They received religious instruction in their parishes, where they were tested on their religious knowledge. They were required to be religiously certified or face punishment. The king demanded a lot of these men, but he also tried to protect them from injustice from their social superiors.

The king took the same care and attention to details regarding the equipment that the men used. Uniforms were made in Sweden, and they were to be properly cared for by the soldiers. When not in use they were to be stored in a chest of specified dimensions, placed out of reach of vermin. All equipment was stored locally and kept under lock and key. Karl XI encouraged the development of an armaments industry in Sweden and the development of quality weapons of war.

Rapid mobilization was an essential element of Karl XI's defensive posture. This would necessitate moving the twenty-three infantry regiments of 1,200 men each and eleven cavalry units moving toward a single point of embarkation in both Sweden and Finland. To facilitate this eventuality, in 1689 Karl XI ordered a cash levy of all the kingdom's property in order to create a fund to immediately pay in cash those who support the marching troops. He also designated travel routes, and placed stores along

those routes to facilitate the ease of their movement through the kingdom. According to Upton, “Karl XI’s mobilization plan was a model of meticulous bureaucratic planning, based on a clear public service ethos” (Upton 1998, 82–83). When employed by Karl XII in 1700, the plan functioned just as it was intended. In Sweden the point of embarkation was in the south at the newly-created naval facility in Karlskrona. The fleet waiting there was created, in part, specifically for the task of transporting the assembled army to whatever destination was needed by the king.

Navy

The defense of the Swedish Empire required more than a strong, well-trained standing army; the geography of the region called for an equally large and effective navy. Unfortunately, during the Scanian war (1674–1679) the poorly equipped and undermanned Swedish navy had been outgunned by the Danes aided by the Dutch and had been destroyed. Rebuilding and expanding the navy was vital to Sweden’s security. Karl XI gave that task to Hans Wachtmeister who was in charge of the navy from 1678 to 1713. To achieve that end, it was deemed necessary to relocate naval headquarters to southern Sweden. The move was imperative and controversial: imperative because it would position the fleet in warmer waters, giving it great mobility year round, and it was closer to the most obvious source of threat—Denmark; controversial because it took the navy beyond the easy control of Stockholm and placed it in, what at the time, was an insecure part of the kingdom—Blekinge, territory only recently conquered from Denmark, and still pro-Danish. The decision turned out to be a wise one, however, because with the development of Trossön into the naval base, Karlskrona, many Swedish sailors and craftsmen were recruited to the area, hastening the region’s assimilation into Sweden.

Wachtmeister was an old friend and companion of the king, and he was a very successful floor manager for the king during the 1680 and 1682 *Riksdagar*. This positioned him well to be an outspoken head of the navy. He did his job well, and to the ire of the king, spared no expense. Nonetheless the *reduktion* had been so successful that despite consistently overspending on the fleet, the financial stability of the nation was not threatened.

In the past, the Burgher estate had paid for a certain quota of seamen in exchange for exemption from conscription. During war this quota was doubled. This quota was supplemented by recruiting sailors from the maritime regions. The move to Karlskrona in Blekinge created recruitment problems: first, the local population was considered a security risk; and second, transporting sailors from the recruitment strongholds of the past was too expensive. Thus, it was decided to ask those living in the remote areas of Sweden and Finland to pay cash rather than supply sailors. This was agreeable, and over fifty different contracts were written. As well, one sum was expected in peacetime that was to be doubled during war. This exempted those regions from conscription and gave the navy funds to freely recruit seamen. The manpower requirements for a peacetime navy were much less than for a nation engaged in war. By 1685, over 2,300 sailors were housed in Blekinge and in the neighboring areas. As the town of Karlskrona developed, eventually sailors could also be billeted there. When mobilization occurred as it did in 1689, an additional 6,200 sailors were supplied by the *rota* system (Upton 1998, 86).

While this system was adequate for recruiting ordinary seaman, for officers and petty officers it was necessary to recruit from the merchant marines and mercenaries. In 1692 a school for midshipmen and navigators was established in Karlskrona, which eased the problem of relying too heavily on men with previous foreign training.

Creating a navy requires ships as well as sailors, and resettlement bonuses were used to draw the necessary craftsmen to Blekinge, particularly from Österbotten. Their arrival in the province was an additional boost to the integration issue. By 1697 the size of the fleet had almost doubled, from twenty-seven to fifty-two ships, with only nine ships built earlier than 1680. Wachtmeister and the Admiralty could be justifiable proud. They had met their goals in such a way that strained neither the manpower nor the financial resources of the state (Upton 1998, 86).

The Lutheran Church

While Karl XI was focused on the external security of Sweden, he was also concerned about the spiritual welfare of his kingdom. In 1686 he presented the *Riksdag* with his own version of Church Law for them to

approve. His aim was to establish a common liturgy and uniform practices throughout the kingdom. To this end, a new catechism was put in use in 1689, written by Bishop Olof Svebilus (1681–1700), who also wrote a new manual for the church ready in 1693. Also, a new school law was also issued in 1693; a new hymnal was available in 1695; and six years after Karl XI's death, a new translation of the Bible was published in 1703 (Roberts 1973, 168). In making these and other changes, Karl XI established the framework for the relationship between church and state for the next three hundred years as well as for the functions of the church itself.

Perhaps the need to fully integrate the former Danish provinces was the unspoken stimulus for Karl XI's actions. A maxim of the seventeenth century was that religious unity was the key to a well-ordered society. While this contemporary belief may have been a goal of many European Christian kingdoms, it was a taken-for-granted reality in Sweden. According to Michael Roberts, the regency of Karl XI sent out a proclamation in 1663 attesting to the fact that Sweden had long been "free from the infection of all false and heretical dogmas and hurtful novelties, and thereby attained to a unity and harmony in doctrine and practice such as no Christian congregation . . . and no Christian government . . . can boast of" (Roberts 1973, 132).

In examining Karl XI's relationship to the question of the locus of ultimate authority in the Lutheran Church of the mid 1680s, it is important to recall that Sweden's allegiance to Lutheranism in the first place was a political decision made by Gustav Vasa (1496–1560) in his fight to free Sweden from Danish domination. The fact that Gustav Eriksson Trolle (1488–1535), Bishop of the Catholic Church and accomplice of the Danish King Kristian II (1481–1559), instigated the Stockholm "blood bath" in which eighty-two Swedish patriots were beheaded in 1520, enabled Gustav Vasa, not long after he was crowned king in 1523, to disband the Catholic Church in Sweden.

A dispute emerged between Gustav Vasa and the Pope about who would be Archbishop of Sweden—Gustav Trolle or a priest of Vasa's own choosing, Johannes Magnus. The Pope demanded that Trolle to be reinstated. In response, Gustav Vasa proposed additional names, but the Pope would have no one except Trolle. Bishop Trolle, however, was completely unacceptable to the national interests of Vasa and Sweden; and his infa-

mous actions related to the “blood bath” in Stockholm caste him as an ally of the enemy, Denmark, making him totally offensive to all Swedes. At an impasse, Gustav Vasa named his own Bishops with Lutheran leanings, and confiscated the property of the Catholic church for the purposes of the State. The emergence of Martin Luther (1483–1546) and his fight against the Catholic church in 1517, only six years before Gustav Vasa was elected King in beleaguered Sweden, gave Vasa the perfect opportunity to keep Sweden Christian but not Catholic. Gustav Vasa was not only head of State, but in naming the Bishops, and seizing church property for the crown, he was the *de facto* head of the church as well.

Seventy years later in 1593, faced with the prospect of a Catholic king, Sigismund of Poland (1566–1632), Duke Karl, an heir to the Swedish throne, called a meeting of the Swedish church to permanently establish Lutheranism as the faith of Sweden. During this council, held in Uppsala between March 1 to 20 and attended by four bishops and 306 priests, the Augsburg Confession was made binding on all Swedes, and it was decided that Swedish monarchs from henceforth must be Lutheran. Duke Karl was the first signatory of this agreement, leaving no doubt that the state authorized the church.

It was clear that Gustav II Adolph like his father believed that “God’s church dwells” within “our sovereign fatherland” (Roberts 1973, 156). Churchmen, on the other hand, believed that the state was no more than an external defense of society; and that even without kings, it “can have its complete form or *esse*” (Roberts 1973, 156). Thus, throughout the seventeenth century, the clergy struggled with the crown to determine which institution bore the ultimate source of authority, whether church or state. Throughout the century the church grew in stature and authority, perhaps because the king was often away waging war or the crown was in the hands of regents, some of which were, in fact, clergy.

During the seventeenth century, the bishops, as servants of the state, participated as “judges, lawgivers, businessmen, and educators” (Roberts 1973, 160). The bishops were extremely influential in their cathedral towns, preaching zealously, catechizing their parishioners, and encouraging education and learning. As Roberts writes, they were “real outposts of civilization in a backward country” (Roberts 1973, 160). Apart from the few nobles that might be resident at their country estates, bishops were the

wealthiest individuals in their districts and although they were revered, they were also resented. Resentment was not just the attitude of the laity, but of the country parson as well. The seventeenth-century saw the gulf widen between those in the episcopacy and the average parish priest.

By seventeen hundred there were fifteen dioceses in Sweden proper and one in Finland. Each diocese was run by a bishop and the dean of the cathedral. Directly under them in the university towns of Uppsala, Lund, and Åbo, were the theological faculty, and in the other diocesan towns the teachers in the cathedral schools or gymnasium. Additionally, the diocese was divided into a number of contracts administered by the "*kontraktprostar*" or rural deans. In the Diocese of Uppsala, for example, there were twenty-seven rural deans that supervised clergy in actual church parishes. One region that fell within the purview of the Diocese of Uppsala, *Oland-Frösåker*, contained fifteen parishes that made up nine pastorates (there were thirteen churches in this region). Some pastorates were located in only one place, others served multiple parishes; some served two, and one served three. The first name of a double named pastorate was the mother society, and the other was the annex society. For example, with the *Ekeby-Bladåker* pastorate, *Ekeby* was the mother society, and *Bladåker* was the annex society. If the pastorate had more than one parish then there was a pastor and an assistant pastor. In addition there were divisions within a *Kontrakt* area depending of who selected the pastor—the king, the consistory, or a patron (Bergström 1991, 27). Each parish was supported by a certain number of mantal (assessed land units) that were not necessarily equal, either in number or value. Thus, some parishes were well off and others were not.

At the end of the seventeenth century, if the clergy was 1% of the Swedish population of 1.4–1.8 million there were somewhere between 14,000 and 18,000 priests in Sweden, and the ratio was one priest per every 100 individuals in the society. That ratio probably fell to one per every 120 individuals in the countryside because there were concentrations of clergy in Stockholm, in the university towns (since they essentially made up the professoriate), and in the cathedral towns that sponsored gymnasia.

In the small towns and hamlets of Sweden, every day life revolved around the changing seasons and the church calendar. The seasons shaped the profane life of the peasant, and the church the sacred. The church was

in the center of the village, the symbol of the parish and its geographical heart. Peasant life was hard. The home of the priest was the community center of the parish, and peasants could bring their complaints, their social injustices, and their needs to the priest; however, the pastor as the head of the church also legislated the sacred law, sometimes enforcing it with cold-hearted brutality.

While Jesper Swedberg's observations in England regarding keeping the sabbath holy all day long made him long for similar standards in Sweden, the Lutheran church in Sweden had vested interests in and control over the private lives of its parishioners. Pastors had the right to physically punish violators of church law, which no doubt led to "abuses and psychological cruelty" (Roberts 1973, 162). According to Roberts, penance could involve "standing naked at the church door, or sitting on the 'whore bench'" (Roberts 1973, 162). Supposedly these punishments were not unpopular and were even seen as necessary, due to the "low level of morality and the extreme violence of ordinary life" (Roberts, 1973, 162).

To fully appreciate the reality of the rural Swedish parish in the seventeenth century, it is necessary to realize that approximately 30% of the clergy were born into the peasantry, and an additional 40% were the sons of clergymen, no doubt many of them coming from these small rural parishes. Their backgrounds and their standard of living after inauguration into the priesthood in many ways mirrored the peasants that they served. They were, no doubt, a bit more educated than their parishioners, but they were also witness to the impoverishment of the parish as the result of the alienation of crown lands, and the drain of manpower from the parish as a result of Sweden's almost continual involvement in war.

In any case, each parish in every diocese in Sweden was a small world unto itself. Some of the older rural churches that were built during the Middle-Ages were the center of parishes that could seat perhaps seventy-five to one hundred people. These people made up the community of the parish, and each one had its own customs, and forms of dress distinct from those in the parishes nearby. These communities were the essential ingredient of parochial democratic self government. According to Michael Roberts, "vigorous lay participation made the parish a vital force in the life of the church, made church membership a real concern to the individual,

and probably helped to lay the foundations for the political education of the nation" (Roberts 1973, 163).

In the early part of the century most prospective priests had attended grammar schools or cathedral schools, but by the end of the century the majority of them had also attended university for a few years before assuming a pastorate. They were schooled in the orthodox theology of the era with little or no emphasis on critical thinking. The amount of actual theological training was minimal, in part, precisely so questions could not be raised, and according to Sten Lindroth, "prospective clergymen often displayed a shocking ignorance of theology" (Lindroth, 1976, 90). It could also be noted that while Sweden was overwhelmingly Lutheran, Swedish priests made no contribution to the intellectual development of European Lutheran theology. Orthodoxy kept discipline in the church, but stifled deep intellectual engagement with the faith.

Marriage, as well as education, could play a role in advancing the status of the clergy. As a rule, clergy tended to marry the daughters of clergymen; and as was often the custom in Sweden, a new clergyman was frequently called upon to marry the widow of the pastor he was replacing. In this way he relieved the parish from the burden of supporting the widow along with supporting him as the new pastor, and in the process it was likely that he could raise his status. In any event, in Sweden it was possible over the course of three or four generations to rise from the peasantry through the clergy, into the bureaucracy and eventually to have the family ennobled. This pattern increased in the later half of the seventeenth century with the expansion of the "collegium" or the administrative colleges and the rationalization of bureaucratic structures in service to the state.

At the height of the regency in the year 1668 and continuing for eight years until 1676, Sweden was in the grip of a witch hysteria. During this time period at least three hundred people, almost all women, were beheaded and burned as witches. The panic originated in Älvdalen in the Dalarna region of Sweden, and broke out the next year in Böhuslän where it festered for several years, and then died out. However, from Dalarna it spread north to Härjedalen, Hälsingland, and Ångermanland, finally moving to Stockholm in 1676.

After the trial of Märet Jonsdötter in Dalarna, a concerned priesthood was asked to alert their congregations through their sermons about the crimes of witches. Pastors were asked to ferret out witches in their parishes. Young (often homeless) boys were paid to stand at the church door in order to “see” the invisible mark of the devil that witches bore on their foreheads. It is not surprising that they discovered more than a few. In Lillhärdal in Härjedalen thirty people were identified as witches. Once seized, it was necessary to bring them to trial. It soon became clear that the local institutions, whether church or state, were not adequately prepared to handle these cases, so a Witchcraft Commission was appointed, consisting of jurists, priests, and laymen. This group traveled around the countryside investigating witchcraft and sentencing those found guilty to burn at the stake (Lindroth 1978, 158–159; www.algonet.se).

In Sweden, children were the most frequently used witnesses against witches, a practice that was, in fact, contrary to Swedish law. The stories they told repeated the same theme over and over. The witches would steal the children out of their beds during the night, and transport them through the air to Blåkulla (the old Norse mountain stronghold) for the sabbath of the devil. There the children were forced to participate in wild unnatural feasts. It was not unusual for zealous investigators to torture the young witnesses, who often were the children of the accused. They were beaten, thrown into openings in ice-covered lakes in the winter, or placed in ovens with the threat that they would be lit. The children attempted to outdo the rich details of each others’ stories. The accused were also tortured, encouraging them to confess, in order to be spared eternal damnation (Lindroth 1978, 159–160; www.algonet.se).

Torsåker parish in the Diocese of Härnösand, Ångermanland, was the site of the most zealous denunciation of witches and witchcraft. The assistant pastor, Laurentius Hornaeus (1645–1719), took to heart his assignment to root out all the witches in the region. In the fall of 1674, over one hundred people had been arrested as witches. The accused were primarily older women who lived alone, although some were young and even pregnant, and a few were men. They were held in the village over the winter. In the June of 1675, without proper notification given to the Witchcraft Commission, seventy-one people were permitted to hear one last sermon, and then were led to a nearby mountain to be executed. They

were beheaded and burned at the stake. In all sixty-five women and six men were executed in a single day (Hogman, "The Torsåker Witch Trial of 1675 and the Clergyman Hornaues," <http://algonet.se>). These sixty-five women were one fifth of the female population of the region which was approximately 340.

This event marked both the height of the hysteria and signaled its end. Later in 1675, Karl XI, recently crowned king, terminated the trials when he disbanded the Witchcraft Commission (Ankarloo et. al., 2000, 90). One additional trial took place in Stockholm in 1676 in which one of the two female victims was actually burned alive. However, it should be noted that the king was not in Stockholm at the time—he was in the south engaged in war. He was preparing for and fighting the battle of Lund which took place on December 1, 1676, in which Sweden was victorious.

Only ten years, later Karl XI presented the *Riksdag* with his reforms for the church. While we have discussed some of these changes, it is useful to note that among other things, this law reduced the power of the clergy throughout Sweden, while simultaneously demanding that the church become an agent for increasing the literacy of the people. Over time, these efforts were effective. As Roberts writes: "And by its laborious hours of catechizing, by its patient battle with illiteracy, by its civilizing influence upon a rude and violent people—in short, by its unique contribution to education at all levels—it laid the foundations of the modern Swedish state" (Roberts 1973, 172–173).

Education

Gustav II Adolf was a strong advocate of education. In his support of education he strongly supported schools: "without them," he said, "barbarism itself arises in a country" (Lindroth 1976, 38). Until the seventeenth century, education in Sweden was emphasized because of its important role in the development of the Lutheran faith. This can be seen by the fact that the very first textbook was the catechism. It was set in a question-and-answer format around the five essential elements of Lutheranism: the Ten Commandments, the creed, the Lord's Prayer, and teachings about baptism and communion (Andrén 1978, 162). While the support for religion through education did not diminish during the "Great Power Era," the

scope of education was broadened to include the inculcation of knowledge of a more secular nature, such as writing and counting for those involved in business and trade, and philosophy and natural science for university students.

During the reign of Gustav II Adolf a three-tiered school system was developed in Sweden: on the lowest were the primary schools found in the parishes and towns; on the second were the old “trivialsolor” or commonplace schools that during the Middle Ages focused on giving young men the necessary tools to become priests. They were run by the cathedral personnel and they taught Latin, argumentation, rhetoric, and public speaking (Andrén 1978, 162–163); and finally on the third were the newly created gymnasia. The first gymnasium was established in Västerås by Bishop Johannes Rudbeckius (1581–1646) in 1723, and not long after that gymnasia were founded in Strängäs, Linköping, Åbo in Finland, and Reval in Estonia. In the 1640s during Queen Kirstina’s era, an additional six gymnasia were founded, including one in Skara in 1641. Sixty-one years later in 1702, Jesper Svedberg was named Bishop of Skara and, among other things, took charge of the Gymnasium there. Karl XI created two additional gymnasia during his reign, one in Karlstad situated on lake Vänern and the other in Kalmar, a fortress town on the Baltic.

Before the end of the century, the gymnasium founded in Stockholm moved to Gävle, and was not replaced until 1821. The reason for this may have been that the nobles and very well-to-do in Stockholm may have engaged private tutors for the sons, and the sons of the burghers attended the more practically oriented “skrivskolor” which emphasized writing and counting, leaving very few candidates to attend the gymnasium. A more pressing matter may have been the educational needs of the children of day laborers and soldiers, many of whom had only one parent at home (Sandin, 1986).

Prior to the seventeenth century, the training of priests was the responsibility of the diocese. This changed, however, when the *Riksdag* of 1604 determined that it would be better to have theology taught in a school setting. A theologian was to serve the school rather than the diocese and school was to be run by a headmaster and a co-headmaster. The initial impact of this change was probably not too great, but over time with the development of cathedral schools and gymnasia, the theological training

of priests achieved a measure of independence from the diocesan structure.

Not only were gymnasia developed during the seventeenth century with the assistance of Gustav II Adolf, but he took a great interest in the University of Uppsala and rescued it financially by giving it a substantial endowment in perpetuity. He presented the university with his own lands in Uppland and Västmanland that yielded 14,000 *riksdalars* annually (Lindroth 1976, 40).

The university was founded in 1477; however, not long afterward it fell on hard times and, in 1520 it closed its doors. It reemerged in 1593 as an academic institution of higher learning by a decree of the Privy Council and Duke Karl, regent of the government of Sweden. During the long hiatus, Swedish students studied on the continent, particularly at German institutions. An attempt was made, too, in the 1580s to develop a college in Stockholm, and for a few years it was successful. However, it was not a university, and it did not have a charter. It closed in 1592 and the professors were dismissed. The interest that reopened the University in Uppsala was clear, as Lindroth writes: "To Gustavus Adolphus and his assistants, usefulness to the State was the primary consideration" (Lindroth 1976, 36). The state needed well-trained officials to assist it, well-trained clergymen to guide their parishioners from "cradle to grave," and frankly, Sweden's honor was at stake. Sweden's recent victories in the Baltic had demonstrated Sweden's might, yet the king saw it as nothing less than scandalous that Sweden could not produce her own government officials, magistrates or law officers, and that Swedish culture was not on a par with the Christian nations on the continent (Lindroth 1976, 36).

Even before Gustav II Adolf committed funds to the university, he increased the size of the faculty from eight to thirteen in 1620, and the following year he increased it again to seventeen. He also made several changes: how the faculty was to be paid, shifting from tithes to fixed salaries; the number of student scholarships available, creating fifty in two years; and by naming Johan Skytte (1577–1645), his former tutor, and the distinguished President of the Exchequer, as Chancellor in 1622 (Lindroth 1976, 37).

The university could now boast of professors in theology, law, medicine, and arts and sciences. Additional scholarships were created and

provisions were made to accommodate one hundred students in the Uppsala University community, of which sixty were to be educated for the clergy and the rest were to fill positions in the government. A new charter was written and signed in 1625, the same year the new university building was completed. The “new academy” was eventually called the Gustavianum, and it housed nearly all the functions of the university, including rooms for students (Lindroth 1976, 40–42).

A new constitution was also written to govern the lives of all the members of the university community. The first draft was not considered satisfactory, so another was drafted but never signed by the king. Nonetheless, it governed the university for the next thirty years (Lindroth 1976, 40–41). The constitution not only spelled out the duties of the administrators, the faculty, and the students, but it also stipulated their rights, the most paramount being that it was the university that had sole jurisdiction over its own members. This set the faculty apart from other Uppsala residents and, the university had its own prison for students who violated university rules (Lindroth 1976, 41).

The university was very democratic, rotating the duties of Rector among the faculty every six months. The Chancellor was appointed by the king, and the Pro-Chancellor position was filled by the Archbishop of the Lutheran Church who resided in Uppsala. The day-to-day administration of the university, however, was in the hands of the university senate. There were four faculties that were allied with the competencies of the faculty: Theology, Law, Medicine, and Liberal Arts and Sciences. Deans, chosen every six months, supervised these faculties. The university also employed several assistants to the faculty, a bursar, and two beadles (Lindroth 1976, 41).

With the increase in faculty there was a broader range of courses offered: Old and New Testament, dogmatics and controversial theology; Swedish and Roman law, moral philosophy, politics; physics, botany, and anatomy; geometry, algebra, optics, mechanics, music theory, and astronomy; and not only Latin, but Hebrew and Greek; history, aesthetics, poetry, and logic (Lindroth 1976, 42–43). Initially it was not easy to find Swedes who could fill the positions and teach these courses. Thus, recruited to the faculty were foreigners who brought new ideas and new currents to Sweden, enriching her intellectual and cultural life. The influx

of foreign professors reached its zenith during the reign of Queen Kristina (1642–1654), who was known for her cultural and intellectual interests. Though she took a great interest in the university, many of her plans and projects were unrealistic and were left unfinished when she abdicated in 1654.

In fact, it was Karl X, in 1655, who signed the new constitution for the university that had for so long been in preparation. The impact was far reaching both over time and throughout the Empire. The constitution remained in force for over two centuries, and became the model for Sweden's other universities (Lindroth, 1975, 50).

During the century there was a steady increase of students attending the university: by mid-century approximately 180 students matriculated every year, and the total student body was somewhere between 1,300 and 1,500. While the number of professorships mid-century equaled those at top-rated continental institutions, their quality left something to be desired. At this point, the university needed more faculty of quality, a separate printing facility, an improved library, and more scholarships. The man to oversee these changes was Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie (1622–1686), the Chancellor of Sweden and the new Chancellor of the University of Uppsala. Sten Lindroth in his book, *A History of Uppsala University*, indicates that De la Gardie, was less than successful in his role as Chancellor, although he immersed himself in all the small administrative details of the university. During De la Gardie's tenure, Johannes Rudbeck was the Rektor. He became increasingly autocratic and was able to manipulate De la Gardie, as well as the Busar. Bad harvests, costly building projects and hiring faculty members for non-endowed positions created a financial crisis for the university. Rudbeck resigned 1669, leaving De la Gardie to deal with an outraged faculty.

According to Lindroth, De la Gardie suffered from indecision and poor financial management, an accusation that also plagued him in his role as Chancellor of the realm. At the helm of the regency of Karl XI, he was ultimately tried in the 1680s by the commission to investigate the regency, and was charged 505,000 dsm. He petitioned the king, claiming that he was reduced to begging to save his Stockholm residence, despite the fact that both he and his wife were left with estates intact. The king refused De la Gardie's request for cash saying he could barely pay the

salaries of government officials for a year, let alone what was due to them from the past (Upton 1998, 58).

De la Gardie remained the chancellor of the university despite his difficulties with the Regency Commission. His last years in this position, however, created additional problems for him because he supported the efforts of Henrik Schütz, a man placed in the position of Rektor by the king in 1684 to probe Rudbeck's tenure as Rektor against the will of the senate and the faculty. During this incident, De la Gardie once again displayed his indecision and weakness, permanently affecting his reputation and legacy at the university.

These years of upheaval at Uppsala had an impact. After 1668, the university now had to compete for students with the new university in Lund, as well as with the one in Åbo. Students also remained attracted to continental universities. The number of students attending Uppsala declined to around 730 during the 1670s, and the numbers slowly grew so that by 1700 the number had averaged around 1000 for several years. Matriculating in 1699 at the age of eleven, Emanuel Swedenborg was one of those students.

One more issue developed at Uppsala before the end of the century—a philosophical dispute between Aristotelians and Cartesians on the faculty, particularly between the Faculty of Medicine and that of Philosophy. Queen Kristina had brought René Descartes (1596-1650) to Sweden to be instructed in philosophy by him. He died not long after he arrived, but his coming challenged the rather insular worldview of Lutheran Sweden, and eventually there were proponents of his position on the university faculties. He argued for seeking truth from observation, rather than from received wisdom of past authorities. Essentially, Aristotle was an acceptable philosophical authority for the clergy; they had found his philosophical system to be a useful support for their religious perspective. For them, God was the measure of all things. For Descartes reason or mind became the standard or measure of all things. Although their difference in outlook was not resolved philosophically, on a practical level the King was willing to permit the Cartesian premises and method to be operationalized as long as Cartesianism was not used to sow doubt in matters of faith.

The library got a boost in the 1690s when the decision was made to house it in the Gustavianum. The upper floor had the roof raised to

accommodate it. Two large rooms were organized to hold the collection, now totaling somewhere between 20,000 and 25,000 books, as well as reading desks for the students. The books included the Silver Bible donated by De la Gardie in 1669, and De la Gardie's entire library of 4,700 books that were seized by the crown as partial payment of his assessment by the Regency Tribunal. In 1694, Karl XI also donated to the university the art cabinet presented to Gustavus II Adolphus from the Lutheran citizens of Augsburg in 1632 when he marched into the city at the head of his troops. The cabinet was placed in the library along with other collections.

The decision to hire Erik Benzelius (1675–1743), the son of the new Archbishop Erik Benzelius (1632–1709) and son-in-law of Dean of the Uppsala Cathedral, Jesper Swedberg, brought the library to a whole new level. He enriched the library using a multitude of different methods—through book purchases, magazine subscriptions, the compilation of catalogues, the use of agents to purchase books abroad, correspondence with bibliophiles and other learned men. In the twenty years he served as librarian, he was single-handedly responsible for transforming a large collection of books into a functioning modern library.

Jesper Swedberg arrived in Uppsala with his family in the fall of 1692. He was called to fill a professorship in theology, and to serve as Dean of the Cathedral. According to Sten Lindroth, he brought "life and pith into the faculty of theology" (Lindroth 1976, 64). He immediately and energetically set about organizing the one-hundredth anniversary of the first Uppsala Meeting establishing the centrality of Lutheranism to the nation. The festivities were attended by Karl XI and lasted for an entire week. There were banquets, speeches, disputations in Latin and Greek, conferring of degrees, and services in the Cathedral, while the university and whole town was regaled with cannon salutes celebrating the common goals—the unity of Church and State (Lindroth 1976, 64).

Culture

Before turning to a discussion of Swedenborg's family circle and his father, Jesper Swedberg; it would be useful to take note of the tremendous cultural changes that took place in seventeenth-century Sweden. Becom-

ing a Great Power had a powerful effect on those of leadership class in Sweden. They began to see Sweden and themselves—because of their identification with their nation—through the eyes of the more cosmopolitan and “civilized” countries of Europe. In the cultural area, Italy was their first model and France became the second. Margareta Revera reports that during the *Riksdag* of 1638, it was stated that “the reign of Gustav II Adolf marked the beginning of a new period in the history of the nobility, which had been oppressed and scorned abroad and had been unworthy of comparison with the nobility of other nations” (Revera 1988, 112). During these same meetings, funds were being solicited from the nobility to build a House of Nobility to symbolize their newly-won status. Three years later the Chancellor, Alex Oxenstierna, (1583–1654) rejected a law that would have stopped the outflow of Swedish currency and capital because he wanted to encourage other nations to invest in and trade with Sweden, and because steps were now beginning “to civilize the nation” (Revera 1988, 112).

While the development of education, towns, and industries (particularly in the field of mining) were all part of the program to civilize Sweden, the introduction of ballet at court was another. Revera cites 1638 as the year that Queen Kristina saw her first ballet. She was eleven years old. The ballet was produced by the newly arrived French ballet instructor; and it was preformed by the sons of prominent nobles and merchants. Among the performers were young Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie, future Ambassador to France and Chancellor of the realm and Chancellor the University of Uppsala, aged fifteen, and second generation aristocrat; another was Lorentz von der Linde age twenty-five, the son of a wealthy Dutch merchant, and third generation immigrant from Holland. In time, he became a baron, a councillor of the realm and a field marshal. Ballet, once introduced, became institutionalized as a form of entertainment in the Swedish court; and later, Karl XI was chided, even by his mother, for his lack of interest in these productions or in the opera (Revera 1988, 110).

Another venture that was launched in 1638 was the Swedish colony of New Sweden. Planted on the shores of the Delaware River, the experiment lasted only seventeen years. During that time about 400 Swedes settled in the New World. Despite these small initial numbers, by the beginning of the eighteenth century there were about 1,500 Swedes in an ethnically

cohesive community in North America. They had been served by Lutheran pastors over the years, and had built six churches, two of which are still standing today (Revera 1988, 113–114). Swedenborg's brother Jesper spent nine years in the New World from 1714–1724, where he taught school in Kristiana; and his father, Jesper Swedberg was the priest in charge of these congregations for many years, beginning in 1698. He sent catechisms and Bibles to them at his own expense.

Many reasons are given for the colonial initiative and for its failure. Obviously trade was an incentive, but developing navigational skills was another, as was stimulating domestic ship building or alternatively colonial ship building using the abundant oak forests reported to be found along the Delaware river. The colonial venture was started by Swedes in collaboration with Dutch shareholders. However, after the first expedition, the Dutch wanted to withdraw, and the enterprise ended when the Dutch seized the colony for themselves. Thus, according to Revera, the desire for a colony was not so much to extend the Swedish Empire abroad, but to consolidate it at home (Revera 1988, 115). However, recruiting Swedes to colonize was counter-productive, given the manpower shortages in Sweden that affected both the military and industry at the time; the first ten years of the colonial experiment took place while Sweden was fighting in the Thirty Years War. Colonizing was something that the "more advanced" or "more civilized" nations of Europe did, and for a short period of time, Sweden joined the club; nonetheless, it was not long before it became clear that the manpower problems confronting Sweden would never allow her to be truly competitive.

New Sweden was ceded to the Dutch in 1655 one year after Queen Kristina abdicated. Kristina's reign saw Sweden emerge as a victor in the Thirty Years War. The nation was after all a guarantor of the Peace of Westphalia. This signaled Sweden's political coming of age, and she became recognized as a Great Power of Europe. No longer isolated in the distant north, politically Sweden was now a part of Europe. What the generals accomplished on the battlefields, and the diplomats accomplished in Osnabrück and Münster, Kristina worked to accomplish at home in Stockholm. Allan Ellenius writes:

With Christina comes the definitive change in the artistic and cultural climate of Sweden. Imported painters, . . . helped to give artistic life a dynamic pulse that had been missing in the retarded climate of the preceding era, and Ehrenstrahl successfully completed the transition. New customs and channels of communication, including a more intensive contact with foreign countries, created a healthy social competition, and with it a more favourable reception for the new fashions, artistic and intellectual, which now made their breakthrough. In addition, the visual arts came also to help the country by presenting the face to the outside world, and in particular to France, that befitted a great power. (Ellenius 1988, 66)

The aristocracy that Queen Kristina created followed her lead and built palaces in Stockholm and castles in the country. They imported architects and artists, sculptors, and portraitists. They spent lavishly, developed elegant manners, set the fashion, and created a whole new life-style to be enjoyed by the few, and imitated as much as possible by the many gazing up from the rung below. It is said that “the new mansions of the nobility were built by German money and filled with war booty” (Revera 1988, 104). The Catholic city of Prague was looted in the last year of the war (1648) and its literary and artistic treasures were brought home to Sweden, including the Silver Bible (Revera 1988, 104).

Discussion of this new ostentatious life-style most frequently turned to Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie and his wife—where they lived, what they wore, the banquets they gave. Some of the foreign travelers to Sweden during this era report that De la Gardie brought extravagance to Sweden. It is interesting to observe that insight into and commentary about the quality of this life most frequently comes from the very visitors from Europe that the Swedes in general and the De la Gardies’ in particular were trying to impress (Revera 1988, 106-108). At the height of this development, the House of Nobles was finally completed in 1674—the building symbolized the grandeur of Sweden’s Noble class and its parity with European aristocracy. A few short years later, Karl XI, through the *reduktion*, had subordinated the aristocracy to the crown, and reasserted Sweden’s need to put Swedish interests and traditions first.

The family circle

When Emanuel Swedberg was born in January of 1688, he was born into a household that combined a heritage of privilege with a spirit of personal achievement; his family cherished Swedish tradition and Lutheran piety and simplicity, and was clearly a part of the establishment. At the time of Emanuel's birth, his father was an important figure in church circles. Ordained in 1685, almost immediately he was appointed chaplain to the king's horse guard, certainly a significant position, given the king's abiding concern for and knowledge of all aspects of Sweden's military forces. At the same time, he was also appointed preacher at the court. Swedberg's bold preaching caught the attention of the king, and very quickly he became a protégé of Karl XI, who named him to a series of important positions in rapid succession. As a result, he was on speaking terms with the king and other members of the royal family. These facts are made clear by many noted Swedish church historians of the past, such as Henry W. Tottie, Claes Annerstadt, and Hilding Pleijel among others (Block 1944, 42), as well as by more recent historians of Swedish history such as Michael Roberts (1973), Sten Lindroth (1976), and Anthony Upton (1998).

Not only was his father a significant and memorable figure in Swedish church history, but his father's older brother, Peter (1644–1692), also played an important role during Sweden's Age of Greatness, particularly in the Royal College of Mines. He held various positions in the College, including treasurer and assessor. He was ennobled in 1683. Peter's first wife, Anna Margaretha Behm, was the older sister of Sarah Behm, Swedenborg's mother. Peter's sons from this first marriage served in the military and both of them rose to the rank of lieutenant-colonel. His daughters married men of rank; one married the royal physician and the other the Quarter-master General. His daughters from his second marriage also married men in the military who were ennobled, and his son was a chamberlain, who married into a noble family (Tafel 1875, 84–85).

The Behm family, to which Swedenborg's mother Sarah (1666-1696) belonged, also moved in the upper circles of Swedish society in the seventeenth century. Albrecht Behm (died 1679), Sarah's father, was an iron mine owner, a master of mines, who was named an Assessor in the Royal

College of Mines in 1675. His older brother, Daniel (1611–1669), was a mine owner, tutor to a son of Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna, and finally a councillor of the court. When made a noble, he took the name Behmer. His brother Hans was a burgomaster; and Lars was a member of the Court of Mines in Falun (Tafel 1875, 86-87).

The lives of Sarah's siblings, their husbands, and their children also fit within this pattern. Although of the five sisters, four died young and only Swedenborg's Aunt Brita survived into the eighteenth century. Sarah's only brother Albrecht (no dates) served with distinction in the Swedish Army, and was ennobled in 1693. As previously noted, her sister Anna (died 1688) was married to the assessor Peter Schönström, her husband's older brother; her sister Brita (died 1755) married Professor Johan Schwede in Uppsala; and her sister Catharina (died 1686) was married to the Dean of Sala, Laurentius Petri Aroselius. Ingrid (died 1688) apparently never married (Tafel 1875, 87; Sigstedt, 1952, 485).

Swedenborg's siblings who survived childhood also married well and lived lives of privilege like their forebears, and like them they made contributions to the Swedish nation within the church, the mining industry, the military, and in industry. To a great extent it is possible to see the threads of the history of Sweden played out in the lives of Swedenborg's family serving as priests and bishops, mining officials, army officers, and clothing manufacturers. They were certainly encouraged by their father to contribute their lives to the service of others. Jesper Swedberg believed that one's life was a gift from God and its fruits ought to be returned to Him by consciously choosing to do good works.

Jesper Swedberg was active in his own life enriching the lives of others. An anecdote about a challenge he gave to the Royal horse regiment is illustrative. He wrote:

Once I made a promise to the whole regiment, which consisted of upwards of 1,200 men, that on the next muster, which took place once every year, I would present every man a copy of Archbishop Dr. Swebilius' catechism. I also wrote in these books the names, about 300, of all those who could read. A year afterwards, when the regiment was mustered near Upsal, nearly 600 could read. This amounted to 600 dalers in copper; for each catechism cost a daler. My promise I had to keep, and to honour.

I went to his Majesty (Karl XI) at the castle, and in all humility made him acquainted with this; he immediately pulled out his purse filled with ducats, took a handful, and gave them to me without counting them. (Tafel 1875, 104–105)

He also took up the cause of educational abuse in Sweden in a sermon he preached to the King in 1686. His text was “The children of Israel did as their fathers before them had done.” The sermon was delivered in the castle at Ulriksdal to the assembled royal family. He spoke about the necessity of kings being the laborers of the church, and the princesses her nurses. He preached a sermon with a similar theme the following week. The king then sought out information about the state of the schools in Sweden and in Stockholm. He learned that the teachers received a very low wage, and immediately wanted to set about fixing the problem. Swedberg thanked the king for his interest in this problem, and made a suggestion about how to achieve this goal, without adding a financial burden to the state. He proposed that the status of the teachers ought to be raised, and if they taught well for three years, then they could be given a good curacy. He believed that raising the status of the teachers would encourage men of distinction to send their sons to them.

This interaction led Karl XI to immediately make Swedberg a more permanent chaplain at the court. Later he gave him a pastorate in Vingåker, where he served briefly in 1692 before the King appointed him to be a Professor of Theology at the University of Uppsala. The family moved to Uppsala in November of 1692. A month later Swedberg was named Rektor of the University, and in 1693, in that position he organized the Jubilee celebration of the one hundredth anniversary of the Uppsala Meeting in which Lutheranism was established as the religion of Sweden.

Swedberg worked on several of the major initiatives set in motion by the pronouncement of the Church Law of 1686, particularly the new hymnal (1695) and the new translation of the Bible. Swedberg readied the hymnal and in fact published it in 1693. He was a good musician and wrote many hymns found in the hymnal along with another noted churchman Harquin Spigel (1645–1714). However, no sooner was it off the press, Bishop Carlsson (the Bishop who had ordained Swedberg) objected to it. Perhaps the real objection was the fact that he was not named to the

committee in charge of producing it. He quickly got others to object to it, and they soon declared that “the King, together with Swedberg, intended to introduce a new religion into the country” (Tafel 1875, 119). In short, they said that the hymnal was heretical. While Swedberg was cleared of this charge, the printed copies of the hymn book were seized and condemned. Ultimately some were shipped to the congregations in American, but the majority of them were left to rot in storage in Skeppsholm (Tafel, 1875, 119). Many of Swedberg’s and Spegel’s hymns found their way in the official 1695 hymnal and are still sung today in the Swedish Lutheran church. Spegel was named Archbishop in 1711 after the death of Erik Benzelius the Elder, the Archbishop from 1700–1709, and father of Swedenborg’s brother-in-law, Erik Benzelius.

Swedberg was a very popular teacher in Uppsala for the ten years he was in residence there. In 1702 he was named Bishop of Skara where he remained until his death in 1735. Skara was a lively and important diocese in Västergötland, an area of deep religious faith and piety. Swedberg prospered there as did the work of the church he attended to. His interest in education found full expression in the management and development of the cathedral school in Skara.

Given Swedberg’s close association with Karl XI, it is not surprising that he was a supporter of royal authority. Swedberg’s difficulties with other senior members of the Swedish church may have had more to do with his support of Karl XI than his interest in pietism (although it is true that he was a strong voice for the benefits of works in the human drama of salvation). In this regard it is interesting to note that Anthony F. Upton closes his book *Charles XI and Swedish Absolutism* with a quote from Swedberg and a discussion of its significance. He is commenting on the fact that despite the coming of the Age of Freedom in 1719, “the major institutional achievements of Charles XI survived: Church Law, the reformed state budget, the *reduktion*, the *indelningsverk* and the *knektehåll* and eventually the new Law Code confirmed by the estates in 1734. But it also lived on in the hearts and minds of the majority of the kingdom’s inhabitants” (Upton 1998, 261). However, in 1719 when the new form of government was affirmed, the two groups that longed for the forms of the past were the peasants and the clergy. Swedberg defied the majority that

ushered in the new age, and according to Upton, spoke for what he suggests was the “silent majority.” This is what Swedberg wrote:

I stood up and declared the opinion of the Clergy with well-chosen words, saying, approximately, we have no permit to take from the ruler the power that God in his Word has ascribed to him . . . the King stands in God’s place on earth. His power is of God. If he abuses it, so he shall answer before God, and not before his subjects. Here we have no Polish Republic, or some kind of English government. We have the power of a King, set out in the Royal Chapter of our old Law Book. They were no children that wrote that. And when, after that, kings ruled, and subjects go on with their lives, things went well in the kingdom . . . As wise men and true doctrine say, the ruler is given by the Lord and power from on high. A subject, a priest, a burgher, a peasant, yes and a nobleman should not question how a king behaves and closely examine and judge what he is undertaking, that is to usurp God’s office and judgment. We must believe and adhere to what the Spirit of God says: in the word of a king is power, and who shall say to him, what is it you are doing? (Upton 1998, 261)

Upton says that Swedberg expressed the voice of the people in 1719, and that the “Age of Freedom” in Sweden was marked by an elite oligarchy of nobles, state officials, and burghers who ruled in the name of the nation not for the sake of the citizens but to further their own class and status interests (Upton, 1998, 261). Swedenborg becomes a player in this world, and ultimately he, too, suggests that freedom is in fact the Lord’s and not humankind’s and that it can only be found in seeking Him on the spiritual, moral, and civil planes of life.

The Relationship between Sweden and Europe

While the record shows that Karl XI undertook major changes in the 1680s, nonetheless, it could also be argued that in 1688 the way of life in Sweden to a great extent still resembled that of the late Middle Ages. Certainly some things had changed, but it is somewhat difficult to pin point precisely what had, beyond Karl XI’s administrative reorganization

at the national level that was aimed at decisions made in the hamlets and villages (particularly in relation to conscription and education). Did soldiers coming back from war describe the places they had seen as merely different or did they see them as more advanced culturally, economically, and politically? It is useful to wonder, what did they think of the religious differences they encountered? Upon return were they so grateful to be home and among familiar ways that they reinforced them and made them stronger?

While Sweden is known for innovations in the tactics of war during the seventeenth century, she made no significant contributions in the areas of religion, philosophy, or culture during that same period. The religious leadership of Sweden prized the exact transmission of the Lutheran faith from generation to generation. They were convinced that the more uniformity and the less deviation there was, the stronger the nation would be. On the whole they were able to enforce (reinforce) this conformity of faith and vision. In this Sweden differed markedly from her European neighbors to the south.

Politically and militarily Sweden had made her debut in Europe. The reviews were mixed. Sweden helped to end warfare fueled by faith and in the process she made a few friends as well as some new enemies. As a new “Great Power” Sweden continued to make war, either for the sake of alliances or for political and economic expansion or for both.

In the 1670s Sweden’s resources were pushed to the limit when “alliance and treaty” obligations forced Sweden to go to war to maintain her self interest. At the end of that conflict, she emerged victorious but seriously weakened. Sweden’s many enemies noticed (Russia, Poland, German states, Denmark, Holland, etc.). Karl XI seized control in an attempt to repair the political and economic damage to Sweden and the Empire. Peace reigned during his lifetime, while resentment and the desire for revenge festered abroad.

Sweden and Europe—A comparison

In the seventeenth century Sweden made her debut in European politics. Under the brilliant leadership of Karl II Gustav, her armies swooped onto the continental stage and brought victory to the Protestant cause.

Until this moment Sweden had been an aggressive small player in Scandinavia and the Baltic region, and the king's exploits brought her recognition and respect throughout Europe. But the reviews were mixed. Sweden achieved fame, Great Power status, and the commensurate responsibilities. However, after signing the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, Sweden continued to wage war and made more enemies. Her introduction to the European stage brought hostility as well as praise.

For Swedes representing their nation diplomatically in treaty negotiations and in the capitals of Europe, greater integration into Europe meant bringing European living standards back to Sweden in an attempt to mirror the grandeur and opulence found on the continent. Castles and manor homes were constructed and built by the growing aristocracy, often by foreign architects and craftsmen, and were furnished with imported goods. Sweden seen through the mirror of Paris or Amsterdam looked crude, rough hewn, and simple. Foreign travelers to Sweden often confirmed this perspective. For example, the French Ambassador to Sweden 1634–1635, Charles Ogier, wrote in his diary that he was impressed with the dowager Queen Maria Elenora's plans for a garden, but when confronted with the reality of Field Marshall Jakob de la Gardie's country home near Stockholm, he was brutally critical: "the great soldier, who had twice captured Moscow, lived in an abode as humble as the houses that 'simple merchants and craftsmen build for themselves in the environs of Paris. . . there is no garden here, no courtyard, no smooth or straight path on which to take a walk, no vineyard, no fruit trees, just cliffs, stones, and steep rocks'" (Conan 2005, 185). However, if he had returned to Stockholm forty years later, he might have seen what the Italian diplomat Lorenzo Magalotti described in 1674—the Swedish capital as a French colony (Revera 1988, 106).

While in appearance Stockholm may have looked French, the underlying reality remained "Gothic" and Lutheran. Olof Rudbeck (1630–1702) took the Gothic idea to its furthest expression in his book *Atlantica* (1679). In this work Rudbeck demonstrated an idea long held by Swedes that Sweden was the oldest kingdom on earth, the cradle of civilization with the oldest language, and that they (the ancient Goths) had brought enlightenment to Greece and Rome. Rudbeck employed his vast knowledge of nature and history to make his case. According to Lindroth, "*Atlantica*

[was] the most celebrated work that issued from the University of Uppsala during the 17th century; it attracted attention abroad” and for a time in Sweden, “but the future was not favorable to them; soon historical criticism awoke and dispelled the dream world of Atlantis” (Lindroth 1976, 76). However, during the seventeenth century belief in *Gothicism* was strong in Sweden and added to a nationalistic fervor that helped to socially integrate Swedes while reinforcing intellectual isolation from the continent.

The Swedish style of Lutheranism was the other element that negatively affected integration into a European world-view or mind-set. Lockhart describes Swedish Lutheranism as “intellectually stifling, intolerant, utterly humorless, and not even intellectually active; [it] produced no theologians of note during the entire century” (Lockhart 2004, 89). This factor also helped to create social cohesion, and in fact, it may have been what “held the kingdom together—if not the empire” (Lockhart 2004, 89). A distinct advantage of this narrow, dogmatic, and orthodox view of faith was the fact that it almost completely eliminated the problems of religious heterodoxy in Sweden. There were simply few fires of faith to dampen or stamp out either among the clergy or the laity. The relatively meager resources of Sweden could thus be focused directly on national defense, rather than internal disruption.

Economically, Sweden imported both technology and entrepreneurs from Europe, according to David Kirby, “even bending their strict religious laws to accommodate them” (Kirby 1990, 239). Göteborg on Sweden’s west coast is a case in point, when it was re-founded in 1619 after the Kalmar War. It was in essence a Dutch town with ten Dutchmen, seven Swedes, and one Scotsman on the first town council (Kirby 1990, 239). Another important area where foreign entrepreneurs played a vital role was in the mining industry, particularly iron. Mining accounted for seventy-five percent of Sweden’s exports in the second half of the century. The production of bar-iron tripled from the 1640s to the 1690s, from 10,000 tons to 33,000 tons annually, while copper production declined by forty percent. 500 forges and 324 foundries produced the bar iron—many of them begun by foreigners (Kirby 1990, 242).

These efforts helped Sweden bolster trade despite a relative backwardness in commerce when compared to the continent. According to Lockhart, Sweden during the first half of the seventeenth century was a “domain” state, which means that income was derived largely from the crown holdings. In addition, finances by continental standards were extremely primitive (Lockhart 2004, 74). Essentially, income was through payment in kind. While this was not a disadvantage for a nation with a conscript army, it did hamper paying mercenary forces that became necessary after Sweden became a guarantor of the treaty of Westphalia. Lockhart suggests that Sweden shifted from being a “domain” state to a “tax” state during the reign of Gustav II Adolf. This implies that the enterprises of the state were financed by tax revenues, credit, armies that were in part self-sustaining, and donations of crown lands (Lockhart, 2004, 75). While this system functioned more or less adequately for several decades, in the long run it required foreign subsidies, and over time it alienated Swedish resources away from the state. The actions of Karl XI returned Sweden to the status of a “domain” state, but with greater financial liquidity and a relatively “modern” administrative structure.

In 1688, Sweden was economically different than continental Europe, and she controlled a vast empire with limited human resources. Payment in kind was still a widespread practice in the small villages of Sweden. However, the state was a major economic player and employer, imports were government by protectionism, and exports were often state-run monopolies. While Karl XI’s reforms were not completed at his death in 1697, nonetheless, they had achieved a great deal, particularly in the Swedish/Finish heart of the nation. Sweden was better off than at any time in her history. But the reforms did not address the administrative or economic integration of Sweden’s loosely-run empire. Thus, when old enemies moved to attack the young king, Karl XII, in 1700, despite his military prowess, Sweden had neither the financial nor the manpower resources to defend itself against the sustained assault of multiple enemies, with newly developed capabilities, particularly Russia. In the past, Sweden had succeeded by expansion and absorption but, for the most part, not actual integration. Karl XI had prepared Sweden to deal a quick defensive war, but not a long sustained one in the east. A more militarized

Russia with seemingly endless resources altered the balance of power. As Lockhart so aptly puts it: “Sweden did not have the resources to sustain its empire, and the empire did not provide Sweden with the resources to do so” (Lockhart 2004, 150).

(To be continued)

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