

term were made possible only through personal enthusiastic reponse on the part of some few members of the Association. Again, in one period of time a lagging membership was built up through the enthusiastic campaign of a few of its members. But by and large, the principal task remains a scholarly and literary one. This idea Dr. Doering supported many times.

The second point of particular interest with respect to Dr. Doering's attitude toward the uses of the Association was his regard for the necessity of its tasks. These, he felt, had to be done. He often said; "If the Association did not do these things, then some other organization would have to." In later years, as the work of the Association and its administration became more and more centered in Bryn Athyn, he modified this statement. "If the Association did not do these things, then the Academy would have to." And as all of us close to the work of the Association know full well, it is really the Academy which does support the uses of the Association—the Academy which was Dr. Doering's real love for so many years of his full and useful life.

PHILOSOPHICAL NOTES

Philosophy vs. Theology: Already in the discussion on the two approaches to philosophy, a distinction has been drawn between philosophy and theology. But in addition, as in the case of science vs. religion, there has been in the history of thought a so-called "conflict" between philosophy and theology.

This conflict has likewise been resolved by the growth of an attitude in which theologians and philosophers mutually ignore each other. Sometimes this attitude has been formalized. This is done by those religionists, on the one hand, who question the use of philosophy in any respect; and by philosophers, on the other—as in the case of Kant—who question whether there can be any metaphysics; that is, any serious study of objects transcendent to the sensations given immediately to man.

In these Notes, in discussing the nature and the state of philosophy, it was pointed out that according to the view of Maritain, the nature of philosophy is independent of theology, whereas the state is not. For example, Christian philosophy brings to philosophy

much that is from revelation. Even those parts of modern philosophy that oppose this Christian philosophy, as to its state, are affected by revelation, because they are in large measure devoted to the effort to separate everything introduced from revelation from themselves. As Maritain puts it: "Western philosophy has never set itself free of Christianity; wherever Christianity did not have a hand in the construction of modern philosophy, it served instead as a stumbling block" (p. 31).

It is not as easy to distinguish between philosophy and theology as it is between science and religion. This is so because, while nearly everybody would agree that the objects of study in religion and science differ, this is not the case with philosophy and theology. Nevertheless, the methods and the source of knowledge are quite evidently different in these two studies.

Even as in the case of science vs. religion, Swedenborg, before the time of his Writings, had no question in his mind that there is a conflict between theology and philosophy. He says in the Preface to the *Infinite*: "Philosophy, if it be truly rational, can never be contrary to revelation; that is to say, if the rational principle partake of the soul more than of the body, or the reason arise from no gross corporeal instinct whose end it tends to realize, forming the soul by use and exercise for perpetual obedience and consent thereto. Reason or understanding is a faculty partaking both of the soul and the body, whose end is to enable the soul to be instructed through the body and its organs, that afterwards it may dispose all things in such an order and connection, and call them forth with such distinctness, that a rational principle may be the result. The end of reason can be no other, than that man may perceive what things are revealed and what are created; thus, the rational cannot be contrary to the Divine; since the end for which reason is given us, is that we may be empowered to perceive that there is a God, and to know that He is to be worshipped. If reason be the mean, endowed with the faculty and power of perceiving, and if the actual perception be the end, then the mean, in so far as it is correctly rational, cannot be repugnant to the end. The very mysteries that are above reason, cannot be contrary to reason, although reason is unable to explain their grounds, but of these subjects we speak in the following Work."

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