

RANDOLPH W. CHILDS—AN APPRECIATION

Since the last annual meeting of the Swedenborg Scientific Association we have lost a good friend through the passing of Randolph W. Childs into the spiritual world.

Randolph Childs has contributed to the pages of the *NEW PHILOSOPHY*; and he has served the association in a number of other ways. From time to time he has advised us in his professional capacity as a lawyer, especially with regard to our by-laws. From 1955 to 1962 he was a member of the board of directors of the association.

However, Randolph Childs is chiefly remembered for another use to the association, both before he was a member of the board and also since. As a very active lifetime member of the New Church, a son of one of the Academy founders, and a long-time worker on the board of that body, he brought to our association not only an evident interest in the physical well-being of our organization but also a manifest love for all of the works of Emanuel Swedenborg.

Because he had an humble approach to the problems of philosophy he was as keenly interested in discussion groups as in published material. He gave his active support to such meetings. He felt the use of such meetings, where people could get together and be of mutual assistance in learning together. He will be remembered by us for this because he was many times a host in his own home, and helped to be host in other homes as well.

While it is true that in large measure the work of such an association as ours is of intellectual or mechanical or business nature, yet its life can only be stimulated by an affection for the uses to be performed. Randolph's presence with us will be remembered for the reason that he brought with him just that—the affection of use.

EDWARD F. ALLEN

PHILOSOPHICAL NOTES

Aphorism and Ancient Philosophy. The writings of earliest Greek philosophy are in the form of aphorisms. Philip Wheelwright says that

So far as Greece is concerned, there are virtually no evidences of anything that could properly be called philosophy existing in earlier times. [That is, much before the 6th century B.C.—Ed.]. There are momentary flashes of

philosophical insight in Hesiod's *Works and Days*, in the so-called Homeric hymns (whatever their dates may have been), and in the fragmentary sayings attributed to Orpheus and his followers; but in none of them is there any intellectual coherence or any interest in finding a method for distinguishing truth from error. *Heraclitus* (New York: Atheneum, 1964) p. 3

He goes on to refer to an ancient saying cited by Plato: "God holds the beginning and the end, as well as the middle, of all existing things," as having been attributed to the legendary Orpheus. Wheelwright points out that this contains an "arresting thought" involving the ideas of the beginning, the end, and the middle, carrying not only temporal but moral meanings. Thus is involved principle, goal or fulfillment, and balance or proportion (*ibid.*). Wheelwright in his introduction to his little book on Heraclitus refers to other aphorisms, for example, those of Xenophanes. But it is by Heraclitus that we are at first introduced to the aphorism in a manner that constructs a philosophy as we now understand it.

I have already referred previously in the notes to Heraclitus' statement considering the question of motion: "You can not step twice into the same river, for other waters are continually flowing on." In those notes it was indicated that this was the origin of a point of view in philosophy with reference to nature that has posed questions that continue up to the present day.

Wheelwright in his book arranges 124 statements by Heraclitus under 8 headings, as follows: The Way of Inquiry, Universal Flux, The Processes of Nature, Human Soul, In Religious Perspective, Man among Men, Relativity and Paradox, and The Hidden Harmony.

Heraclitus. What comes to us from Heraclitus consists of some 100 sentences, mostly aphorisms, making much use of the metaphor. What is it that distinguishes these from other aphorisms written in his time? The aphorism was the common method of expression in those days, but the sentences written by Heraclitus have been singled out not only by the ancient scholars who followed him, but also by modern scholars, as representing the earliest written efforts which in any complete way seem to construct a philosophy. One of his aphorisms on knowledge is the following:

We should let ourselves be guided by what is common to all. Yet, although the Logos is common to all, most men live as if each of them had a private intelligence of his own (*Heraclitus*, p. 19).

We have already in these notes referred to the statement that lies at the basis of his ideas, on change as the nature of the world. On the human soul he said,

You could not discover the limits of soul, even if you traveled every road to do so; such is the depth of its meaning (*ibid.* p. 58).

Swedenborg confirms this in his own studies. Heraclitus, however, was not content with a negative statement but also attributed to the soul certain positive characteristics.

Souls are vaporized from what is moist.

Soul has its own principle of growth.

A dry soul is wisest and best (*ibid.* p. 58).

The Metaphor and Philosophy. The metaphors used in early philosophy are of a radical kind. Many metaphors can be reduced to a simpler structure known as the simile. Wheelwright discusses this subject in a very interesting manner. He uses for an example the metaphor, "He is a pig." This is a simple metaphor and can be changed into a simile as follows: "He eats like a pig." When we say "God is reason" we may rewrite this, "God is like Reason." Wheelwright says,

Although there is an apparent gain in logical precision here, the appearance of clarity is misleading, for a certain unspoken assumption has been unwittingly introduced. In uttering the simile we assume that we know independently what God is and what reason is, and that it is possible to discover a relation of similarity between the two ideas independently conceived (*ibid.* p. 96).

Wheelwright refers to such a metaphor as "radical" and not merely "grammatical." He says, "It must work mainly not by comparison, like a simile, but by insight and transcendental probing" (*ibid.* p. 97).

I cannot pursue this very interesting subject any further at this point, but to do so with any degree of completeness would be to lay the foundations of most of pre-sophistic philosophy.

Radical Symbol. The above note calls to mind that symbols other than metaphor may have a special nature by which they are

able to represent something in nature or an idea, in a manner peculiar to that symbol and impossible to accomplish with other symbols. It has been said that a picture is worth a thousand words. This conveys a false idea. If a picture is a true picture, then it must convey ideas that no number of words can convey. If a description is a good one, it must say something no picture can.

I realize that others do not agree with this. There is a special kind of magic associated with words by some people. See for example in the *Syntopicon* under "sign" and "symbol" where Augustine is credited with believing that

Words hold the chief place (among symbols), because everything which can be expressed by gestures, or by such non-verbal symbols as flags or bugle calls, can also be expressed in words, where many thoughts which words readily express do not lend themselves easily to other modes of expression. (Vol. II, p. 731.)

Axiom, a Symbol? Verbal statements according to their form have been identified by a number of terms. We have referred to the symbol by itself, the metaphor, and the myth. Euclid in his systematization of geometry *The Elements* found it necessary to set up certain statements upon which his geometry was based. These statements he called, according to the Heath translation, "common notions." Mathematics books for many years referred to these statements as "axioms." Webster gives a long list of such verbal statements as follows: axiom, maxim, aphorism, apothegm, adage, proverb, saying.

Even as mathematics depends for its construction upon axioms, so there are other developments of human thoughts which depend upon these several kinds of verbal expressions.

Metaphor. Different symbols consisting of a single word, phrase, or clause have been classified by rhetoricians in several ways. There is one general classification called "trope." Webster lists rhetorical tropes into four kinds; metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony. There are also mathematical and musical tropes as well as rhetorical.

With the vast array of different symbols now already spread before us in these notes, it is evident that in considering the history of thought one can hardly be concerned with only one kind of symbol without in fact narrowing his own perspective with regard to that history.

The Beginning of Philosophy. There are a number of references in the Writings that contrast the thought of the period in which philosophy began with that of ancient times.

As before said, the memory-knowledges of the ancients treated of the correspondence of things in the natural world with things in the spiritual world. The memory-knowledges which are now called philosophy, such as that of Aristotle and others like him, were unknown to them. This is evident also from the books of the ancient writers, most of which were written in language that signified, represented, and corresponded to interior things, as is evident from the following instances. . . . (AC 4966.)

The balance of the number consists of examples that clearly give us indications of what is meant by "Internal Sense." In another number Swedenborg discusses not only the history of thought but also the nature of thought itself, dividing it into three aspects. As he says :

With man there is knowledge, intelligence, and wisdom. Knowledge is of things cognized; intelligence is of reason; and wisdom is of life. Wisdom considered in its fulness is at the same time of things cognized, of reason, and of life; cognitions precede; through them reason is formed; and wisdom by both, and this when one lives rationally according to the verities that are cognitions. Wisdom therefore is at once of reason and of life; and it is becoming wisdom while it is of reason and thence of life, and is wisdom when it has become of life and thence of reason. (CL 130.)

But our main interest here is in the history of thought.

The most ancient people in this world acknowledged no other wisdom but wisdom of life. This was the wisdom of the men of old who were called *sophi* (wise men). But the ancient people who succeeded the most ancient acknowledged as wisdom the wisdom of reason; and they were called *philosophi* (lovers of wisdom). But at this day many even call knowledge wisdom; for the learned, the erudite, and the mere sciolists are called wise—wisdom has thus glided down from its summit to its valley. (CL 130.)

We know from the study of the history of philosophy that the sophists in the beginning had many admirable qualities. But by the time Plato was writing, sophistry had become degraded. The principal degradation consisted in challenging knowledge itself. This led to a challenge of specific knowledge having to do with ethics and morals. And thus a relativity was introduced into the very standards by which man lived. And Plato presents Socrates in many dialogues as using the sophistic dialectic method to seek out the meaning of value itself. As an example, in Book I of *The Republic*, the dialogue consists of an effort to define justice.

The dialogue is another form of expression, and its use in this period of time is to be contrasted with the earlier use of the aphorism. Later users of the dialogue are Galileo and Berkeley.

But to go back to Swedenborg, in SD 3952 there is a discussion concerning some of the characters in mythology, a reference to the Stoics and also to Aristotle. In this number he refers to spirits of the more ancient times, "who, as spirits, were delighted with ideas, and indulged in thoughts, as is well known in respect to the Stoics and others; for formerly they could think much better without philosophy (than with it). . . ." Swedenborg's own early background was in science and philosophy, and in one place he says,

I was once asked how from a philosopher I became a theologian; and I answered, In the same manner that fishermen were made disciples and apostles by the Lord; and that I also from early youth had been a spiritual fisherman. (*Intercourse Between the Soul and the Body* 20.)

In the balance of the number beginning with his answer to the question, "What is a spiritual fisherman?" Swedenborg introduces us explicitly to the meaning of the internal sense by giving the internal sense not only of fishermen but of water, fish, river, etc.

In *The Word Explained* 907-915 Swedenborg discusses the conflict in the mind of man between spiritual knowledges and natural knowledges. He says that even with those who try to relate and harmonize these two kinds of knowledges great difficulties are presented to the mind.

For howsoever minds are imbued with the knowledge of heavenly things taken from the Divine Word; and howsoever they strive to seek a concordance [between this knowledge and human philosophy]; yet it is evident, and shows forth from all their problems, that there is an opposition between them (909).

Nevertheless Swedenborg says,

It can indeed be evident that philosophy in itself can never be contrary to the things which are in the Divine Word. Natural things and heavenly are in concord, just as, in man, when the man is a true man, his natural part and his spiritual part are in concord. . . . In nature are found effects, but in heaven causes and principles; just as is the case in the human body. Human philosophy or learning makes judgments and conclusions concerning spiritual things from things natural; and because, after the fall, the natural man is of such a nature that he is entirely opposed to the spiritual man and continually attacks him, therefore, the philosophy which comes from man, that is, which is taken from his rational mind, is of such a nature that it destroys the things which are drawn from the Divine Word (911).

And Swedenborg adds,

For this reason, it is not philosophy regarded in itself that is to blame, but the human mind, whose state after the fall is thus characterized, from which the philosophy is drawn (911).

Philosophy originated when man began to self-consciously ask himself "What is real?," "What is the source of knowledge upon which I answer this question?" and "What is the importance of the answers to these two questions to life?"

The method by which the philosopher seeks out answers to these questions may use any form of expression that is understandable in his time—the aphorism, as with Heraclitus, the dialogue as with Socrates and Plato, or the epic as illustrated by Dante in the Middle Ages.

Dante Alighieri. In an earlier issue of the NEW PHILOSOPHY a review article was published on two small works connecting the names of Swedenborg and Dante. When that issue appeared I was asked why I had not made special note of the 700th anniversary of Dante. I am not able to give any good reason why the 100th, 200th, or even the 700th anniversary of a birth is any more significant than the 113th, the 256th, or the 699th. Nevertheless, during the year 1964 the 400th anniversary of William Shakespeare was celebrated throughout the English speaking world, and tourist travel in England during the summer of 1964 was especially augmented by this event. During that same year another 400th anniversary was celebrated, but not with as much public knowledge. This was the 400th anniversary of the birth of Galileo Galilei. It seems that the main events celebrating that anniversary consisted of weekly seminars at universities in Italy.

The rationale of man's predilection for anniversary dates rounded off to zeros in the last 2 or 3 places was mildly challenged in an address which I heard Raymond Seeger give in New York, January last. The title of his paper was "Galileo, Yesterday and Today." (Since published in *American Journal of Physics*, Sept. 1965.) In the opening paragraph he says,

In the year 1564 at least three persons died: Michelangelo Buonarotti, John Calvin, Andreas Vesalius. In the same year at least three persons were born: Christopher Marlowe, William Shakespeare, Galileo Galilei.

After the lecture, which was given to several hundred physicists, the audience quickly filed out. Interest in history among modern

men of action is at a low ebb. I took advantage of Seeger's isolation on the stage and approached him. Several years ago he had given a paper on what he called, "A Galileo Pilgrimage." As in the present paper he had referred to Galileo's tomb and monument in Santa Croce in Florence. This is directly across the nave from the tomb of Michelangelo. In the earlier talk Seeger observed that earlier on the day of his visit someone had placed a small vase of fresh flowers on the tomb of Michelangelo. He went on to note that no one had placed a flower on the tomb of Galileo. I told Seeger that I had a grudge against him. He looked momentarily startled until I explained to him the cause of the grudge. In the summer of 1964 I had the opportunity to make a short visit to Florence and after my own "pilgrimage" to Santa Croce, as I stepped out into the square in front of the church I recalled Seeger's remarks and so I used some of my valuable time in Florence to reenter and check on the flower situation. Sure enough someone had placed a fresh rose upon the tomb of Michelangelo. I walked across and inspected the tomb of Galileo. There was no flower there. I addressed Seeger in these words. "If you had had any real deep feeling about the subject then I think that you in your visit would have begun the tradition of placing a flower upon the tomb of Galileo. And I can assure you, Sir, that I would have felt duty bound in my visit to have done the same thing. In that way there would have been two times when the tomb of Galileo would have been respected and one of these days, the day that I visited the tomb, would have been during Galileo's 400th anniversary." Seeger's answer was restricted to a wry smile.

I do not wish to talk further about anniversaries, nor about Galileo, but in that same Franciscan church of Santa Croce in Florence, there is a monument to Dante Alighieri and it is to him that I want to devote some remarks. Dante's home in Florence still stands. It is on a narrow street, and is completely surrounded by other buildings and would be easily passed by unless one happened to be looking for it, using the instructions from a guide book. The building in 1964 was being used by an art group for a display of its works of art.

Dante did not always live in Florence. A well known symbol of identifying him with Florence in the popular mind is a painting by Henry Holiday which quite evidently was painted on Lungarno Corsini near the Trinita bridge crossing the Arno. At one time

Dante had political troubles in Florence, and for a while he lived up in the mountains in a neighborhood known as Bagni d'Lucca. Bagni d'Lucca consists of a group of villas scattered on hills over the area of several square miles. Apparently during his stay Dante lived in or near one of these villas called Montefegatese. As one approaches Montefegatese one passes by a high point from which there is a panorama of that hill upon which the town is built. I was able once to spend a couple of hours at this place making a small water color sketch of the panorama. From this point one sees across a fertile valley covered with vegetation, and looks upon the town as it climbs up the hill to a point near the top, where rough virgin growth has been allowed to take over. On the very top of this hill one sees a dark shaft. As one climbs up through the very narrow streets of the town one is impressed with the fact that many of the people in this town are living in a manner very similar to the way in which people lived many years ago. Water supply, for instance, is attainable only at infrequent places along the way, and roads for vehicular traffic stop about halfway up the hill. By means of a path through the growth near the top one arrives at this shaft. The shaft is built of rough, unhewn stone and is about fifteen feet tall. On its very top is placed a bronze bust of Dante. Somehow I could not help but feel that this symbol was more appropriate to the great epic writer than was the empty tomb in Santa Croce.

Dante's Epic and Philosophy. There is a contrast between the gnomic aphorisms of Heraclitus and the epic style of *Paradiso*. Nevertheless serious self-conscious contemplation of philosophical ideas that relate to Dante's period can be found in *The Divine Comedy*.

In Canto III of *Paradiso* Dante sees reflections in a pool and turns to see the objects themselves and becomes involved in a confusion between the image and the object. Beatrice speaks:

"Wonder not that I smile," she said, "in presence of thy child-like thought,
since it trusts not its foot upon the truth,
but turneth thee after its wont, to vacancy. True substances are they which
thou beholdest, relegated here for failure of their vows."

The editor comments, "Narcissus took his own reflection for an actual being. Dante took the actual beings he saw for reflections."

Wicksteed translation, Temple Classics Edition (London: Dent, 1919), p. 29

Appearances, whether real or mere, whether being our mediate or immediate contact with the object, or only its representation through a man-made symbol, are an important topic in philosophy since Plato first made specific reference to "the saving of appearances." I hardly need add also that this topic of appearance, both mere and real, is important in the understanding of Swedenborg.

And therefore doth the Scripture condescend to your capacity, assigning foot and hand to God, with other meaning;
and Holy Church doth represent to you with human aspect Gabriel and Michael, and him too who made Tobit sound again. (Canto IV, p. 39)

And the editor comments, "Even the *literal sense* is not the figure itself, but the thing figured. For when Scripture names the arm of God, the *literal sense* is not that God hath any such corporeal member, but hath that which is signified by the said member, to wit operative power." (Wicksteed quoting Aquinas, p. 46).

Although an internal sense versus a literal sense has not always been of concern to philosophers, nevertheless it is of paramount importance in the New Church. And it might be interesting to contrast the possible meaning of internal sense that is possible since the Writings have been given with other than literal sense as meant by Aquinas. And again with respect to quite another subject we read, also from Canto IV:

Wherefore there springeth, like a shoot, questioning at the foot of truth;
which is a thing that thrusteth us to-wards the summit, on from
ridge to ridge.
This doth invite me and giveth me assurance, with reverence, lady, to make
question to thee as to another truth which is dark to me (p. 45).

The Italian for the phrase in the second line is *a piè del vero il dubbio*. The editor refers to the Italian *dubbio* as meaning a question or difficulty, not a doubt.

Doubt versus question or difficulty is of importance in every period of philosophy, whether for example we consider the paradoxes of Heraclitus which gave him "the reputation for obscurity" (Wheelwright p. 92), and made ancient writers refer to him as "The Dark," "The Obscure," and "The Riddling"; or as with the Sophists and their eventual skepticism as compared with Socrates,

who although he used their method of questioning, nevertheless directed it toward a positive search for knowledge.

St. Augustine leads philosophers in the positive principle of belief as against doubt when he says, "Understand in order that you may believe, believe in order that you may understand. Some things we do not believe unless we understand them; others we do not understand unless we believe."

I skip to Descartes and his *dubito ergo sum*, which was a positive application of doubt as one element in a chain of reasoning whose purpose was to arrive at knowledge that is certain.

The doubting and skepticism of Hume caused Kant, as he said, "to be awakened from his dogmatic slumbers."

Recently doubt as to the existence of truth has been introduced to modern philosophy by relativists in the conflict between causal and statistical explanations. Many other doubts and questions have been raised by the innumerable results of experimental science. In each case the opportunity is given either to accept skepticism or to accept the challenge for further search for answers.

Physicists, for example, are concerned with the problem presented to them by the particle with its wave-like properties. But the working physicist does not in consequence accept a skepticism in physics. He accepts his duality as a challenge to further inquiry.

And once more I return to the symbol in Dante. We read in Canto XXIV:

Wherefore my pen leapeth, and I write it not; for such folds our imagination,
not only our speech, is too vivid coloring (p. 293).

And our editor remarks, "Dante regards human speech and even human imagination as too aggressive and indiscriminating for the delicate folds of the pictures he fain would paint" (p. 300).

Here again we are concerned with the symbol, and ask ourselves in each case what is the proper symbol. Dante's editor refers to the artistic work, the art of Giotto. Not only in artistic expression, but in mathematics and in philosophy itself, there is beauty in simplicity properly displayed. However, this demand for simplicity can be carried to an extreme. I believe that there are examples of this in modern art that carries one away from all content, because the concern seems to be for medium alone. In philosophy an extreme application is represented by William of Occam, who

said that only particulars exist and all our knowledge begins with them. That universals exist only in the mind was a challenge to the realists and might be said to be the beginning of modern idealism. Nevertheless Occams' principle, "Entities or principles should not be unnecessarily multiplied," is used by the practicing scientist, who is usually a realist and often is scornful to the suggestion that his science depends upon philosophical conclusions.

I will add another note to illustrate, drawing upon the comments of scholars whose reputations have been established.

Dante in Retrospect. Herbert Butterfield in *The Origins of Modern Science* (New York: Macmillan, 1960) introduces his chapter on "The Conservatism of Copernicus" with a presentation of medieval science drawn from Dante (cf. pp. 17-24).

Included is the exposition of the Ptolemaic system with the motionless earth at the center; distinction between the science of the earth and that of the heavens as separate organizations; that the matter of the earth is composed of four elements: earth, water, air, and fire, together with physical consequences; that the geography of the earth places Jerusalem at its center; that in heavenly bodies only one motion is possible—that is, the circular; and also that the various spheres in the Ptolemaic system are moved by Intelligences or Spirits. Butterfield says, "In this whole picture of the universe there is more of Aristotle than of Christianity" (p. 23).

E. A. Burtt in *Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1954) quotes at length (cf. p. 20 *et seq.*) from *Paradiso* to show the essentially human character of the universe. Burtt then quotes from a modern living writer, Bertrand Russell, to show the contrast. In part we read from Burtt, "After quoting the Mephistophelian account of creation as the performance of a quite heartless capricious being, [Russell] proceeds":

Such, in outline, but even more purposeless, more void of meaning, is the world which Science presents for our belief. Amid such a world, if anywhere, our ideas henceforward must find a home. That man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end which they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labours of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspirations,

all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of Man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins—all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand. Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul's habitation henceforth be safely built—(Bertrand Russell, *A Free Man's Worship*, New York: 1918 p. 46).

God and Philosophy. There are many things that can be brought out to relate Dante with his predecessors and also with his effect upon the philosophy that followed him. As indicated in a previous note, philosophy as we moderns know it had its beginning with the Greeks. And this beginning was indicated at a time when man still wrote using forms that were derived from mythological exposition, that is, the aphorism.

The earliest philosophers set themselves in opposition to the mythology that was known to them. In consequence we must come up to Plato before we begin to arrive at reflection which can be expressed in the language and ideas that are familiar to us today. When we do so we become conscious of a cosmology which was taught by Ptolemy and which was at the basis of Dante's philosophy. The motion of the heavenly bodies was in circles. How is this related to God? I depend upon John Burnet in his *Greek Philosophy, Thales to Plato* (London: Macmillan, 1964) for the following ideas.

The Ionians had called fire, air, water and the like gods, but that only meant there were no other gods but these (p. 273).

Burnet also says :

Anaximander and Xenophanes had called the world or the World gods or God, but that was at most a sort of pantheism, as it was also with Parmenides.

How Plato relates to God the cosmology that was familiar to him is given by Burnet as follows :

Now, if we look at the motions of the heavenly bodies, we see at once that they must be caused by a good soul or souls, and indeed by the best, since they are the most regular of all motions. That is due to their circular character, which must have been given them by a good soul, since, if left to themselves, things do not move in a circle but in a straight line. These souls are what we call gods, if there are many, or God, if there is one only, or one which is the best of all (p. 273).

And Burnet also says, "Belief in God was doubtless part of the Pythagorean religion, but it was hardly a part of Pythagorean science."

Plato brought the idea of God into philosophy for the first time, and the form the doctrine took in his mind was that God was a living soul and that God was good. So much as that, but no more, he believed himself to have established by strictly scientific reasoning.

These notes do not intend in any way to give a complete picture of the transition from mythology to philosophy, much less to trace out any detailed development of the special problems that have since become a part of philosophy. Nevertheless it is hoped that they give some indication of how this development took place and also enough source material to lead the reader into a more complete study of the question.

At any rate, mythology as a symbol could not be the same thing after philosophy took hold of the minds of men as it was before. But it seems to me there are two contrasts involved here. There is the contrast between the stories of an earlier period, when they still preserved their symbolic meaning, and philosophy. Then there is a contrast between the stories of a later period, when they lost their symbolic meaning, and philosophy.

Symbols. Their Complexes and History. The above series of notes in addition to that in the previous issue should serve to show that "symbol" is a much broader concept than "word," and that there are many forms other than myth consisting of a complex of symbols. I have expressed a number of ideas that others may or may not agree with, for example:

- 1) That in our present-day perspective our view of the importance of a particular symbol or complexes of symbols may very well depend upon our philosophical view—*i.e.*, from its being monistic or pluralistic.
- 2) That a monistic philosophy is charged with the responsibility of showing how one symbol makes one with all other symbols as well as their objects. That a pluralistic philosophy is charged with showing how the symbols are related to their objects.
- 3) That each symbol or complex expresses in some special way an aspect of nature or of thought that is peculiar to that symbol.
- 4) That no historical division can be made with respect to that

period beginning with Greek philosophy that separates minds of different periods into an appreciation or a lack of appreciation of metaphors. To be sure there are styles as to the mode of expression: it may be in one period a Homeric poem (to begin just before the philosophical Greek period), it may be an Heraclitean aphorism, it may be a Platonic dialogue, it may be a Dānte epic—or, to skip to more recent times, a partial differential equation or a pattern suggested by mathematical matrices.

But we must not in all this lose sight of one historical change that is not a mere style—whatever its special form of expression, whether song, poem, or prose, or whether it be in Hebrew, Greek, or Latin—and that change is what is involved in the expression of “The Churches”—or what is sometimes referred to in the New Church as “genius.”

And I think it is proper to bring to a close this present series by going back to Dr. Odhner’s talk from which all this began.

Representative Truth. The statement responsible for the origin of these notes used the term “representative truth.” (See H. L. Odhner, “The Racial Man and the Human Form of Society,” *NEW PHILOSOPHY*, July–Sept., 1965, p. 83.)

The importance of this statement, both to history and also to our discussion on symbols, can now be appreciated more fully, and so I quote the full paragraph.

The pragmatic modern mind—overloaded with facts—is easily made contemptuous of metaphor, and underestimates the value of what the Writings call *representative truth*, the type of truth which speaks in correspondences and allegories, and is addressed rather to the heart than to the brain. Yet this type of truth is the first form of human communication—older than speech or words. The men of the “Golden Age” are said to have communicated by gestures, actions, and sounds rather than by articulate words. And the power of rituals, representing spiritual powers and spiritual processes of salvation from evil, became in time abused and turned into magical practices; while underlying truths were turned into myths no longer understood.

Clearly, as with the modern man and his symbols (as in differential equations and matrix algebra), so also the ancient man had his special symbols that go beyond “articulate words.” But let us not be confused by the form of the symbol, however special it may be to a given age—as for example “myths no longer understood”—

that is *by us*, or by differential equations not yet understood *by the ancients*.

The essential idea is involved in "representative truths" which is put in italics in Dr. Odhner's paper. Scientifics or memory-knowledges themselves, in whatever form they are expressed, mean something quite different to the most ancient mind than what they mean to the Greek mind (circa 6th to 3rd centuries B.C.) or than what they mean to the Christian mind (circa A.D. 1200), or to the present-day mind.

The memory-knowledges of the most ancients had to do with objects immediately present to the senses, as "mountain" or "hill," "horse," "wings," "throne," "sword," etc.

Who at this day knows these significations, and where are the knowledges that teach them? Men call such things emblems, not knowing anything whatever about correspondences and representation (AC 4966).

As I listened to Dr. Odhner when he gave his paper, I felt that he was driving at a larger idea than what any of us—the commentators in the discussion following the address or I in the above notes—have touched upon. Although perhaps it needs a better term—I cannot at present think of a better one—I call this a "Philosophy of History."

History somehow is connected with what Dr. Odhner called "The Racial Man." Somehow we connect this in heaven with The Grand Man. Somehow we connect this on earth with the human form.

But the human involves both a body and a soul. Dr. Odhner asks,

Is there in a nation, a society, or a church anything which could be likened to a higher consciousness—a soul or a spirit? (p. 91).

There is a relation between symbol and that which is represented. Dr. Odhner said something about this too:

Here we must heed the warning in the Writings that doctrine is not gathered by correspondences, for these can only illustrate and corroborate doctrines drawn by the analysis of open teachings, (SS 56.) For analogy or correspondence is never identity (pp. 91-92).

Clearly there is here involved something deeper than can be represented in symbols that are understood under a monistic philosophy.

E. F. A.