

year and two reprints last year are from sources not only outside the Academy but in three cases from outside any branch of the New Church.

The climate of opinion among philosophers today is beginning to show that operationalistic and positivistic tendencies have arrived at a dead end. Naturalistic humanism is not as unquestionably favored as it was 25 years ago. People are now writing who imply in their works "degrees" in mind and in creation. Every now and then a respectable place is given revelation in philosophical discourses. The general climate in which we work, I believe, is improving. But the challenge to potential New Church scholarship to "do homework" must be met if the purposes of the NEW PHILOSOPHY are to continue to be pursued.

I wish to express again this year as in the past thanks to the editorial board: Lennart O. Alfelt, Donald C. Fitzpatrick, Jr., and Kenneth Rose, for their valuable work in seeing through the press the issues of the NEW PHILOSOPHY from the time copy is collected.

This year I wish especially to thank Miss Beryl Briscoe for her editing work in the preparation of Swedenborg's *Selected Sentences*, translated by Dr. Alfred Acton. Miss Briscoe is also seeing the work through press as the January, 1967, issue of the NEW PHILOSOPHY.

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A HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF FREE WILL

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I. INTRODUCTION—HERACLITUS

John Wright, Bishop of Pittsburgh, in a foreword to a three-volume text on philosophy, tells a story about Gertrude Stein when she was dying. According to the story:

. . . she wearily asked the friends clustered about her bed: *What is the answer?* No one replied; no theologian was present. *In that case,* she insisted, *what is the question?* The silence remained unbroken; philosophy, too, was without a representative.¹

¹ Jesse A. Mann and Gerald F. Kreyche, ed., *Reflections on Man* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1966), p. viii.

Reading this made me wonder if the relation between the philosophers and our modern poets and artists is somewhat less than it might be. The connection has not always been so thin. Lucretius put what Democritus said into verse and constructed cosmological grounds for the Epicurean belief in free will:

When the atoms are travelling straight down through empty space by their own weight, at quite indeterminate times and places, they swerve ever so little from their course. . . .²

Other poets have taken the opposite position. For example, Chaucer is quoted:

I am, he said, but done for, so to say;

For all that comes, comes by necessity, . . .

Troilus sees no way of avoiding the conclusion that "free choice is an idle dream."³

While these two poets treated the problem on the natural plane, others were concerned with Divine things and especially with man's relation to an omnipotent and omniscient God.

Milton's *Paradise Lost* tries "to justify the ways of God to man," tries to show how it can be understood that God foresaw Adam's disobedience and yet that this disobedience was an act of free will. Milton also tries to show how it can be understood that those who follow Adam can preserve an individual responsibility through free choice.

There is much too much concerning free will for a single talk or even for a single mind. The problems set by accepting determination on the natural plane and omnipotence and omniscience on the Divine plane plague all who have thought about the subject of man's relation to freedom. As the authors of *The Syntopicon* put it:

As the contingent is opposed to the necessary, as that which happens by chance is opposed to that which is fully determined by causes, so fortune is opposed to fate or destiny. This opposition is most evident in the great poems, especially the tragedies, which depict man's efforts to direct his own destiny, now pitting his freedom against both fate and fortune, now courting fortune in his struggle against fate.⁴

² Lucretius, *On The Nature Of The Universe*, translated by Ronald Latham (London: Penguin Books, 1952), p. 66.

³ Chaucer: *Troilus and Criseyde*, quoted in *The Great Ideas. A Syntopicon of Great Books of the Western World*, (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), vol. I, p. 517.

⁴ *Syntopicon*, vol. I, p. 186.

Not only the poets but almost everybody, willingly or unwillingly, sooner or later comes face to face with these deep and broad problems. In the book already referred to it says,

Although relatively few men in history have given us a coherent and thoroughgoing philosophy of man, it is safe to assert that no thinking adult has ever failed to formulate for himself some philosophy of man, however unrefined. More often than not, the person making such an implicit formulation would not even be aware of his doing so. Yet if he were asked to respond to some key questions, it would be immediately apparent that he had broached the subject.

Let us ask him, for example, whether he thinks man is free, and if so, to what extent. Or we might inquire of him the meaning that he ascribes to freedom as it is applied to man. If such questions are posed Socratically, the answers are bound to be forthcoming, since everyone has given at least peripheral consideration to these and to similar questions.⁵

A philosophy usually begins with a cosmology—begins when there is a presumption of some kind of form and with a concept of substance. It begins with a reality, a being. Whatever else Heraclitus may have given philosophy, he is most important for giving to all philosophies the demanding questions, "What in any reality is moved?" and "Where in any reality is there change?" He is answered by an opponent who denies change and asserts only what *is* and that it *is* because it is permanent and fixed. So Heraclitus is really responsible for Parmenides. Once this confrontation has been effected, no philosopher and no scientist can ignore the application of the problem of change to the realities of his subject. The scientist sees change and motion in all the composite and simple particulars of nature: changes of state produce spectra, and activity produces myriads of records in cloud chambers, bubble chambers, and photographic emulsions. There are also other motions: electron spins, nuclear spins, particle decay, radioactivity, fission, and fusion. But modern physical science also depends on what is fixed in such concepts as bonding, the geometry of molecules, and other fixed aspects of the structure of matter. While it is true that activity and change produce the most startling and insistent demands upon our interest, the unchanging character of molecules, of atoms, and of certain particles provides the fixed framework in which activity itself can be studied.

⁵ Mann and Kreyche, *Reflections on Man*, p. 1.

So it is also on the Divine plane, where the Lord is the Reality. We recall Heraclitus when we are taught of the Lord's influx, of His Love and His Divine Truth. Yet also it seems that Parmenides speaks when we think of the Lord's enduring presence everywhere, of His certain unchanging nature even unto eternity.

What is it that makes change? What is it that is behind action? There are people who believe that always in Divine acts, often in human acts, and even sometimes in changes in material things, the chain of cause and effect relations must sooner or later come to an end. The first cause is a spontaneous cause and it is identified with free will, either in God or in man, and even sometimes in things.

Perhaps free will was not yet a consciously recognized concept in those early days of philosophy when Heraclitus lived. In the aphorisms of that time, not only with respect to men but also with respect to the gods, it was fate and fortune. The concepts that come from self-conscious introspection did not yet seem to exist in that period of thought. Heraclitus taught that there was law, fixed and unalterable law. Sometimes this law was fate and sometimes it was justice. To follow law is necessary. "This alone is wise," he says, "to understand the intelligence by which all things are steered through all things." And so we can presume that if the question of the existence of free will had come up, he would have voted against it.

II. SOCRATES AND PLATO

In the important Greek period that produced Socrates, then Plato, and then Aristotle, man's freedom and man's responsibility became founded upon rational grounds. Rationality depends upon knowledge. Heraclitus had seemed to make philosophy the science of unalterable law consisting of teachings about fate, of an intelligence beyond man which steers him through all things. This was a positive teaching. The Sophists who followed succeeded in bringing into question all positive teaching about anything—even about the existence of any kind of dependable knowledge whatever. Their method, manifest in the dialogue, seemed to bring into confrontation a negative principle against every positive assertion. What indeed could be meant in such

circumstances about knowledge? If thought itself is chaotic, turbulent, without order, what place for freedom?

This was the extreme situation into which Socrates entered. It was not only to establish virtue itself, as so many have said, but to establish the meaning of virtue that seems to characterize the problem of Socrates. The most important virtue in these circumstances is knowledge. As expressed in one place:

He held that man's crowning achievement is knowledge. Having attained knowledge, man would do the right thing, he would be good. Without knowledge man was in danger of acting wrongly. Further, he believed that man could, through knowledge, have some influence upon his destiny here and hereafter. Man might influence to some degree at least the fate which was his. Here was the beginning of a belief, vague though it was, that a man was possessed of some degree of freedom of choice.⁶

As the importance of Socrates lies in his effort to raise up knowledge as a virtue, so Plato's importance depends upon his emphasis upon reason, which is the faculty of knowledge and thought. Here we have a problem in language with which I cannot involve myself, but I give the following from the *Syntopicon*:

Though [Plato] does not use the word [will], the role he assigns to spirit as the auxiliary of reason corresponds to the function performed by what later writers call "will."⁷

Contemporary writers take opposing attitudes on Plato's views on the dignity and responsibility of the individual. Some accuse him of being a totalitarian. If they are right, he would probably have voted on the side of those opposing the existence of free will. Karl Popper takes this position:

Although I admire much in Plato's philosophy, far beyond those parts which I believe to be Socratic, I do not take it as my task to add to the countless tributes to his genius. I am, rather, bent on destroying what is in my opinion mischievous in this philosophy. It is the totalitarian tendency of Plato's political philosophy which I shall try to analyse and to criticize.⁸

On the other hand John Wild has commented upon this as follows:

⁶ S. E. Frost, Jr., *Basic Teachings of the Great Philosophers* (Garden City: Dolphin Books, Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1962), p. 130f.

⁷ *Syntopicon*, vol. II, p. 1072.

⁸ Karl R. Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1963), vol. I, p. 34.

Social justice is the manifestation of an order that must first be achieved within. The ultimate choice rests with the single person, and, whatever his lot, there is always room for such a choice. No matter how degenerate a culture may become, it is always possible for the individual to rebel, and to initiate a process of reversal.

A primary aim of Plato's life was to preserve the life and spirit of such a rebel and, so far as this was possible, to continue this rebellion. According to Plato, Socrates was born into a community suffering from intellectual confusion and lethargy, and from social disorder and power politics. In his portrait of Socrates he is trying to show how the weak and fragile individual person can use his unique powers of reason and rational aspiration to combat such tendencies in thought and word and deed. Plato's final answer to totalitarianism is the life and work of Socrates.

To anyone who is seriously in doubt about this, the only possible suggestion is: read the dialogues for yourself and see.⁹

I confess that the above is an indirect way of relating Plato to the particular problem of free will, and that only by implication does it give his attitude. But, whether one limits himself to the dialogues in which Socrates takes part or extends his reading throughout all of Plato, he will find that not only political freedom but also freedom of thought and individual act permeate all of what seems to make life worthwhile for Plato. This is evident even though his language is not our language, and the concept which goes by the word "will" was not yet explicitly developed.

It was the teachings of Socrates that ennobled the early works of Plato. Plato carried on the teaching of freedom in a constructive view of a divine Creator, who placed responsibility upon man to "so order his life as . . . to live justly and wisely."¹⁰ Man is free to control his passions, but man is also free to allow them to destroy the harmony that would enable him to live in a proper way.

The problem in language, referred to above with Plato, concerning the term "will" seems to continue with Aristotle. Nevertheless we are told that the word appears in English translations as if the Greek original were different.¹¹ At any rate we seem to be at the place where the concept of will is emergent.

Frost comments on Aristotle as follows:

⁹ John Wild, *Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 25.

¹⁰ Frost, *Basic Teachings*, p. 131.

¹¹ *Syntopicon*, vol. II, p. 1072.

Central in the thinking of Aristotle is the belief in the freedom of man. Morality, for him, is not a matter of some inevitable law, but is a matter of free choice. He writes that "Virtue, as well as evil, lies in our power." We are free to do that which is good or to do that which is evil. There is no power in the universe forcing us either way. In another place he says, "Virtue is a disposition, or habit, involving deliberate purpose or choice."¹²

III. EPICUREANS AND STOICS

The results of the Socratic-Platonic period were preserved through the threads of thought maintained by the Neo-Platonists. Free choice, man's responsibility, and the effects upon the various theories of ethics or psychology, and of the state and government, place emphasis upon liberty.

The main new beginnings are with the Epicureans, the Stoics, and somewhat later, of course, in Christianity as taught by the early Christian fathers, notably Origen.

The Epicurean demand is called hedonism. The problem presented to the Epicurean is how to define and to make possible the good life that depends upon pleasure. While there are noble ends involved, they are all natural. Epicureanism, whatever its more or less obvious results later in its decline, at the outset at least did place upon man the responsibility to choose certain things and not others. Its seriousness is implied by the nature of its educational curriculum. It required a study of man's nature. Music, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy are the sciences which contribute to the purpose of Epicureanism—all others are valueless. The freedom that is established is freedom from the fear of gods, freedom from fear of natural phenomena, and freedom from the fear of death. Each of these does seem to merit attention. But the limitation to natural ends leads to justifications or values depending only upon those ends.

If natural ends and natural means are what are brought to a philosophy, then freedom and free choice must depend upon nature. And although Epicurean doctrine for its more or less full development depends upon Epicurus, its cosmological seeds were sown by Democritus a hundred years before. Democritus, however, had inserted a stumbling block. His theory of atoms with their natural motions seemed to imbue nature with a determinism which

¹² Frost, *Basic Teachings*, p. 131f.

left no room for freedom. The very nature of deterministic atoms of which man is constituted would determine the nature of man. And so it was necessary that Epicurus assign to the atoms themselves some power or element of will. They must in some way be free to react against the forces of nature. This task was performed for the Epicureans by Lucretius in his poem referred to above.

Here we see beginnings or the seeds of thought which are to receive attention again and again in history. *First* the units of creation are endowed with things that go far beyond mere existence, mere locality, mere impenetrability. We recognize some of the characteristics of the monads of Leibniz. *Second* the beginning of individuality is seen in spontaneous activity. Spontaneity cannot follow from a unique cause-and-effect relation. Spontaneity can follow only if there is a possibility of more than one activity. And if there is any basis for individuality it seems to imply choice of some kind.

The Stoic philosophy tried to weld together the Heraclitian activity-principle in all things with the Parmenidian immovability principle in matter. What is important with respect to free will, however, is the stress the Stoics placed upon reason and its relation to cosmology. The Stoic's universe was much larger and its content more complex than that of the Epicureans. Knowledge as a virtue with Socrates was not enough; there also had to be a criterion of truth. Logic and metaphysics are added therefore to the curriculum of the Epicureans listed above.

To the Stoics nature is deterministic. Even God is not completely free. Although He has prevision and will, He himself is substance, and from this substance "everything proceeds with the necessity of a process of nature."¹³ When man in his turn understands through reason the eternal laws of nature, he will obey these laws of nature. This represents his manifest freedom, for he is free to assent. Thilly and Wood put this in the very interesting way:

A man is free when he acts in accordance with reason, that is, in obedience to the eternal laws of nature.¹⁴

¹³ Frank Thilly and Ledger Wood, *A History of Philosophy* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 3d ed., 1964), p. 135.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

As there were new beginnings with the Epicureans, there were also new beginnings with the Stoics which are of interest to us with respect to our study of freedom. *First* is the idea that freedom when applied to God does not mean that God must be a libertine but himself acts according to law. *Second* is the phrase, "acts in accordance with reason." These concepts have a familiar ring to a reader of Swedenborg's *Divine Providence*.

I hasten on now, not ignoring the possible influence of the early Christians upon the ideas of free will. But in their case the teachings of Christ are more immediate and lack the doctrine which is reflected in later Christian thought beginning with Augustine. Their more immediate concern was with love of the neighbor, with forgiveness and getting rid of passions, in short with following the example of Christ. When reason does come to the fore, it is sometimes condemned. It must not interfere with faith and the simple expressions of faith. How remote all this is from the usual elements that make up the history of philosophy is shown by Thilly and Wood. They begin by quoting Tertullian:

"The Son of God was born. I am not ashamed of it because it is shameful; the Son of God died, it is credible for the very reason that it is silly; and, having been buried, He rose again, it is certain because it is impossible." This is a polemical overstatement of the Christian positions, but it suggests to us that in the third century, from the point of view of Christianity as a faith, classicism was bankrupt both in epistemology and ethics.¹⁵

Certainly man is free to choose among these things. He is free not to love the neighbor; he is free not to forgive; he is free not to control his passions; but it is doubtful, lacking doctrine and philosophy, that he will make a self-conscious judgment whether free will exists or not, and if so to what extent.

IV. ORIGEN

That man has freedom in fact means that he is free to choose what is evil, that is, what is not good. This is called a permission. The existence of permissions within the stories of the Bible testifies to a belief in freedom to one who believes. But also these very same permissions testify not only against free will but often against a belief in revelation itself.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 167.

The early Christian father and teacher Origen devotes Chapter I of Book III of his work *On First Principles* to free will. He begins by reciting what is evidence in favor of free will based upon experiences in life. Origen also has a cosmological principle which explains the possibility of free will. This evidence exists in its first beginning when "living things are moved from within themselves when there arises within them an image which calls forth an impulse."

The rational animal, however, has something besides its imaginative nature, namely reason, which judges the images. Some it rejects, others it approves of, . . . So it happens that, since there are in the nature of reason possibilities of contemplating good and evil, by following out which and contemplating them both we are led to choose good and avoid evil, we are worthy of praise when we devote ourselves to the practice of good, and of blame when we act in the opposite way.¹⁶

But for the most part Origen's arguments depend upon the Bible. He notes statements which quite literally support freedom.¹⁷ As when Moses says,

I have set before thy face the way of life and the way of death. Choose the good and walk in it. (Deut. XXX 15, 19.)

And Isaiah:

If ye are unwilling and disobey me, a sword shall devour you. (Is. I. 19, 20).

Also:

Indeed, there are in the scriptures ten thousand passages which with the utmost clearness prove the existence of free will.¹⁸

But Origen does not make use only of an eclectic assortment of quotations. He also comments extensively on some hard examples, for he then says,

But since certain sayings from both the Old and the New Testaments incline us to the opposite conclusion, namely, that it is not in our power whether we keep the commandments and are saved or transgress them and are lost. . . .¹⁹

He then comments at length on,

¹⁶ Origen, *On First Principles*, translated by G. W. Butterworth (New York: Harper Torchbooks, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1966), pp. 159-160.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

I will harden Pharaoh's heart (Exod. IV, 21. VII, 3.)

That seeing they may not see (Matt. XIII, 10.)

I will take away their stony hearts of flesh, that they may walk in my statutes and keep my judgments (Ezek. XI, 19, 20.)²⁰

All of these as well as quotations selected from the Pauline writings, which were so effective in church history, seem to indicate that God makes the choice. Nevertheless Origen's effort is always to produce explanations which preserve man's freedom. I will jump forward momentarily to Swedenborg, to bring out a comparison.

In the work *Divine Providence* Swedenborg treats of the choices made by individuals and also by nations, which were choices against God. Nevertheless they were allowed by permission in accordance with the laws of Divine Providence:

1. The wisest of men, Adam, and his wife suffered themselves to be led astray by a serpent, and God did not avert this by His Divine Providence.
2. Their first son Cain killed his brother Abel, and God did not withhold him at the time by speaking to him, but only after the deed cursed him.
3. The Israelitish nation worshipped a golden calf in the desert, and acknowledged it as the god which led them out of the land of Egypt. Yet Jehovah saw this from Mount Sinai nearby and did not seek to prevent it.
4. David numbered the people, and in consequence a pestilence was sent upon them, by which so many thousands of men perished; and God, not before but after the deed, sent the prophet Gad to him and announced punishment.
5. Solomon was permitted to establish idolatrous worship.
6. Many kings after him were permitted to profane the temple and the holy things of the Church.
7. And lastly, that nation was permitted to crucify the Lord.²¹

The next three numbers (DP 237, 238, 239) enumerate particular examples of how every worshipper of himself may confirm himself against the Divine Providence. The balance of the chapter (Nos. 240-274) is devoted to an extensive commentary on these enumerations.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 167.

²¹ Emanuel Swedenborg, *Angelic Wisdom concerning the Divine Providence*, translated by Wm. C. Dick and E. J. Pulsford (London: The Swedenborg Society, Inc., 1949), no. 236.

In the history of the Christian Church, St. Augustine stands in a crucial position. The denial of free will and the institution of predestination begins with him. People still debate whether he was more of a religious figure than a philosopher, but today generally his teachings are referred to as philosophical.

The abstract for Chapter XXIII of Book XII of his *City of God* reads as follows:

That God foreknew that the first man whom he created would sin, and at the same time foresaw how large a company of righteous men he would translate by his grace from the human race into the society of the angels.²²

The extreme meanings of the words "grace" and "faith" now appear simultaneously. To whom God's grace will be given no one knows. Augustine says,

Faith is really faith only when we await in hope what we do not yet see in fact.²³

The place of grace and faith in their extreme forms is given in the following:

As it is, however, through a greater and more wonderful act of grace on the part of the Saviour our punishment of sin has been converted to serve the ends of righteousness. For whereas once man was told: "You will die if you sin," the martyr is now told: "Die that you may not sin." Whereas once man was told: "If you break the commandment, you shall surely die," we are now told: "If you refuse to die, you will be breaking the commandment." The thing that was once duly feared to prevent sin is now duly accepted to avoid sin.²⁴

The extremities are further emphasized as follows:

This is true in the case of the holy martyrs who are confronted by their persecutor with the alternative of abandoning their faith or suffering death. For the righteous choose to suffer for their belief what the first wicked men suffered for their lack of it.²⁵

What got man into this condition? Was he never possessed of will? This doesn't seem to fit. He has a will but it is evil, according to Augustine. Apparently in the original condition in the Garden of Eden he had a will. But according to Augustine

²² St. Augustine, *The City of God Against the Pagans*, transl. by Philip Levine (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 113.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 147 (Book XIII, chapt. iv).

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 149.

man became possessed of pride and "pride is the start of sin." (Ecclesiasticus 10:13) So man had already become evil by developing a new will, but this new will was an evil will. And so Augustine's heading for Chapter XIII of Book XIV is:

That in Adam's transgression the evil act was preceded by an evil will.²⁶

Aquinas in some measure had a clear belief in the freedom of the human will as can be seen when he distinguished between man and beast. But when he was faced with the Augustinian teaching he modified his free will doctrine, and accepted the Augustinian doctrines of original sin and salvation by Divine grace. Aquinas, however, clung to the belief that even though grace is from God, man must cooperate. There is thus a sense in which man is responsible.

V. DESCARTES

Descartes stands at the very opening of modern science, and because he recognized the philosophical implications of mechanical determinism associated with that science, we should examine his ideas on free will somewhat in detail. Perhaps he better than anyone of his day recognized the problems set for free will by a mechanistic universe.

In his conception of external nature, he was in agreement with the great natural scientists of the new era: everything in nature—even physiological processes and emotions—must be explained mechanically, without the aid of forms or essences. At the same time, he accepted the fundamental principles of the time-honored idealistic or spiritualistic philosophy and attempted to adapt them to the demands of the new science: his problem was to reconcile the mechanism of nature with the freedom of God and the human soul.²⁷

Descartes accepted the existence of free will. The theorems of his *Principles* explicitly state this. But I thought that for this evening it would add to the variety of our topic if rather than discussing these I discuss how Descartes considers the problem of man's relation to God and its connection with will.

He begins by acknowledging that God wills but not as we do, nor does He in any way will evil. What then is the source of evil with us? How do we err at all? Concerning this Thilly-Wood interprets Descartes as follows:

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 335.

²⁷ Thilly and Wood, *A History of Philosophy*, p. 302.

In the first place, the power of distinguishing the true from the false, which God has given us, is not infinite. Moreover, error depends on the concurrence of two causes, namely, the faculty of cognition and the faculty of election, or the power of free choice—understanding and will.²⁸

Descartes says of God:

. . . it is impossible for him ever to deceive me . . . for in all fraud and deceit there is a certain imperfection: and although it may seem that the ability to deceive is a mark of subtlety or power, yet the will testifies without doubt of malice and weakness; and such, accordingly, cannot be found in God.²⁹

Descartes claims that any faculty given man when used “aright” would not lead to error. So although Descartes cannot see within himself the cause of error or falsity, nevertheless,

. . . recurring to myself, experience assures me that I am nevertheless subject to innumerable errors.³⁰

Descartes suggests error is a defect, and yet he says:

Nevertheless this is not yet quite satisfactory; for error is not a pure negation. . . .³¹

Descartes asks whether God implants in his creature “any faculty not perfect in its kind?” And yet he asks if it is better if “I should be deceived than I should not?”

But he suggests that he must not be surprised if “I am not always capable of comprehending the reasons why God acts as he does. . . .” Then he says (almost without any apparent relation to his argument),

It further occurs to me that we must not consider only one creature apart from others, if we wish to determine the perfection of the works of Deity, but generally all his creatures together; for the same object that might perhaps, with some show of reason, be deemed highly imperfect if it were alone in the world, may for all that be the most perfect possible, considered as forming part of the whole universe. . . .³²

In pursuing his effort to separate the origin of evil from God he says:

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 307.

²⁹ Descartes, *Meditations on the First Philosophy*, transl. by John Veitch in *The Method, Meditations and Philosophy of Descartes* (New York: Tudor Publishing Co., n.d.), Meditation IV, p. 250.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 251.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 252.

With regard to privation, in which alone consists the formal reason of error and sin, this does not require the concurrence of Deity, because it is not a thing [or existence], and if it be referred to God as to its cause, it ought not to be called privation, but negation [according to the signification of these words in the schools]. For in truth it is no imperfection in Deity that he has accorded to me the power of giving or withholding my assent from certain things of which he has not put a clear and distinct knowledge in my understanding; but it is doubtless an imperfection in me that I do not use my freedom aright, and readily give my judgment on matters which I only obscurely and confusedly conceive.³³

Returning to the previous suggestion made by Descartes and referring to the above statement that it is necessary that he realize that he is not alone among God's creatures, he says:

And I easily understand that, in so far as I consider myself as a single whole, without reference to any other being in the universe, I should have been much more perfect than I now am, had Deity created me superior to error; but I cannot therefore deny that it is not somehow a greater perfection in the universe, that certain of its parts are not exempt from defect, as others are, than if they were all perfectly alike.³⁴

To return to his own responsibility in the matter of error he says:

I can acquire . . . the habitude of not erring . . . it is in being superior to error that the highest and chief perfection of man consists. . . .³⁵

Following Descartes and the introduction of the determinism of mechanics various ideas about the relation of man to his Creator were considered, for example, pre-established harmony and occasionalism. One of Descartes' most loyal followers so far as the consistent application of rationalism is concerned is Spinoza. But his complete pantheism leaves little room for freedom. The only self-caused is the underlying substance of all things, namely God. No finite individual has freedom. With Leibniz there is an extreme individualization introduced by his monads. Man, the highest monad, is free from influence of other monads. Man strives and man chooses the desire which is strongest with himself. Leibniz accepted the mechanization of science but held that man has an inner nature which is free.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 256.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 257.

VI. KANT AND THE ROMANTICISTS

Kant demands that free will exist. But this demand comes about in a very special way which borders on the paradoxical. In considering the question, "How is metaphysics in general possible?" Kant lists four "antinomies." Each of these has a thesis and its opposite or antithesis. The third antinomy is expressly pertinent here. It is this:

Causality according to the laws of nature is not the only causality from which the appearances of the world can be deduced. There is also required for their explanation another, that of freedom.⁸⁶

Its corresponding antithesis is, briefly put, there is no Liberty, but all is Nature. In his *Critique of Pure Reason* he considers that he has succeeded in proving both the thesis and its antithesis. This amounts to saying that it can be proved that there is freedom, and also it can be proved that there is no freedom. A similar condition exists with the other antinomies. Number one states that time and space has a beginning; Number two that everything in the world consists of simple elements; and the fourth is that in the series of World-Causes there is some necessary Being.

What is Kant's solution to the antinomy on free will? It is not an easy one nor is it consistent with other elements of his philosophy. As Thilly and Wood put it:

To the intellect's destructive criticism of its own competence and the will's demand for the recognition of its moral and religious values, philosophy was now compelled to make some answer.⁸⁷

Coupled with the "intellect's destructive criticism of its own competence" as manifest by the proofs both of the thesis and of the antithesis, there was also the essentially idealistic conclusion in Kant's philosophy that the human mind could know only perceptions but not the things-in-themselves. Strictly this was not idealism because he held that while the mind could not know the things-in-themselves, nevertheless the mind could *think* them.

⁸⁶ Norman Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'* (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), p. 492.

⁸⁷ Thilly and Wood, *A History of Philosophy*, p. 413.

In addition to his effort to keep strict adherence to the conclusions of pure reason, Kant was at the same time moved to accept a strong feeling for man's moral responsibility. The expression of this responsibility was called by him "the moral imperative." It could be stated that "one ought, therefore one can." This he says insures the freedom of the will. Kant felt that man has a certain power to originate acts. Man knows of this power because he holds himself responsible for his decisions and acts. Now every act has a cause. The cause of the act is man's will. The regression stops at this place. One might say that man's will is the first cause of his acts.

According to Kant the existence of free will must be. But the necessity of its existence does not depend on pure reason because pure reason alone demonstrates also its denial. Free will takes place on a different level than that of nature which is completely deterministic.

He thus seeks to prove that the determinism of nature does not altogether preclude the Idea of free causality. . . . The intellect refuses to regard anything within the phenomenal series as absolutely free and independent; everything is contingent, that is depends on something else. But this is not to deny that the whole series may depend on some intelligible being, which is free, independent of all empirical conditions, and itself the ground of the possibility of all these phenomena. . . . When we are speaking of phenomena, we must speak in terms of sense; but that is not necessarily the only way of looking at things.³⁸

The German philosophers immediately following Kant form the school called Romanticism. The elements of Romanticism are already in Kant. Romanticism in its beginnings in Kant is a reaction to the results of his *Critique of Pure Reason*, where the conclusion is that the thing-in-itself is unknowable. In Kant's case, however, this *noumena*, as it is called, is known in one exceptional case and that is the case of self or ego.

But it is but a short step from saying a thing is unknowable to denying its existence. Thus idealism is the principle living thought in Romanticism. That is, the realm of *noumena* is the living spirit. All reality is ultimately spiritual. Although the way in which the spiritual is regarded differs among the romantics, they all react against the results of pure reason alone. If reason has let them down to what do they turn? It is said:

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 435.

Knowing is living, and the philosopher must approach nature through inspiration, longing, and sympathy.³⁹

And wherein is the seat of inspiration, of longing, and of sympathy? It is in the self and in the relation of the self to other selves. And while romanticism was inadequate as a complete philosophy, it did place emphasis upon things that had been set aside by pure reason such as the emotional factor in knowledge and concepts dealing with change, and especially with creativity. The emphasis upon the *a priori* in Kant left no room for creative thought. Yet the principle effects of romanticism could not be explained in words. One could understand "only by re-living the experience of their creator."

The exact place of this in Kant appears at the end of the cause-and-effect regression in nature, that is, when man acts. When man acts it is no longer because of natural law but because a choice has been made. This is the central object of interest in the case of both Fichte and Schelling. As with Kant the subject is not science nor metaphysics but moral law. As Thilly and Wood put it:

If it were not for the moral law, we should know nothing of freedom and the ideal order, and be helpless to free ourselves from the mechanism of nature; it is moral truth that both sets us free and proves our freedom.⁴⁰

Thus for Fichte the self or ego is itself a self-determining activity.

Only such activity is truly real, all else is dead passive existence: it is the principle of life and mind, of knowledge and conduct, indeed, of our entire world of experience, the moving power in all progress and civilization.⁴¹

And later:

. . . only when we have seen through the nature of ordinary knowing, detected its superficiality and relativity, can we grasp the living realities behind the surface: freedom, the moral world-order, and God. If we were limited to scientific intelligence, we could never rise above the notion of an inexorable causal order, and would ourselves be unable to escape the machinery of nature.⁴²

³⁹ Dagobert D. Runes, ed., *Dictionary of Philosophy* (Totowa, N. J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1966), p. 272.

⁴⁰ Thilly and Wood, *A History of Philosophy*, p. 452.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 453.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 456.

And again later :

The man without the ethical ideal, the man who cannot free himself from the machinery of nature, cannot conceive of himself otherwise than as a thing or product, or take an interest in the free self: he cannot know and prize what he has not experienced—the freedom to be a person—and he cannot experience it because he has never achieved it. The man who has freed himself from the slavery of the senses, who is a self-determining agent, regards himself as a power superior to everything sensuous, and cannot will to conceive himself as a mere thing.⁴³

The place of nature, of the world and its deterministic laws, is given as follows:

The world is a means of realizing moral purposes; since it affords a sphere for moral endeavor, what difference does it make whether it is real or apparent? The ego as a self-active being needs a world of opposition, one in which it can struggle, one in which it can become conscious of itself and its freedom, one in which it can achieve freedom. It demands a world ordered according to laws, a strictly determined world, in order that the free self may realize its purposes by relying on these laws. The ego must know what to expect, otherwise rational purposive action would be impossible.⁴⁴

Although both Fichte and Schelling strive to establish a basis for free choice their cosmological approach is different. The ego of Fichte is an individual, but the ego of Schelling bears a close relation to man in Spinoza's pantheism. In Schelling it is the absolute that is unfolded in history. There is no distinction between the world of nature and spirit in Schelling; all is monistic.

"All qualities are sensations, all bodies are percepts of nature; nature itself, with all its sensations and percepts, is a congealed intelligence."⁴⁵

And later Thilly and Wood say of Schelling:

The different forces of nature are fundamentally the same; heat, light, magnetism, electricity are different stages of one and the same principle, as are also inorganic and organic nature.⁴⁶

The third important German of the romanticist period is Friedrich Schleiermacher. The special problem he tackles is how to establish man's individual freedom in its relation to God. He carries the monism of Schelling a step further into complete pantheism. As Thilly and Wood freely quote him:

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 458.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 468, Schelling quoted.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 468.

The sense of universality is the highest condition of one's own perfection; the ethical life is a life in society, in a society of unique individuals who respect humanity in its uniqueness, whether in themselves or in others. "The more each becomes like the universe, the more fully he communicates himself to others, the more perfect will be the unity of all; . . . rising above themselves and triumphing over themselves, they are on the way to true immortality and eternity." It is the religious feeling, however, that illuminates one's entire life and brings unity into it. In the feeling of piety man recognizes that his desire to be a unique personality is in harmony with the action of the universe; "Religion regards all events in the world as the acts of God." Personal immortality is out of the question; the immortality of religion consists in becoming one with the infinite; to be immortal is "to be eternal in every moment of time."⁴⁷

This negative view of personal immortality illustrates how different the approach to idealism is among the romanticists.

Fichte, in quite contrary manner to that given above, believes in a difference between the absolute ego and the individual ego.

Fichte's system depends both upon Kant's moral imperative and upon a universal moral purpose of God.⁴⁸

There can be no deliverance from sense unless there is something to be delivered from, a state of unfreedom, a natural ego limited by a world. The moral law implies freedom, freedom implies overcoming of obstacles, and this implies a sensible world. The moral law thus implies an indefinitely continued life of struggle, hence immortality; and it implies a universal purpose or a God.⁴⁹

VII. NATURALISM

Since we who are here tonight are imbedded in the contemporary period, it is impossible to select the most historically significant contemporary school. Nevertheless that attitude which during the nineteenth century was called mechanistic and which is more properly now called naturalistic is probably the most influential.

Its original scientific basis was Newton's mechanics. The laws of nature obeying these Newtonian principles are called deterministic. How can free will exist in a deterministic world? You will recall that Descartes already had pointed out that nature and even biological and even some psychological faculties are mechanistic. But as a dualist Descartes looked for free will

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 476.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 462.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

on a different level of creation than that of body and nature. So also with Kant there cannot be freedom in a world of nature that is controlled by causal relations. It was necessary for him to retreat into the idealistic self to find a place where free will could operate.

But the temper of our times is critical of dualism. People seem to be more easily aware of its problems than they are of the problems of monism. And so if one cannot go to a higher or interior level of creation as in dualism, or deny the things-in-themselves in nature as in idealism, one cannot establish free will in the mind.

There were those with another ideal—also monistic, but materialistic rather than idealistic. Among them were La Mettrie, John Priestley, David Hartley, and many others. In general the materialistic position solved the free will question by simply stating that in a deterministic world there is no room for free will.

Herbart was clear and precise on this point; for example:

Everything in the mind follows fixed laws, and psychical processes are reducible to mathematical formulae. Hence there is no free will.⁵⁰

Although Herbart was not a monist his conclusion concerning the deterministic nature of mental activity agrees with naturalistic monism.

Herbart died in the middle of the nineteenth century, and monistic materialism has since had little to offer that was new. In the late twenties while I was in college I recall that when Heisenberg's Indeterminacy Principle was first stated, some of the English physicists suggested that this principle made in deterministic nature a place for freedom. This seemed to repeat in a measure the Epicurean argument concerning Democritean atoms. A contemporary physicist William J. Pollard writes,

I have grave doubts that there is any relationship at all between [the Heisenberg principle and human free will]. I cannot see how the existence of random chance fluctuations in the electrons, atoms, and molecules of which I am constituted can in any way contribute to an understanding of my subjective experience of my own freedom.⁵¹

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 494.

⁵¹ William G. Pollard, *Chance and Providence* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), p. 53f.

In the same work Pollard, who is also an ordained priest in the Episcopal Church, outlines a basis for freedom in what he calls "The Twofold Nature of Reality." This suggests the methods of Descartes and Kant mentioned above. With Descartes, philosophy is dualistic. Pollard's twofold reality depends upon the *I* and *It* and the *I* and *Thou* worlds of the theologian Martin Buber. He speaks of the intellectual prison that is the scientific world, which Pollard identifies with Buber's *I* and *It*. He says,

There remains the question: how can the man, who being enmeshed in the scientific thought forms of his age sees nothing beyond chance and accident in the shaping of events, be enabled to escape from his intellectual prison and helped over the barrier to the point where he is able to think Biblically about the same phenomena?⁵²

And so:

By its very nature science must be exclusively concerned with the world of observable objects and events.⁵³

Over and against this world there is the world of the *I* and *Thou* in which beings meet each other, as he says,

. . . not as objects of each other's experience, but as beings who share the fact of existence in common and meet on an equal basis and footing.⁵⁴

According to Pollard, freedom is absent in the world of *I* and *It* but emerges in the world of *I* and *Thou*. He gives a quotation from Buber, in this respect, a portion of which is,

"The free man is he who wills without arbitrary self-will. He believes in reality, that is, he believes in the real solidarity of the real twofold entity *I* and *Thou*."⁵⁵

What is given above on the history of free will is only an introduction to a vast subject. The history of philosophy can be written around cosmology, or around epistemology, or around values. This is well known. But I believe the history of philosophy could also be written around free will. Many views I have not mentioned would be given in a full treatment. Consider for illustration the following three examples:

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 153f.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 157.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

(1) Schopenhauer's view is that man can be happy and at peace only if he suppresses his selfish desires, that is, when he negates his will, when he wills not to will. This seems to be the first half of what the Writings teach. Their second half has to do with the training of a new will to take the place of the hereditary will. This illustrates that there is a variety of views on the desirability of man's having free will. According to Schopenhauer man has will but he should negate it.

(2) Philosophers in the examples above used reason, belief, introspection and psychological empiricism. John Stuart Mill made appeal to facts. According to him, "Freedom, . . . is a fact of human existence."⁵⁶ (See Thilly and Wood pp. 538-9 concerning Mill's ideas on a "Science of Human Conduct.")

(3) The members of the American pragmatic school, to varying degrees, affirmed in favor of free will. John Dewey came close to defining will in such a way as to support emergent evolution. As Frost puts his position,

He conceives of a world which is in the making, and man as doing some of the creating. Unless this is all a sham, a play before an audience, man must be free to make decisions and to have his decisions count in the ultimate nature of things. Human wants, desires, willings are determiners of the universe.⁵⁷

This was written before atomic energy became a pragmatic fact. At the present time we are awaiting an historical choice, which will be either dreadful or wonderful according to which path men will take in the use of the power that resides in the ultimates that are called atomic nuclei.

Dewey speaks of willings which are to determine the universe. His universe is a monistic natural universe. In the Writings we learn of man's responsibility of shaping and determining his own future through the training of a new will. We also learn of the formation to an ever-increasing extent of a more perfect heaven in what is called the Grand Man.

VIII. CONTEMPORARY ANIMISM

I mention elsewhere that the temper of the times is such as to feel consciously overburdened with the problems of dualism.

⁵⁶ Frost, *Basic Teachings*, p. 151.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 151f.

The problems of monism are not so consciously dealt with. Yet problems arise wherever any serious effort at a synthesis goes beyond an area or level of specialization. The challenge to the possible reality of free will clearly exists in a monistic and deterministic interpretation. Even monists have their terms that distinguish between "levels" or "areas," or "dimensions." There is a book entitled *Free Will and Determinism* by Allan M. Munn.⁵⁸ The first 194 of its 215 pages are devoted to a naturalistic-mechanistic description, linking a possible indeterminism in man with quantum mechanics. At last on page 195 he says,

Thus, just as in the last chapter we decided against consideration of a mind which was non-material and distinct from the physically observable brain (plus nervous system, etc.), similarly we will not concern ourselves with a will which is assumed to be an entity in itself.

And then he continues,

The coupling of the expression "free will" with that of "determinism" in the title of this book indicates that we consider the two to be concepts of the same functional type.

The monistic character is thus exemplified, but also the need to bring determinism and free will together in the same work is justified by the phrase "same functional type."

Animism to some may not seem to have any direct importance to our topic. But for one who holds the doctrine that all things have inner principles of spontaneity or activity, will is possibly related to things as well as humans. Far from being an obsolete idea, it has been revived at the present time. Even as spontaneity among the Lucretian atoms was necessary in order that man's freedom be possible, so with modern particles of physics there is an inner activity and spontaneity. But first consider how one author has interpolated Lucretian phrases as follows:

For [Lucretius], "nature free at once and rid of her haughty lords is seen to do all things spontaneously of herself without the meddling of the gods." . . . If man by his "power of free action" can "make some commencement or motion to break through the decrees of fate, in order that cause follow not cause from everlasting," it is because in the atoms of his makeup "there is another cause of motions . . . caused by a minute swerving of first-beginnings at no fixed part of space and no fixed time."⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Allan M. Munn, *Free-Will and Determinism* (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1960).

⁵⁹ *Syntopicon*, vol. I, p. 517.

An explicit reference of an anti-animistic character is found in the contemporary book referred to above :

We have established that indeterminism is a necessary condition for free-will. To see that it is not a sufficient condition we can take some simple examples.⁶⁰

One of the examples he takes is that of the motion of an electron through a pair of slits. This in physics is an example of an indeterminate motion. The author says,

. . . we would not speak of the electron's free will. . . .⁶¹

My old teacher in quantum mechanics back in the twenties has an article in the January issue for 1967 of *American Journal of Physics* entitled "Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics." In describing an electron-beam experiment similar to the one referred to by Munn, he says,

. . . after encountering the potential barrier the electron is either in the reflected wave or the transmitted wave. Potentially, it is in both until it makes a quantum transition, i.e., until it is scattered or absorbed into the material, or emits a photon, etc. Only in such an act does the electron "make up its mind" as to where it is and what it is doing.⁶²

One ought not to conclude too soon that the last sentence should not be taken too literally. The author continues,

Now all this sounds very strange when we are speaking about micro-objects. Somewhat similar statements do not sound strange when we are speaking about human beings or even the higher animals.⁶³

And somewhat later he says,

. . . as the research on viruses demonstrated that there is no sharp line of demarcation between the living and the non-living, so the development of quantum mechanics may be demonstrating that freedom is not something that is limited to man and the higher animals according to some conceptions of biological phenomena, but rather extends down in some measure to molecules, atoms, electrons, and all the elementary particles.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ Munn, *Free-Will and Determinism*, p. 212.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² Enos E. Witmer, "Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics and the Future of Physics," *American Journal of Physics* (Volume 35, no. 1, January 1967), p. 49.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

Apparently the origin of this idea was not with Witmer but with Dirac and Bohr according to what follows in the article. At any rate, even though the idea was considered and given up as an "explanation" by Bohr, the interesting fact is that animism was not so dead that the idea was not considered.

And here it is revived again in 1967 by Witmer, and properly so. For in a monistic interpretation of creation there is a definite problem. Specifically, in what piece of matter does life begin? And at what stage is free will introduced?

IX. OMNIPOTENCE AND FREEDOM

God's omnipotence from the human point of view has caused many to deny man's freedom, and sometimes this denial has even been the official doctrine of churches. The Writings teach that only through freedom and by exercise of his rationality can man begin to travel on the road to regeneration. This road to regeneration is what is meant by the saving of one's soul. It is in contrast with the opposite doctrine that man is saved only by vicarious atonement or by grace. Regeneration imposes upon man a responsibility, because he is man. Omnipotence to the New Church is an always present power for good and for the establishment of vessels for the reception of good. This is a positive principle of omnipotence as contrasted with a negative principle denying man to be free on the one hand, and on the other hand including within omnipotence the power of the Lord to act contrary to His own order.

There is a Memorabilium (TCR 74) which teaches concerning the Divine order:

Hear with moderation, what that order is, according to whose laws the omnipotent God acts.⁶⁵

In the Latin this reads: "*Auscultate primum cum moderamine. . .*" Yes, with *moderamine*—that is, with control or moderation. Why *cum moderamine*? Because, Swedenborg says,

God from Himself, as from order, created the universe in order, and for order; in like manner He created man, in whom He established the laws of His order, by virtue of which he became an image and likeness of God. The sum of those laws is that a man should believe

⁶⁵ Emanuel Swedenborg, *The True Christian Religion*, transl. by Isaiah Tansley (London: The Swedenborg Society, 1921), no. 74: 3.

in God, and love his neighbor, and so far as he does so from his natural powers, he makes himself a receptacle of the Divine omnipotence, and so far God unites Himself to man and man to Himself; then a man's faith becomes a living and saving faith, and his actions living and saving charity.⁶⁶

And all this is in contrast to the view that is expressed by some who appear in the same memorable relation.

Is not omnipotence hereby limited? and does not a limitation of omnipotence imply a contradiction? ⁶⁷

To this Swedenborg replied,

It is no contradiction to act omnipotently according to the laws of justice with judgment, or according to laws inscribed on love from wisdom; but the supposition that God can act contrary to the laws of His own justice and love is a contradiction, for this would be not to act from this judgment and wisdom. Such a contradiction is implied in this faith of yours, that God can of mere grace justify an unrighteous man. . . .⁶⁸

And then in the same relation Swedenborg spells out in detail what God's omnipotence is as it is manifest in the operations according to His order.

This we can see on the natural plane. For how could man have any freedom in a disorderly world? Determinism has been used to deny man freedom and yet what freedom would man have to conduct his daily life if the earth did not rotate on its axis according to deterministic laws—or in larger periods of time if it did not revolve in a true periodic manner in its orbit? The laws of mechanics are applied to the flight of an airplane so that there will be smooth laminar airflow and not turbulence. This is necessary so that the pilot can be free to guide his plane. How could this be the case if the air as it passed the plane, instead of following the law of Bernoulli, would follow only the law of chance? Consider a boat adrift on a violent and stormy sea. Here is a condition approaching turbulence where determination that leads to freedom of navigation is missing. What essential freedom of action do the occupants have—especially the captain? Must not his every act be carefully executed to face emergent contingency following contingency? He must

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, no. 74: 4.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

spend his entire mental resources trying to foresee and to ready himself for the next haphazard thrust of the tortuous waves, this sometimes merely to stabilize the ship to keep it afloat, with no freedom to direct it in a course.

And in society, how can there be any freedom of the individual unless there is law and order? And in the individual, how can he have any natural freedom of physical act whatsoever unless he is possessed of a body with reasonably good health, that is, a body in which deterministic functions of the heart, the lungs, the brains, the digestive system, etc., are in order? Similarly it is necessary that the mind itself be in order.

In what is spiritual with man—that is, his thought—man is possessed of two faculties: the faculty of reason and the faculty of freedom. These are his to think by and to act according to. While these are brought into play, he is possessed of a will and an understanding. These are cosmological principles and they too are sometimes spoken of as faculties. But they must be faculties in a different sense than the faculties of reason and freedom which he has from the beginning. For the understanding must be opened—hence changed—and the will that is with man originally is hereditary, and its evil associations must be laid aside, and a new will must be made. If one could see this new will, one could estimate the degree of man's regeneration. By his will and understanding, which man has through regeneration, conjunction with God is made possible, because man has freely chosen to be led by God rather than by what is of hell. Thus it says that there is "a reciprocal dwelling of man in God." What is this? Is not God always present everywhere? Is not man seemingly only modifying God's omnipotence and also His omnipresence? Not at all. God is present in all, but it is possible for man, because he is man, to make that presence within himself something different than the mere presence of God in things in general. As it says in the Writings,

. . . it must be known that God is perpetually present with and continually striving and acting in every man, even touching his free will, but yet never forcing it. For if He should violate a man's free will, his dwelling in God would be destroyed, and only God's dwelling in man—and this dwelling is in all—would remain whether on earth, in heaven, or in hell; for it is the source of their power to will and understand.⁶⁹

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, no. 74: 3.