

COMPARISON, ANALOGY, AND REAL CORRESPONDENCE

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The essential purpose of this study is to try to demonstrate the importance of analogical thought in the development of the interior natural mind as a basis and nexus for later spiritual thought from correspondences. I believe that the Writings teach that analogical thought is vital to the development of the first rational, in fact is one of its major functions. Yet while many today see this use of analogy, they dead-end its use through insisting that the probability or "verity" of an analogy can only be determined empirically. Thus they see inductive reasoning as the end rather than a means to the development of human thought. But I also believe that the importance of analogy to the natural mind can easily be overlooked by New Churchmen, because of the extremely common usage in both the philosophical works and the Writings of such terms as *comparison*, *similitude*, *analogy*, etc., as if they were identical with the terms *signification* or *correspondence*. Thus we tend to try to get the mind to think spiritually from causes, without first developing the fundamental processes of natural thought as a nexus or bridge. In this way we do not see perhaps as clearly as we should the exercise of analogical thought as an important step towards the later development of spiritual thought itself.

Let me begin the defense of analogical thought with an example of the many ways the Writings employ metaphorical language. In the Word, the Lord in respect to love is "*likened or compared*" to the sun (HH 119). In the Old and New Testaments the Lord is also "*called not only a sun but fire and light*" (DLW 98). This metaphor is carried over into the Heavenly Doctrine: "The sun of heaven is the Lord" (HH 117). Yet doctrine makes clear that this is not an identification, but grows out of the correspondence of all things to the Lord. "All *comparisons* in the Word are *significative*, for they are from *correspondences* in like manner as the things themselves" (AE 69). "The comparisons in the Word are all made by means of significatives" (AC 3901; see also 3941e, 4231, 7571, 10445; cf. 3579).

Now many of the comparisons in the Writings, if not identical

with correspondences, are closely linked to them, because they are based upon the correspondential appearances in the other world. For example, we read that the angels "liken" certain men to owls which see in darkness (HH 102). In a more direct use, however, of varied terminology in the Writings for the correspondential relationship, we read of such things as "a *likeness* and *analogy* between the formation of man in the womb and his reformation and regeneration" (Wis. IV). The universal heaven is a "*likeness or similitude*" of the Lord (AC 1013:4, 4302:3). Every society of heaven is a "*likeness*" of man (HH 68). And in the most perfect form there is a "*likeness*" of the parts with the whole (HH 72). And further, regarding what is almost universally treated as the correspondence between heart and lungs, we read of disclosing "the *analogy* with the love of the will and the wisdom of the understanding" (DLW 405:e). Or we read of the "*analogy* between natural good and truth and spiritual good and truth" (DP 312). Every created thing is an "analogue" (DLW 56; cf. CL 238). Love, wisdom, and use in their descent into the body are changed into "what is analogous and correspondent" (CL 183; cf. CL 389e. For examples of additional usages of "resemblances" [Lat. *instar*] see Love XVII; Ath. 22, AC 10076:2, 10125).

These statements indicate a seeming lack of definitive usage in the Writings or the Scriptures concerning likeness, comparison, metaphor, analogy, and even signification and correspondence. Some of these terms at times are certainly used definitively. But more frequently, I believe, they are used as synonyms to enrich the understanding of the basic concept of correspondence and so to lead to correspondential or spiritual thought. Such a use of synonyms provides different modes of approach to the doctrine. While not definitive, it is certainly in keeping with a dynamic and teaching view of rational revelation.

But we also realize that the Writings *seem* to make what we might call *ordinary* comparisons to elucidate doctrinal points. These comparisons do not *seem* to be strictly correspondential. (Cf. AC2715, 3404:3, 3425:2; TCR 57, 60, 117, 112, 123, 124, 125, 304, 325, 374, 375, 404, 506:7, 660, 710; CL 443; DP 294:3; Coro. 33.2, 51:3, 57:2, 59:4; SS 33.) Thus we also read of analogues, so called "on account of the appearance" (ISB 15:6). Or of something analogous "to freedom," "to taste," "to percep-

tion," "to reason" (TCR 499:2; AC 4622, 1442, 1962). Or again we read of a "merely analogous" relation between brutes and men (AC 671), but further, that some "not inaptly" compare themselves to brutes (EU 58). But perhaps the closest to a "common" comparison occurs where we read almost casually, "Such spirits may be *compared* to icebergs . . . or if you please may be *called* icebergs" (TCR 385).

The Writings *seem* then also to contain a common language use of metaphorical terms, as well as a use of them as general synonyms for signification and correspondence. We underscore the word "seem" in this statement, however, and would not press the argument too hard, because of what is said concerning comparisons in the Old and New Testaments.

It should be known that all comparisons in the Word are as much according to correspondences as are the things not said comparatively. [AE 411: 11].

In part the truths of the sense of the letter of the Word are not naked truths, but are appearances of truth, and are like similitudes and comparisons which are taken from such things as exist in nature, and are therefore accommodated and adapted to the capacity of the simple and also of children. But as these are at the same time correspondences, they are receptacles and abodes of genuine truth, and are vessels containing it. . . . [TCR 215; SS 40]

The Writings themselves at least sometimes use such comparisons for the sake of the simple.

This, too may be illustrated by comparisons; and this shall be done for the sake of the simple minded, who see better by comparisons than by analytically formed deductions from the Word and from reason. [TCR 131; cf. TCR 710, 724e]

In another place they state, "This is a *proper* comparison, because [there is a correspondence]" (TCR 367: 4).

We also must realize that the appearance that a comparison does not involve correspondences can be very strong even though fallacious. The teachings regarding the Old and New Testaments should make us very careful not to push too hard for the ordinary language usage of comparisons in the Writings. We read,

That by "a door" is signified communication, appears like a metaphorical way of speaking, or like a comparison; but in the Word there are no metaphorical expressions or comparisons, but real correspondences. Even the comparisons therein are made by such things as correspond. . . . [AC 8989: 11]

He who knows not the internal sense of the Word may suppose that such things in the Word are only comparisons, like many expressions in common speech, . . . But in the Word all things are representative of spiritual and celestial things, and are real correspondences; for the Word has come down from heaven, and because it has come down thence it is in its origin the Divine celestial and spiritual to which those things which belong to the sense of the letter correspond. [AC 4434:6]

One reading the Word believes that such things in it are merely comparisons, but be it known that they are real correspondences. . . . [AC 10669:4]

This is linked to and forms the basis for appearances in the other world.

He therefore who does not know what this or that thing in nature represents and especially he who is quite unaware that anything is representative, cannot but believe that these representatives are merely comparisons, such as every one uses in common speech. They indeed are comparisons, but such as correspond, and are therefore actually presented to view in the world of spirits, when the angels in an interior heaven are conversing about the spiritual and celestial things of the Lord's kingdom. [AC 5115e]

A comparison can be so apt, in fact in the Word is so apt, that it coheres to the correspondence even to the point where it can be called a correspondence.

We speak of this as signifying when yet it is a comparison, because in the Word all comparisons like plain statements, are correspondences, and in the spiritual sense they cohere with the subject treated of. . . . [AR 334; cf. AE 376:28, 401:27, 539:11, 644:5]

In the development of the mind, then, the goal seems to be to so enter into analogical thinking that similitudes, comparisons, metaphors and analogies cohere to the subject so that they lead to the sight of the correspondence. Such usage can become common usage where the correspondences become so real that they hardly need explication (cf. AC 5201:4, 4424). When metaphorical language so coheres to its subject, the mind will then be formed to receive influx and it will be able to think correspondentially and from use—or, what is the same, from causes. The whole of the threefold Word is so constructed as to lead man to such spiritual thought which is no longer based upon comparisons and analogies, but upon "real correspondences." Viewed in this way, the seemingly casual linking of these various metaphorical terms to correspondences becomes a dynamic means for leading the natural mind into spiritual thought.

With this background, having considered the more common usages of these terms in the Writings, I would like to turn to two or three key teachings. The fact that as far as I know they are almost unique does not to my mind make them any less important, nor in any way less consistent with the basic purpose of the overall teachings we have just been reviewing. We read,

There are two things in man that are most distinct from each other, namely, the rational and the natural. The rational constitutes the internal man and the natural the external; but the natural like the rational has also its own external and internal. The external of the natural is from the senses of the body, and from what flows in from the world immediately through these senses. By these man has communication with worldly and bodily things. They who are exclusively in this natural are called sensuous men, for in thought they scarcely go beyond this. *But the internal of the natural is constituted of the conclusions drawn analytically and analogically from these things in the external, and yet it draws and deduces its conclusions from the senses. Thus the natural has communication through the senses with worldly and bodily things, and through things analogical and analytical with the rational, and thus with the things of the spiritual world. Such is the natural.* [AC 4570:2; ital. added]

Attractive as the subject is, we are simply going to ignore analytical thought and its development and its limitations as described in the Writings. We have plenty to consider by maintaining our focus on analogical thought. One observation is important: The analogical thought spoken of here is a function of the natural mind, and must not be confused with correspondential or spiritual thought. We know that children feel deep spiritual affections when the letter of the Word is read. They gain many insights from the comparisons in the New Testament parables. But these are "borrowed states" preparatory to the real and rational sight of the relation between the spiritual and the natural. Such thought cannot give rational consideration to causes.

A second passage further confirms analogical thought as a function of the natural mind.

With every man who is being regenerated there are two rationals, one before regeneration, the other after regeneration. The first, which is before regeneration, is procured through the experience of the senses, by reflections upon things of civic life and of moral life, and by means of the sciences and the reasonings derived from them and by means of them, also by means of the knowledges of spiritual things from the doctrine of faith or from the Word. *But these go no further at that time than a little above the ideas of corporeal memory, which comparatively are quite material.*

Whatever therefore it then thinks is from such things; or in order that what it thinks may be comprehended at the same time by interior or intellectual sight, the semblances of such things are presented by comparison or analogically. Of this kind is the first rational, or that which is before regeneration. [AC 2657:2, ital. added]

Note again it is a function of the first rational or that which is before regeneration.

But the rational after regeneration is formed by the Lord through the affections of spiritual truth and good, which affections are implanted by the Lord in a wonderful manner in the truths of the former rational; and those things in it which are in agreement and which favor, are thus vivified; but the rest are separated from it as of no use; until at length spiritual goods and truths are collected together as it were into bundles, the incongruous things which cannot be vivified being rejected to the circumference, and this by successive steps as spiritual goods and truths grow, together with the life of the affections of them [AC 2657:3, ital. added; cf. AC 4038]

Notice the affections of spiritual good and truth are implanted in a wonderful manner, in the truths of the former rational. But in order that that first rational may be in intellectual sight, semblances of material ideas are presented by comparison or analogically. Comparison and analogy as functions of the first rational play a vital part in forming a plane of truth for the reception of spiritual influx.

Another passage puts this opening of the mind in a different setting.

But as he grows up, and from things of sense draws conclusions as to causes, he thereby begins to think from the interior natural; for from things of sense he then forms some truths, which rise above the senses, but still remain within the things that are in nature. But when he becomes a young man, if as he then matures he cultivates his rational he thus forms reasons from the things in the interior natural, which reasons are truths still higher, and are as it were drawn out from the things in the interior natural. The ideas of thought from these are called in the learned world *intellectual and immaterial ideas*; while the ideas from the scientifics in both naturals, in so far as from the senses they partake of the world, are called material ideas. In this way man mounts in his understanding from the world toward heaven. But still he does not come into heaven with his understanding unless he receives good from the Lord, which is continually present and flowing in; . . . [AC 5497, ital. added; cf. AC 2280, 3603, 10225]

If good is perceived, then the Lord can reorder the mind in the wonderful manner described above. This happens so far as he

does the truths he learns (AC 5126).

While we think of the effort of the first rational to think immaterially and to draw conclusions as to causes, we should remind ourselves that,

from effects nothing but effects can be learned; when effects alone are considered no cause is brought to light; but causes reveal effects. To know effects from causes is to be wise; but to search for causes from effects is not to be wise, because fallacies then present themselves which the investigator calls causes, and this is to turn wisdom into foolishness. [DLW 119]

Now while logical analysis frequently reasons in closely prescribed rules of validity from effects to causes, the use of analogy in everything from everyday life to natural science involves a different kind of inference as to cause—a probability rather than a proof. Its assumption of parallel circumstances implies, however, an attitude towards orderly relationships, which may not be and frequently is not present in a purely analytical approach. Only a man who appreciates analogical thought and its probability can grasp what the term “harmony” means in New Church philosophical thought. I believe such an appreciation is precisely what prepares the natural rational for future thought.

When we consider even such a relatively simple thing as the ability of the mind to interpret nerve impulses as sensations, we are awed. But when confronted with the ability of the imagination to associate or compare one “thing concept” with another, we find ourselves with others quite seriously asking, “Does an idea develop except by metaphor? Does a man think without comparing one concept to another?” (cf. RP 498). More is involved than simple association through common physical properties. Complex comparisons develop on the basis of function and apparent if not obvious purpose. Relationships are viewed which are on a different plane than that of mere sensation. Once the mind begins to construct a series of comparisons into a natural rational analogy, it finds itself face to face with metaphysical questions. This makes sense. What causes it to make sense? Or as philosophers might say, what is the origin of its “harmony”? Since the argument is based upon analogy, it can never be proven. But it does lead even to the point of considering the probability of God Himself and of man’s relationship to Him. No such emphasis on the development of the understanding can be separated from the necessity of the will to make a choice or commitment;

nor for the religious man of looking beyond self to the Word. But being confronted with the questions makes the mind ripe, open, full of potential activity in which, if the man wills, the Lord can implant spiritual good and truth in a "wonderful way."

Thus when a man's mind reaches and develops through the proper use of reason, it can be infilled with a bounty of spiritual goods and truths that less well prepared minds can never so richly appreciate. Man is no longer pondering a simple mathematical analogy such as 2 is to 4 as 4 is to x; nor the analogies of induction in the scientific method which are made probable in direct proportion to their relevance to experience. Man is now confronted with a real correspondential relationship which looks to revelation rather than experience to affirm its validity. The Word becomes the medium of conjunction as the only source of spiritual truth. The threefold Word is accommodated to each degree of mental development, be it a wise or simple state. Each degree is a reactive plane of finite reception, which man feels as his own. Thus, as the natural mind is trained in its functions through the Word, so the spiritual mind can be trained in its. There is indeed, as we have read in an earlier connection, an "analogy between natural good and truth and spiritual good and truth" (DP 312). The well-trained New Churchman reaches maturity and sees the world of experience and the world of Divine revelation in a close parallelism. In series after series, he sees points of comparison. The analogy becomes more and more probable, but he is not confronted with proof. The goal is to prepare the mind to see the most fundamental relationship of all, the relation of the Divine to the Human. But commitment of the will, and acknowledgment of the limitations of self in life, are the only things that can turn that relationship from the humanist's mere comparison and analogy to the "real correspondence" which revelation alone can disclose. These relationships are not constructions of the human mind, mere analogies to be validated against experience, and therefore merely probable. In freedom, they are seen as true. Their validity is founded upon the rock of Divine revelation, which is wisely and freely viewed, only by the self-evidencing reason of love.

Now, I believe Swedenborg's preparation can usefully be viewed in terms of the growing use of analogy in nature, in the human body, and finally in revelation. It is useful to look at some

quotations from his pre-theological works which are suggestive of the necessary and gradual development of his analogical thought until his mind was prepared to think from "real correspondences."

Notice how some of the earlier statements in the *Principia* seem to be mostly rooted to the mathematical and empirical use of analogy.

We have an active and most subtle principle and soul, *to which* phenomena can be submitted; whereby we are enabled through the comparison and series of many phenomena to form a judgment respecting them; and by considering their uniformities, *similarities, analogies, and analyses*, to discover their causes by *geometrical and rational investigation* ["Means to a True Philosophy"; *Principia*, (Rendell, Tansley ed., 1912), p. 10 ital. added]

But those alone arrive at the goal of true wisdom who not only possess a very great store of experience, but have also their organs so formed and disposed from the senses even to the soul, by means of exercise, and so well and closely connected and arranged that whenever required, they can adduce *from their treasures of experience* such instances, and such only, as are suited to the immediate purpose; by the *similitude, analysis, and comparison* of which they are enabled to reason clearly, and by a chain of argument to arrive even at the causes of the subject of the inquiry, or at the things antecedent and prior to it. [Ibid., p. 14, ital. added]

The second means leading to wisdom, by which the secrets of invisible nature may be unlocked and revealed is geometry and rational philosophy; by means of which we are enabled *to compare our experiments*, to set them in order analytically, to reduce them to laws, rules, and *analogies*, and thence to elicit some third or fourth thing which was unknown before. Experience alone cannot unfold or disclose anything and reduce it to its more simple parts; it cannot so *arrange facts that resemble* one another to discover what was unknown by observing its similarity to what is known; for this is the office of reason. But to retain many things in the memory, and afterwards to form theories or *conclusions respecting things unknown from their resemblances and analogies to such as are known and thus to speak from a chain of experiments*, is a method of attaining wisdom at once familiar and natural. [Ibid., p. 16, ital. added]

But the rational principle consists in knowing how, and at the same time in being able *to arrange into such order and connection the reasons known from the world, so as to view their analogy*; yet this presupposes an active principle, or a certain force impelling into motion all those things which inhere in a similarly orderly manner in its organs; that is, it presupposes a soul. [Ibid., p. 31, ital. added]

Yet suppose him to be deficient in the faculty of reasoning correctly, or of *comparing* the several parts of his knowledge and experience, and presenting them distinctly to the soul, he can never know the mysteries and inward recesses of philosophy [Ibid., p. 32, ital. added]

Time and again throughout his works Swedenborg uses induc-

tive argument by means of analogy and strives to confirm it through experience. He uses what we have described as analogical thought as a fundamental means to the development of his philosophy. He begins more and more to see that form of thinking in relation to both the soul and Scripture, as well as experience, yet he also sees its basic limitation as to proof. In the *Economy*, we read,

We are not forbidden to approach the Divine sanctuary by the path of *comparison*; for since it is He for Whom we exist, and Whose we are to be, and with Whom we are conjoined by love, so in order that we may understand His attributes, *He has willed that we should understand through nature; consequently through signs, by the help of which the principles of our minds are formed.* There is nothing more usual, *even in the Scriptures*, than a comparison of the Deity to the Sun; of His life with Therefore *let us go on in the path of comparison, remembering always that although comparison illustrates yet it does not teach the nature of that with which the comparison is made.* [EAK 254 ital. added; cf. EAK 311]

This was similarly taught in *The Infinite*: "Analogical instances illustrate, although they cannot demonstrate . . ." (Wilkinson's transl., 1908, p. 137). And still later in the *Fibre*,

We must therefore speak infra-naturally, but as said above, we must be understood *in an analogical way, or by way of eminence.* [Fibre 266:b, ital. added]

For there is such a coestablished harmony of all things in the same series, that they mutually correspond to each other, with a difference merely of perfection according to degrees. Wherefore inferiors regard superiors as their analogues and eminences. . . . [Fibre 160; cf. also the Prologue to the AK 20]

Notice how strongly he defends this method: "Yet these forms possess something analogous thereto; for *in the absence of an idea of something analogous, there can be no escape from the idea of nothing. . . .*" (RP 498, ital added) Earlier in the same work he puts forth an interesting definition.

Substances which determine themselves, or are determined, have a mutual regard for each other. This is called analogy. The analogy of all determinations, whether that analogy be successive or simultaneous, is called harmony or disharmony. [RP 176]

Finally, his mind having been prepared and led time and again to the necessity of making a choice to accept or reject the correspondence between the spiritual and the natural, we find him applying a wide variety of metaphorical language to the Scriptures.

The effort seems to be to inspire the natural rational to think by way of comparison and analogy on the basis of revealed truth in addition to the basis of experience. In this connection, note the way the *Word Explained* speaks.

These *correspondences are called analogies*, for what this or that spiritual thing is cannot be expressed since our understanding can think [of it] only when it is said that it is such and such or that it must be so called by analogy or by eminence. [WE 877, ital. added]

From the *similitude* between spiritual things and natural *flow various comparisons, and these, when they correspond, are everywhere concordant*. [WE 4501, ital. added]

Comparisons which in themselves are sometimes correspondences. . . . [Ibid 4508; cf. also 5860, 5871]

But note particularly :

That in primitive times men beheld spiritual things under natural objects, is clearly apparent from the Divine Word, which was spoken by the Messiah through Moses and the Prophets. *There we find scarcely a thing that is not allegorical, in the sense that it deeply involves things spiritual. . . . The Divine Word is so full of this kind of speech, that if one is ignorant of these allegories and of the correspondences of natural things with spiritual, he can hardly advance a single step*, as the saying is, to the understanding of the things which are found in the Divine Word. The Messiah himself spoke scarcely anything except by *parables and similitudes*; and under these none but heavenly things are meant. Thus when He spoke concerning the Kingdom of God, he *compared* it to a garden, to a field and a sower, to a feast, to virgins, to sheep, etc. *Hence it is clear, that they are mere correspondences of natural things with spiritual*. [WE 876, ital. added]

So by Swedenborg's example we are led through the broad and rich exercise of the first rational, in a manner which he adequately defined, and yet which is shown perhaps even more clearly by his repeated usage. But the exercise of such reasonings came to be seen as a basis and a bridge to spiritual understanding. It did not turn in upon itself, or fall back into the shifting sands of mere experience together with its inevitable determinism. Instead it became more and more actively tuned to the harmonies of creation, until it was fully prepared to think spiritually and from correspondence, not only about creation, but from revelation itself. At this point the continuous progression of analogy and comparison gave way to a discrete step to real correspondences. Yet as terms they remained to lift our minds through whatever our special intellectual pursuits are, to see the relation of the Divine

to the Human, the spiritual to the natural, of Final Cause to the world of effects.

What this means to each of us is that we must deliberately look for the analogies in our fields. If we work with language, perhaps we explore all the realms of metaphorical expression as means for opening and elevating the thought, not to solidify it in the demands of concrete and stifling realism, but for its own sake. If we work in the sciences, of course, we use induction, and of course we seek to verify our analogies in the laboratory experience, but we also learn how to live with open questions. We find that those questions actually form an active and receptive plane to bring us face to face with the most fundamental analogy of all, the relation of Creator to creation. In short, through any field man can be led to the most fundamental questions of life, to a Being outside of himself with whom he can communicate only through correspondences, and on the basis of an authority outside of himself. I believe this developing and inquiring function of the natural rational is too often confused with its illustrative and confirmative function of later states.

Whatever our field, think for a moment of the development of human thought itself. "The most ancient people . . . did not simply compare [spiritual to natural things] but they likewise *called* them so" (AC 1551, ital. added; cf 195, 746, 715). The very process of naming anything involves mental association, in fact in one sense can be called metaphorical. When the most ancients received spiritual influx as perception, the metaphor was clearly seen and provided a basis for the thought to be lifted to accept the Lord Himself, and His relation to man. Their thought process as of itself was receptive and free. But when in that freedom they shut their minds off to spiritual influx, the metaphor fell into a sensual identification. The mind turned back to experience and mankind became polytheistic and idolatrous. There is then a sense of freedom and the as-of-self which comes right out of sensation, into the naming process of language, and into the thought process itself.

In a world that seems dedicated to confining the mind to mere analysis—in a world that seems to love nothing more than to refute any but the most sterile analogies and to demythologize what others hold sacred—I believe we must labor to uphold and restore the use of analogy, as a basis and a nexus for genuine

metaphysical thought. Every discipline can turn in upon itself and demand that the empirical cycle be completed and that every analogy will only be regarded as relevant if it can return to its base in experience. But the only road to freedom is a correspondential relation of cause and effect, seen first through analogy, probable but not yet self-evidently true, until the internal mind is opened by the spiritual affection of truth and the man walks confidently in the light of spiritual thought.

EDITORIAL NOTES

There has been no space in the last several issues to give information about the various authors. In at least one case this has unfortunately caused some confusion among our readers. In our January, 1975, issue we published a paper, "Adam, Noah, and the Stone Age" by the Rev. Erik E. Sandström, who is the Pastor of Michael Church of the General Church in London, England. Note the middle initial "E." which (in writing) distinguishes him from his father, the Rev. Erik Sandström, who is the Dean of the Theological School at the Academy of the New Church in Bryn Athyn, Pa. Dean Sandström is known to our readers from earlier contributions. Another paper by him is to be published in our next issue.

Following an invitation by the Paul Carpenter Fellowship Committee, an "Ancient Church Conference" was held at the Academy of the New Church, Bryn Athyn, Pa., between August 27 and September 1, 1975. Scholars from various branches of the New Church presented papers on subjects related to the study of the Ancient Church and the work of translation. All together, twenty-six persons participated in the conference. Speakers and subjects in the order they appeared were: Bishop Elmo C. Acton, Academy of the New Church (ANC): "The Ancient Word"; the Rev. Erik Sandström, ANC: "Some Characteristics of the Ancient Church"; Mr. Prescott A. Rogers, ANC: "Ancient Church and Ancient History: The Need for a Methodology"; the Rev. Dr. Horand K. Gutfeldt, Urbana College: "Indications of the Most Ancient Church and the Ancient Church in Egypt"; the Rev. Robert S. Jungé, ANC: "The Role of Correspondences and Evidence of the Internal Sense in Identifying the Ancient Word"; the Rev. Dr. Robert H. Kirven, Swedenborg School of Religion (SSR): "The Eranos Conferences"; the Rev. Dr. George F. Dole, SSR: "Prephilosophical Epistemology"; Professor E. Bruce Glenn, ANC: "Man the Symbolist—Then and Now"; the Rev. Norman Ryder of the General Conference, England: "The Ancient Church and the Old Testament: A Study of Translation"; the Rev. John E. Elliott, Swedenborg Society, London: "Translation of the Writings." In addition there were two sessions open to the public. At the first session the Rev. Harold C. Cranch of the General Church spoke on "The Museum—a Tool for Research and Education," illustrated by objects and slides. At the second session the Rev. Messrs. Ryder and Elliott spoke of "Translating the Old Testament and the Writings." It is planned that a monograph of the transactions of this conference will be published.