firm our thought, then, and to that extent, it is true. According to the pragmatist, then, that which we deem to be true *is* true, because practical consequences tell us it is true.

The pragmatic attitude was an attitude that looked "away from first things, principles, 'categories', supposed necessities; and looked towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts." It is this basic premise which indicates the whole weakness of pragmatism. In their effort to be practical, the pragmatists looked to results and consequences, and found that truth was relative. They looked in one direction only, and became blind in one eye. The real necessity of both *cause* and *effect* is spoken of in many places in the Writings. "Each and everything that exist are as cause and effect; no effect can exist without an efficient cause; the efficient cause is the internal of the effect, and the effect is the external of it" (AC 9473:2). Pragmatism was the ignorance of the relationship between internals and externals, of blindness as to causes, the failure to recognize anything above the lowest degree of the rational mind, the refusal to see anything beyond self, anything beyond chaotic creation, in which truth could only be relative.

PHILOSOPHICAL NOTES

Science vs. Religion: A reference is made elsewhere in this issue to the relation of religion to science. In the review of Schroedinger's book he is quoted as follows: "The comparative truce [i.e., between religion and science] we witness today, at least among cultured people, was not reached by setting in harmony with one another the two kinds of outlook . . . but rather by a resolve to ignore each other . . . little short of contempt."

In keeping with the name of the so-called "conflict," this section is entitled "Science vs. Religion." But this very label is itself confusing. The confusion arises in the equivocal word "science" on the one hand, and in the careless interchange in the use of "religion" and "theology."

However strictly one may define religion, it seems that its force in man's mind is measured by faith and worship. Theology, on the other hand, has to do more with the formal study of the objects of faith and worship. The single word "science" is used in con-

temporary language both to represent a faith in and also a formalized study of the objects immediately given to the senses, and of the laws that seem to connect the sensations.

If a comparison is to be made, it ought to be between "science and theology" where each term applies to the formalized intellectual study of appropriate objects, or between "science and religion" where emphasis is upon faith in each case, and in some respects worship. If such distinctions are not made, as so often happens, the so-called "conflict" is the incongruous one of comparing a faith with a formal intellectual study.

As soon as such distinctions are made, it is quite likely that some of our readers will feel an opposition to either one or the other of the alternatives stated. It is presumed that the more "scientifically minded"—whatever that might mean—may feel that there is an objection to making science into a faith. Again, the more "religious minded"—again, whatever that might mean—may feel an objection to an emphasis upon the formalized aspects of the objects of religion. It seems, however, that such a view ought to be tested within a single field, that is, within science or within theology and religion. For example, there is enough to the problem of comparing the faith of science to the formal scientific aspects of science which is as yet unsettled.

To the confirmed sensualist, who accepts as the only things given in his science the experiences of the senses, no problem exists. His faith is simple. He believes only in the experiences of the senses. A corresponding simplicity of view exists with the person whose religion is faith alone. Science vs. religion in this case resolves itself very simply into a comparison between two faiths.

However, the question of science in general vs. religion in general is not in other cases so easy to isolate in our thoughts. This is especially so when we take science to be—as we find it in our age—consisting of all its experimental details plus its state, which is the result of history (in the case of physics) from Archimedes through Galileo, Newton, Einstein to Schrödinger. This science as we know it, even as in the case of philosophy, has its *nature* and its *state*.

Nor is this all, for there are people such as we who follow Swedenborg, who have a religion which teaches that faith should be supported by intellectual understanding.

It is interesting to note that, even before the time of his Writings,

there was never any doubt in Swedenborg's mind as to the relation of science and religion—regardless of what the prevailing relation may have been between the more vocal scientists and the religionists of his day. In the *Economy* he said: "The truth of nature, and the truth of revelation,, however separate, are never at variance" (EAK II. 217).

E. F. A.

BOOK REVIEW

NATURE AND THE GREEKS, by Erwin Schrödinger. Shearman Lectures delivered at University College, London, in May 1948, Cambridge 1954, 97 pp.; price $2.00.

Readers may remember that a book by this author was reviewed in the April 1954 issue of the NEW PHILOSOPHY. It is notable that many statements of that review could be applied to the book to be considered here.

Modern authors who write about the scientific and philosophic thought of today more often than not devote part of their labors to analyzing the basis of modern thought in ancient writings. Schrödinger, being no exception, offers the reason that he "had been swept along unwittingly, as happens so often, by a trend of thought rooted somehow in the intellectual situation of our time" (p. 2). Assuming that a trend exists, he then proceeds to ask: "How did it originate? what were its causes? and what does it really mean?" (p. 3). Two situations are offered in answer to these questions.

Prior to the seventeenth century, the dogmas of the Christian churches had become rigid and inflexible. Scientific research was frowned upon, especially when popular ideas and religious tenets were contradicted by new scientific ideas. With the advent of religious and scientific freedom, a growing antagonism arose between religion and science; and it is the contention of the author that this antagonism should lead to a re-examination of the basic science and philosophy (i.e., Greek) which underlies our present-day thought. If any error exists, then we may find it at its source.

The second situation which is responsible for our retrospection is the present crisis of modern science. With the emergence of physics, accompanied by quantum theory and the theory of rela-