

Translator's Corner

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SWEDENBORG'S HIDDEN INFLUENCE ON KANT[†]

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I.7 SYNTHESIS: KANT'S LATE RECONCILIATION WITH SWEDENBORG

In actual fact, in the 1780s the critical spokesman of the Enlightenment turns anew to the Nordic seer with an astonishing expression of appreciation for his person and doctrine, as is explicitly evident from the notes on Kant's college lectures on rational psychology published by K.H.L. von Pölitz (contained in the lectures on metaphysics).

In view of the unusually metaphysically speculative character of these later lectures, for Kant, their content in part going beyond the restrictions of the CPR, a detailed literary critique would be useful.

I.7.1. The Applicability of the Notes

In the year 1821 when K.H.L. von Pölitz published Kant's lectures on metaphysics, in which is contained the lecture on rational psychology relevant here, since Kant's lecture outlines had been lost, he could no longer base them on these but solely on the college notebooks of those who had heard him.

In contrast to what had been done in all previous complete editions of Kant's work, the Berlin Academy decided to publish these lectures too in a

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critical edition, since they could contribute to a better understanding of essential aspects of the course of Kant's development.⁴⁴¹

As the source of these lectures v. Pölitz states in his 1821 edition that he has published Kant's declarations unchanged as found in three college notebooks from the years 1788-90.⁴⁴²

In spite of some misgiving regarding particular systemic inconsistencies that were immediately obvious to Kant savants like v. Pölitz, these unusual lectures of Kant, particularly here in the relevant excerpts on rational psychology, must be taken quite seriously.

For although they could have been amended in the spirit of the philosophic views known from Kant's other writings, on account of the authenticity of the whole corpus von Pölitz preferred not to do this, saying: "In each printed line the readers indeed have the true Kant."⁴⁴³

In critically examining the notebooks here in question one must above all take care to see whether there is not some kind of mutual dependence between them. For such a dependence would allow one to conclude that there was a common source from which they were copied, which would make the individual notebooks worthless. To establish the authenticity of the individual notebooks it is necessary that they be independent, because if several notebooks proffered the same content independently of each other, they would mutually confirm the authenticity of Kant's words.

Max Heinze submitted the two notebooks, on which Pölitz had obviously collaborated, to a literary-historical critique.⁴⁴⁴ He designated them respectively as L1 and L2 (because both happened to be in Leipzig), in order to distinguish them from three other manuscripts he also investigated, which he designated K1 and K2 (because at that time they were in Königsberg) and H (because at that time it was in the possession of Pastor

⁴⁴¹ Cf. W. Dilthey in his forward to the Academy edition of the Kantian writings, AA I, Berlin 1910, p. XIII ff.; also in: Vladimir Satura, *Kant-Studien*, Ergänzungsheft 101, Bonn 1971, p. 10.

⁴⁴² "The second manuscript was written in the year 1788, and by a second hand in the year 1789 or 1790...partially corrected, but mostly expanded and completed...This work is thus the product of two manuscripts and of notes taken in three lectures of Kant on metaphysics." (K.H.L. von Pölitz, *Kants Vorlesungen über Metaphysik*, Erfurt 1821, Preface).

⁴⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁴ Cf. Max Heinze, *Vorlesungen Kants über Metaphysik aus drei Semestern*, Leipzig 1894.

Kraus in Hamburg). Of these five notebooks, according to Heinze, three, L1, K1 and H, are dependent on one series of transcription, or on back to back lectures in one and the same semester, since the variations among them are very slight.⁴⁴⁵

On the other hand, the other two notebooks, L2 and K2, display no relationship whatsoever, either among themselves or among the first three transcriptions. From this Max Heinze drew the conclusion that in these five notebooks are captured the lectures from three different semesters. The important finding for my use of the lectures is that L1 and L2, that is, the two employed by von Pölitz, are independent of each other and refer to two different semesters.

The relatively correct sentence structure and neat handwriting in both these notebooks allow one to conclude that they were drafted at leisure at home from an outline or from notes taken during the lecture. Only the marginal glosses stem from another hand and were apparently written down directly during the lectures.⁴⁴⁶

There has been a great deal of discussion about what year the lectures could have been held. On the title page stand the words: "Kant's metaphysics. A course on. Taken down in 1798." The year is certainly incorrect, since in the year 1798 Kant had ceased lecturing. The numbers "89" are written over the last two digits in another color. The year 1789 is certainly more likely, but one has no guarantee whether the person making the correction was certain or whether he simply reversed the last two digits on a supposition. Benno Erdmann regards this year as likely,⁴⁴⁷ while Heinze prefers to give support to the year 1789 or 1791.⁴⁴⁸

In notebook L1 (the one, then, from which Pölitz had published Kant's lectures on the here relevant empirical and rational psychology) any further reference point is lacking. On account of the handwriting Pölitz thinks that this manuscript is older than "L2." On purely internal evidence (the still incomplete table of contents and the fact that a few contemporaneous

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid., 19; in: Satura, *Kant-Studien*, 13.

⁴⁴⁶ Cf. *ibid.*

⁴⁴⁷ Cf. Benno Erdmann, *Mitteilungen über Kants metaphysischen Standpunkt in der Zeit um 1777*, *Phil. Monatshefte* 20, 1884, p. 65, in Satura, *Kant-Studien*, p. 14.

⁴⁴⁸ Cf. Max Heinze, *Vorlesungen Kants*, p. 26 in Satura, *Kant-Studien*, p. 14.

philosophers are spoken of in the past tense) different authors assign different dates, from the year 1773 to the year 1785.⁴⁴⁹

On account of some of the psychological doctrines contained in this notebook (e.g., the outright identification of the inner mind with consciousness) it seems necessary to attribute it to the beginning of the critical period. In any case it remains without doubt that L1 is to be considered as the older of the two sources used by von Pölitz, and that manuscript L2, with which Pölitz compared the older manuscript, stems from around the year 1790.⁴⁵⁰

For my purposes, the exact dating plays no roll, but suffices to establish the approximate period in which Kant held his lectures. In this context it is interesting that the older notebook L1 still falls in the beginning of the critical period.

The suspicion of mistakes attends every transcription of a lecture. This suspicion immediately gives rise to two negative lines of thinking:

1. A shorter or longer text may not be taken from one or the other of these notebooks and be claimed to be a quotation from Kant.
2. No notebook, taken by itself alone, provides any possibility whatsoever of being able to distinguish which thought stems from Kant himself and which is a personal reflection of the note taker or editor.

If, however, two or more transcriptions independently of each other present the same thought, the same definition, the same example, then one can maintain with certitude that the passage in question is not an editorial, alien interpolation, not a later addition, but that it goes back to a source common to both manuscripts, in our case to the lecturing Kant. Therefore three conditions must be filled for one to be able to reconstruct Kant's rational psychology from the course notes:

⁴⁴⁹ 1776/77-79/80, Max Heinze, *Vorlesungen Kants*, p. 36; -1774, Benno Erdmann, "Mitteilungen über Kants metaphysischen Standpunkt," in *Phil. Monatshefte*, 19, 1883, p. 144; 1778/79-1784/85, Arnoldt, *Kritische Exkurse*, p. 421; -1781/82, O. Thon, *Die Grundprinzipien der Kantischen Moralphilosophie*, Berlin 1895, p. 33 ff.; 1778-80, P. Menzer, "Der Entwicklungsgang der Kantischen Ethik in den Jahren 1760-1785," *Kant-Studien* 3, 1889, p. 65, all together in Satura, *Kant-Studien*, p. 14.

⁴⁵⁰ Cf. Heinze, "Vorlesungen Kants," p. 26, in Satura, *Kant-Studien*, p. 14.

1. Several sets of such notes must be extant.
2. These must be independent of each other.
3. Only those thoughts can be ascribed to Kant for which parallel passages can be cited from these notebooks, wherein there must be an agreement of at least the content, if not necessarily the form of expression.

This method I have taken as a basis in the evaluation of the course notebooks is not in itself new. It is frequently used by historians in researching literary sources.⁴⁵¹

In discussing the individual course notebooks that come into question in regard to the subject of rational psychology, I have shown that they are not copies of each other, since "L1" and "L2" came into being independently of each other. In addition the 1783 transcription of Mrongovius can be used as a check on Pölitz' sources, since it displays striking parallels.

In the analysis of the content of Kant's lectures on rational psychology that now follows I shall place the decisive passages at hand from the mutually independent sources L1, L2 and K2, as well as those from Mrongovius' transcription, side by side.

In view of the repeated quotations of Kant's teaching about the "commerce of soul and body, the change of the mode of observation brought about by death, and an association with spirits already during bodily life,"⁴⁵² where he expressly refers to Swedenborg, my literary critique comes to the conclusion that the following views of Kant are to be taken as speculations he made very earnestly and which he wanted to make accessible to a broader public.

I.7.2. The Philosophic Substance of Kant's Lectures on Rational Psychology

In the third section of his lectures on metaphysics, titled "Rational Psychology," Kant begins by "proving" the immortality of the human soul

⁴⁵¹ As Satura has done: *Kant-Studien*, 22.

⁴⁵² Cf. the analysis of the content of Kant's lectures on rational psychology in the following chapter.

as a simple, finite-like substance from three arguments, two *a priori* and one *a posteriori*:

First. Kant deduces the immortality of the human soul *a priori*—since the basis of life rests on the inner principle of its spontaneity:

Consequently neither the beginning of the soul's life nor the continuance of life itself stems from the body. Therefore, if the body at once ceases to exist, the principle of the life still remains that independently of the body had carried out the acts of life, and thus after the separation from the body must continue to exercise the same acts of life unhindered.⁴⁵³

Second. The immortality of the soul is similarly deduced *a priori*, from the necessity for man's moral perfection, although not with quite the same apodictic certainty as from its spontaneity: "The moral proof is, however, a more adequate basis of belief."⁴⁵⁴

This proof of immortality is also found in the CPR, as a postulate of practical reason, of course.⁴⁵⁵

The first *a priori* proof of the immortality of the soul from its original spontaneity could have a connection with Kant's moral philosophy, insofar as, in Kant's view, the moral law arises spontaneously from pure reason.

Third. In the last analysis one must also assume the perpetuity of soul activity *a posteriori* from the insurmountable discrepancy between the spiritual potentialities and their insufficient fulfillment in a single human lifetime. We find in the soul such powers and abilities as that have no definite purpose in this life. For this reason Kant deduces the existence of a state where these powers can be used:

Therefore about the soul one can reasonably conjecture that it must keep open to a future world, where all these powers can be needed and put to use.⁴⁵⁶

⁴⁵³ Kant's lectures on rational psychology, in: *Kants Vorlesungen über Metaphysik*, ed. by v. Pölitz, Erfurt 1821: text by AA XVIII, Vol. 5, Part 1, Berlin 1968, 235.

⁴⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 243 ff.

⁴⁵⁵ Cf. Chapter 6.

⁴⁵⁶ *Kant's Vorlesungen über die rationale Psychologie*, nach v. Pölitz, 246.

According to Mrongovius these three proofs of immortality can be found in altogether analogous form in Kant's lectures on metaphysics from the year 1783, wherein the moral proof of immortality is here also actually designated as a postulate:

With man, consequently, the body is not the principle of life but the soul, and furthermore, it does not serve the continuation of life. Therefore, the separation of the body from the soul must not also involve an alteration of life.

That human beings are obligated to act reasonably and to be good is an apodictic statement. Only immortality can provide the motivation for this. Therefore it is a practical postulate that the soul is immortal.

Therefore in this life all talents are disproportionate.⁴⁵⁷

The agreement between Kant's rational psychology and Swedenborg's esoteric theory of the soul are in any case so striking that one can set both theories parallel to each other still without then being able to determine which statement stems from Swedenborg and which from Kant:

The life present with man is twofold: animal and spiritual. The animal life is the life of man as man, and for this the body is necessary, so that man may be a living being. The other life is the spiritual life, where the soul, independently of the body, must continue to carry on the same activities of life...If now the body's machine is destroyed so that the soul can no longer work in it, the animal life certainly ceases, but not the spiritual.⁴⁵⁸

Man, considered in himself, is a spirit and also in the same form; for everything in man that lives and sensates comes from his spirit—and there is not the least part in man that does not live and

⁴⁵⁷ *Kants Vorlesungen über Metaphysik, nach Mrongovius*, ed. by AA XXIX, 6. Vol., 1. Part, 2. Section, Berlin 1983, 215, 218, 217.

⁴⁵⁸ *Kants Lectures on Rational Psychology*, according to Pölitiz, 235 f.

have feeling. From this it now follows that when the body is separated from its spirit, which is called death, the man nevertheless remains and lives as a man.⁴⁵⁹

This conception of Kant and Swedenborg of the provisional commerce between the body and soul is found in a similar form also in Kant's lectures according to Mrongovius:

Perhaps in the future it [the soul] could be conscious of itself without a body.⁴⁶⁰

In any case Kant emphasizes in his lectures that his deliberations could be valued only as speculations, that they could in no way rank as certain knowledge about the state of the soul after death:

Anyhow, as regards the state of the soul on the other side of life's border, we will not be able here to say anything with certainty. For while the limits of our reason stretch to the border, they do not cross and go beyond it.⁴⁶¹

At this point it seems advisable to me also to set alongside these the corresponding parallel passages from the sources L2 and K2 apparently disregarded by von Pölitz, from which restrictions on reason in its theoretical use emerge even still more sharply:

The state of the soul after death. Of this not much can be said, other than what is negative, that is to say, what we do not know.

The immortality of the soul is a hypothesis, however not a theoretical one, but one made with a moral and practical intent.⁴⁶²

⁴⁵⁹ Swedenborg, *The Spiritual World*, 432, text according to du Prel: *Kants mystische Weltanschauung*, S. XXXV f.

⁴⁶⁰ *Kants Lectures on Rational Psychology*, according to Mrongovius, 216 (Additions in parenthesis mine).

⁴⁶¹ *Kants Lectures on Rational Psychology*, according to Pölitz, 252.

⁴⁶² *Kants Lectures on Rational Psychology*, according to L2, 100, and K2, 691, text according to AA XXVIII, Vol. 5, Section 2, Part 1, Berlin 1970.

From these sources it becomes evident that in his lectures Kant speculates, not proves, as the notes according to Pölitz allege. Nevertheless it is certain that these speculations about the immortality of the soul and about the state of the soul after death go back to Kant himself, since their content is found in all the available independent sources, and besides this they come to view already in "Dreams."

It almost seems as if Kant in the meantime had made his own his speculations in "Dreams," where his intention had been to imitate Swedenborg and criticize himself, and that he had done this in spite of the wording of the CPR, where he had explained such metaphysical objects as inaccessible!

But it gets even better—or for many Kantians—even worse. By the immortality of the soul in Kant's discourse is meant not only the continuation of existence itself after bodily death, but according to his metaphysical doctrine pre-existence is also included with it:

But from the state of the soul after death we can also come to a conclusion regarding the state of the soul before birth. For from the proofs we will give for the existence of the soul after death, it appears to follow that before birth we have been in pure spiritual life, and that by birth the soul has so to speak come into a prison, into a hell, which hinders it in its spiritual life.⁴⁶³

For Swedenborg specialists these statements are familiar teachings, for the seer interprets earthly life as a prison, as a captivity of the soul, which has strayed from its actual calling, heavenly life as an angel and must make amends for this wickedness on earth.⁴⁶⁴

In spite of the speculatively metaphysical content of his lectures Kant displays a logical stringency here. Since the soul has now been declared immortal, it follows that it has not only a life after death but equally so also a pre-existence. This pre-existence of the soul considered by Kant, how-

⁴⁶³ *Kant's Lectures on Rational Psychology*, according to Pölitz, 232.

⁴⁶⁴ Cf., e.g., the presentation of Swedenborg's theology by Robert Kirven: "Swedenborgs Theologie im Überblick. Eine Lesehilfe zu seinen Werken," in Zwink (ed.): *Emanuel Swedenborg*, 44-79.

ever, must in no case be confused with the Hindu doctrine of rebirth, as in the case of the transmigration of souls. For in the case of a previous existence as an animal or human being the soul would have just a little a pure spiritual existence as in this life. Thus in Kant, as in Swedenborg furthermore, only a spiritual pre-existence of the human soul in the spiritual kingdom can be meant. This conception of a spiritual pre-existence of the soul is inescapable in the corresponding place in Mrongovius' transcription:

The soul must have existed previously although birth is the first beginning of its life in the world.⁴⁶⁵

But if the soul is limited in its higher spiritual faculties by man's bodily birth into the world or, what is quite the same, if it forfeits them by commerce with the body, then what purpose can earthly life have?

Kant answers this question about the meaning of earthly life in just the same way as Swedenborg, saying

that the soul, having been in a spiritual life has had a spiritual power of life, and already possesses all abilities and faculties, but in such a way that these abilities have developed through the body, and that all the knowledge that it has from the world has been acquired in the first place through the body, and therefore must be prepared through the body for the future continuation of life. The soul's state before birth was therefore was one without consciousness of the world and of itself.⁴⁶⁶

This elevation of the soul is also emphasized by Kant in his lectures in the year 1783:

Death, therefore, is a continuation of the life of the soul, and only its future life will be its true life.⁴⁶⁷

⁴⁶⁵ *Kant's Lectures on Rational Psychology*, according to Mrongovius, 218.

⁴⁶⁶ *Kant's Lectures on Rational Psychology*, according to Mrongovius, 232 f.

⁴⁶⁷ *Kant's Lectures on Rational Psychology*, according to Mrongovius, 215.

This conception of Kant's, that our earthly life is necessary for the constitution of the personal nature even though it hinders the freedom of the soul, agrees with Swedenborg's teaching

that the soul is begotten in the spiritual world and that our earthly existence serves for the building of our spiritual body, both as regards form for the stabilization of the spiritual body and also as regards content for the development of specific aptitudes and abilities.⁴⁶⁸

However, in his lectures from the years 1787-1790 Kant goes yet one essential step further. Here he does not content himself with the mere explanation of the meaning of the soul's earthly existence as individualization and stabilization, but to the soul after the body's death—thus after the dissolution of the certainly necessary but yet unhappy commerce between body and soul—he even attributes an increase of human abilities that goes beyond measure:

If now, however, the body entirely ceases, the soul is thus freed from its impediments and now for the first properly begins to live. Therefore death is not the absolute termination of life, but a release from the impediments to a complete life.⁴⁶⁹

Also Swedenborg teaches that at the moment of death man leaves behind him the hindrances to a complete life,

those cares for being raised to high positions, to which a person gives so much thought during the life of the body. Indeed, he knows that other things which do not belong to the earthly kingdom take the place of these.⁴⁷⁰

⁴⁶⁸ Cf. Geymüller, *Swedenborg und die übersinnliche Welt*, in facsimile, Zürich, pp. 133-137; and Kirven, "Swedenborgs Theologie im Überblick," in Zwink (ed.), *Emanuel Swedenborg*, pp. 44-79.

⁴⁶⁹ *Kant's Lectures on Rational Psychology*, according to Pölitiz, 237.

⁴⁷⁰ Emanuel Swedenborg, *Arcana Coelestia* (trans. John Elliot; 11 vols.; London: The Swedenborg Society, 1987) 5. nr. 3957.4.

Kant places particularly great value on the following point in his doctrine of the soul regarding the preservation of the personal nature, which fully agrees with Swedenborg's views on the subject:

The personal nature, the soul's essential element after death, and the identity of its personal nature, consists, however, in the fact that it is conscious of being a person, and that it is also conscious of its identity. For otherwise the past state would have no connection with the coming one.⁴⁷¹

In any case, as regards Kant's assertion of the "personal survival of death" the question presents itself, Wherein then does the individual personal nature of the soul rest, when only the general structures of the cognitive faculty lie in the transcendental subject, but not the individual characteristics? As a guarantee of the continuation of the personal nature Kant adduces the continuity of the inner mind, which would not be bound to body:

Consciousness of oneself and the identity of the person rest on the inner mind. The inner mind will in fact continue to exist even without a body, because the body is not a principle of life—and therefore the personal nature continues too.⁴⁷²

Besides the inner mind as bearer of the individual personal nature, however, one must also assume qualitative individual differences as well, which lie especially in the moral character of each individual. Besides these *a priori* differences, in every single subject there naturally also arise *a posteriori* individual differences due to the variety of sensorial experiences.

Here too Kant appears to have internalized Swedenborg's teaching, for Swedenborg also teaches the unbroken continuation of identity in the soul's inner mind, so that

the life which a person has made for himself in the world follows him, or that he is such a life after death.⁴⁷³

⁴⁷¹ *Kant's Lectures on Rational Psychology*, according to Pölitiz, 252.

⁴⁷² *Ibid.*, 253.

⁴⁷³ Emanuel Swedenborg, *Arcana Coelestia*, 3957c.

According to Swedenborg's grand conception of man, physical existence serves for building of spiritual life. This means that a person internalizes the objects of his desires, that they become a part of his personal nature and even follow him into the spiritual kingdom on the other side as habits that have become dear to him.

Among the above mentioned corporeal hindrances to the soul Kant here reckons also sensorial observation, for to the soul in the bodiless state he ascribes observation that is entirely intellectual:

However when the soul separates from the body, it will no longer have the same sensorial observation of this world. It will no longer perceive the world as it appears to be, but as it is.⁴⁷⁴

Here Kant quite obviously abandons the critical ground of the CPR, in that—breaking through and expanding his first postulate of cognition, CP1—he attributes to man after his bodily death the faculty of direct spiritual observation without sensual instrumentality:

Consequently, the separation of the soul from the body consists in the change of sensorial observation into spiritual observation; and this is the other world. The other world, consequently, is not another place, but only another observation. As to its objects the other world remains the same; it is not differentiated as to its substances; it is merely observed spiritually.⁴⁷⁵

So it is that Kant explains the change from the world of appearance to the world to the world as it is in itself merely by the change of the nature of observation from sensorial perception to spiritual observation.

This idea of Kant's about the change of the nature of observation from a sensory to an intellectual or spiritual mode of cognition through the disembodiment of the soul is covered in the notes of Mrongovius from the year 1783:

⁴⁷⁴ *Kant's Lectures on Rational Psychology*, according to Pölitz, 255.

⁴⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

But what can we imagine by the separation of the soul from the body? Nothing more than the beginning of intellectual and the end of sensorial life...The soul then begins to view things differently than it had been accustomed to in conjunction with the physical body.⁴⁷⁶

These concessions regarding the disembodied soul overstep by far the boundary principles of the human cognitive faculty that Kant had laid down in the CPR.

For the sake of comparison, beside Kant's statements let us place Swedenborg's corresponding comments. We see thus that Swedenborg teaches just as Kant that "when man puts of his physical body, he commands a much clearer understanding than when he was living in the body."⁴⁷⁷ For when he has been divested of the body...he is like those who are engaged in a more inward thought by virtue of their mind having been withdrawn from what is external and sensual.⁴⁷⁸

Kant describes intellectual perception in the following manner, categorically denying man this possibility of a direct spiritual perception of the "world in itself":

That understanding, through whose self-awareness the multiplicity of observation may be provided, an understanding, through whose imagination the objects of this imagination may conjointly exist, would not require a special act of synthesis of the multiplicity to produce the unity of consciousness required by man's understanding, which merely thinks, but does not observe.⁴⁷⁹

Although Kant's conception of the change of the world through the mere change of the mode of observation expressed in his lectures on rational psychology in the years of the 1780's appears to overstep the

⁴⁷⁶ Kant's *Lectures on Rational Psychology*, according to Mrongovius, 219.

⁴⁷⁷ Emanuel Swedenborg, *Arcana Coelestia*, 3957b.

⁴⁷⁸ Emanuel Swedenborg, *Arcana Coelestia*, 3957b.

⁴⁷⁹ Kant, *KrV*, B 138 f.

boundaries of the human cognitive system in the CPR, nevertheless no logical contradiction to his cognitive system lies in his presentation. For indeed, according to Kant's cognitive theory, it is just through the pure forms of our cognitive faculty, just through sensation and the understanding's concepts, that the world of "things in themselves" is organized into that world of appearances that we know as the material world. The critique does not prove that the objects of the senses are also such in themselves as they appear to our perception, but

it much more clearly demonstrates that if I take away the thinking subject, the whole physical world ceases, since it is nothing but the appearance in the sensation of our subject and a kind of mental imagery of these.⁴⁸⁰

That the world of appearance must therefore necessarily disappear with the cessation of sensation at death arises from Kant's transcendental idealism. Whether, however, on the one hand an immortal, cognizing subject could then exist, or on the other, whether this intelligible subject could then comprehend the world as it is in itself by means of spiritual observation, was an opinion that in the CPR Kant relegated to the realm of speculation, or in the best case to the domain of religion, of personal faith, which stands free to everyone. That he himself, however, after discharging his critical task, inclines to this kind of speculation, and in addition openly expounds it, yes, and even attempts to prove it, confirms once again my thesis already stated at the outset, that in Kant's heart there was a plainly insurmountable tension between reason and the demand of morality, between rational ethos and transcendental ethic.

In fact in his lectures he came close to Swedenborg's teaching about a moral spiritual kingdom, in the course of which he expressly characterized Swedenborg's system on this point as "sublime":

Swedenborg's thought on this point is quite sublime...He says: "All spiritual natures stand in association with one another, except that the fellowship and association of spirits is not linked to

⁴⁸⁰ Kant, *KrV*, A 383.

the body's conditions. There one spirit would not be far or near another; it is rather a spiritual association."⁴⁸¹

Within such a purely spiritual universe similar souls would immediately find each other, so that different spiritual communities would develop themselves. Thus Swedenborg teaches, in parallel to Kant's remarks, "that if that outer part, which belongs to the body and the world, is taken from a person, he is then such as his nature was inwardly..."⁴⁸²

As is evident from the above quotations, for Swedenborg as for Kant it is above all a matter of the moral nature of the human soul and its moral improvement in the spiritual kingdom beyond, for which reason Kant postulates immortality in his CPrR.

That from the assumption of a purely spiritual universe, in which the human soul participates, there naturally follows the *a priori* possibility of occult phenomena such as thought-reading, clairvoyance, prophecy, and likewise contact with spirits, Kant naturally has himself also seen in his mystical psychology:

As spirits our souls now stand together with one another in this association and fellowship, and assuredly already here in this world; only we do not see ourselves in this fellowship, because we still have sensorial observation... When now the obstacle of sensorial observation is suddenly set aside, we then see ourselves in this spiritual fellowship, and this is the other world. These are not now different things, but the same ones, but which we observe differently.⁴⁸³

The soul in a purely spiritual fellowship, equipped with the power of intellectual observation, would naturally be in position for non-spatial and non-temporal perceptions, as well as for noncausal influences which to the living person upon their transformation into sensorial observation

⁴⁸¹ Kant's *Lectures on Rational Psychology*, according to Pölitz, 213.

⁴⁸² Emanuel Swedenborg, *Arcana Coelestia* 3957e, f.

⁴⁸³ Kant's *Lectures on Rational Psychology*, according to Pölitz, 257.

would appear as occult phenomena, analogously to the morally determined free-will.

In the view that the ethical “good” cannot be drawn from the world of the senses, but stems from pure reason, Kant agrees with Swedenborg inasmuch as Swedenborg teaches that man cannot derive “the good” from himself, in this case that is to say, from his sensorial-bodily existence, but that the “good” and the “true” from God flow into man, under the presupposition, of course, that the man possesses a corresponding receiving vessel, which Swedenborg in agreement with Kant sees given in “moral conscience.” Thus Swedenborg says

that Heaven or the Lord through Heaven continually exerts an influence and flows in with the Good and the True, and that insofar as there is not in the more inward man, which lives after the death of the body, something that receives the Good and the True, just as a soil or footing, the Good and True flowing in cannot be received...where there is no conscience...⁴⁸⁴

And in point of fact in his rational psychology Kant does also directly draw out moral consequences of his postulation of an intelligible space—and timeless spirit kingdom:

Heaven is consequently everywhere there such a fellowship of holy, spiritual beings. However it is nowhere, because it occupies no place in the world, as the community is not set up in the physical world...Accordingly, the soul will not come into Hell if it has been wicked; it will merely see itself in the company of evil spirits—and that is to be in Hell.⁴⁸⁵

Here one can thus clearly see the correlation which I have already surmised in the last chapter, between this metaphysical speculation of Kant and his own “occult” doctrine of morality.

⁴⁸⁴ Emanuel Swedenborg, *Arcana Coelestia*, 3957g.

⁴⁸⁵ *Kant's Lectures on Rational Psychology*, according to Pölitz, 254 f.

Just like Kant Swedenborg also defines “heaven” and “hell” not as physical places but as inner states of the moral nature of souls. He teaches,

that these compose the life of heaven or heaven, but that the opposite composes hellish life or hell.⁴⁸⁶

As then can be clearly and plainly seen from these striking parallels between Kant’s and Swedenborg’s views on the spirit world beyond, Kant has construed the nature of the spirit world from pure reason precisely as Swedenborg has revealed it from things ostensibly “heard and seen.” If there is a spirit kingdom on the other side as Kant presents it in these lectures, then on logical grounds it must be of such a nature as Swedenborg describes it from things “seen and heard.”

Certainly Kant could have gotten some inspiration, if not even borrowed some ideas, from Swedenborg’s revelatory work, the *Arcana Coelestia*, which, as we know, he expressly admits to having read already at the beginning of *Dreams*.

If one places these statements of Kant about Swedenborg and occult phenomena beside those in his polemical tract from the year 1766, the similarity in content immediately jumps to the eye. For in his polemical tract from the year 1766 he also accepts a “spiritistic” spirit community,

as soon as that conjunction [with the body] has ceased, the community wherein the soul always stands in association with spiritual natures is all that remains, and must then reveal itself in clear view to its consciousness.⁴⁸⁷

However, with these two premises, first, that in that intelligible mode of being the departed soul, whose personality would be retained by virtue of the continuity of the inner mind, must have allotted to it the faculty of intellectual observation outside the space-time-causality continuum; and second, that on other hand every individual soul must take its moral place

⁴⁸⁶ Emanuel Swedenborg, *Arcana Coelestia* 3957h.

⁴⁸⁷ Kant, *Dreams*, 37 (additions in parenthesis mine).

within that morally structured spirit kingdom already during its life-time—all the conditions would be given that are fundamentally needed to make possible the existence of occult phenomena, indeed, even to explain them.

The transformation of impressions received supra-sensorially from the “world-in-itself” might be imagined in the following way. By means of his inner mind a seer like Swedenborg would receive intellectually understood impressions from that intelligible, moral world of souls—some of them already departed. This would do in order to project these inner mental images, through the productive power of his imagination, in a reversed direction of perception, from his understanding into his sensorial perception. Then, these appear in the space-time-causality continuum as puzzling incursions into the continuum of perception, just as do occult phenomena.

As a result of there being this twofold observation, sensorial and intellectual, intersections between these two in principle different modes of observation would not be precluded. Occasionally they could, admittedly, degenerate into chimeras and fantasies, but notwithstanding they would also have observational content communicated from that intelligible spirit world. Such an overlap between the two fundamentally distinct modes of observation Kant had indeed already ironizingly recognized in his *Dreams*, but here in his lectures on rational psychology he has made this Swedenborg imitation manifestly his own, earnest conviction.

How differently Kant presents Swedenborg's personal nature and esoteric teaching in his psychology than he does in his polemical tract of 1766, in which through his own metaphysical imitations he endeavors to discredit the seer as a rank fantasizer and spirit-seer!

All the same, in a historical-critical view these statements from Pölitiz' transcript L1 that have been used must be set in relation to the original source L2, in which Kant mentions Swedenborg only as an example of how far one can go in metaphysical speculation:

Speaking of the possibility of association with departed souls...All appearances of spirits and ghosts, all dream interpretation, fore-seeing of the future, premonition and the like are to be utterly

rejected, because no rule at all can be produced from them...It is not worth the effort to speak further of them.⁴⁸⁸

It seems noteworthy to me that in spite of his alleged skepticism about all spirit appearances Kant nevertheless speaks quite extensively about them—about how one can picture the spirit kingdom of the dead to oneself—and in so doing he again has recourse to Swedenborg's conception of spirit appearances, on which he here shows himself an authority.

Certainly he regards more detailed considerations of the hereafter as objectionable, because in his opinion occult phenomena, like spirit appearances, are not accessible to everyone; nevertheless, he does not deny the fundamental basic possibility of a supra- or extra-sensory contact with the spirit world.

In the source K2 Kant also emphasizes the speculative nature of Swedenborg's teaching about the state of the soul after death:

The state of the soul (*status animae*) after death. This is nothing but a dream.⁴⁸⁹

Here too in Kant's discussion is shown the same contradiction between his self-imposed prohibition against speculating on such occult things as a spirit kingdom and spirit appearances, ("this is nothing but a dream") and against the actual completed speculation itself, where he here again cites Swedenborg's teaching on the hereafter.

In view of these two sets of statements in Kant's lectures on rational psychology, why speculate about *Dreams* at all, one asks, and why in such methodical detail, and above all, why then always in the context of Swedenborg?

Although according to these later sources L2 and K2 (about 1790) Kant stresses the limits of reason in reference to the question of the state of the soul after death, he cannot help eagerly speculating over it himself. In so doing he goes to the model of Swedenborg, which at one time he explains

⁴⁸⁸ *Kant's Lectures on Rational Psychology*, according to L2, 102 f., in AA XXVIII, 4. Abt., 5. B., 2. H., 1. T., Berlin 1970.

⁴⁸⁹ *Kants Vorlesungen über die rationale Psychologie*, according to K2 (according to Heinze), 691, in AA XXVIII, 4. Abt., 5. B., 2. H., 1. T., Berlin 1970.

as something to be rejected because it lacks universal validity (in L2), at another time cites as a neutral example (in K2), and then at another time again describes as "exalted" (in L1 according to Pölitz). How are these differing valuations of Swedenborg to be explained?

One explanation could be that at the beginning of the year 1780, from which the main source, L1, used by Pölitz unquestionably stems, he was thinking more respectfully of Swedenborg than he had been towards the end of his critical period, from which the sources L2 and K2 stem. It seems to me, however, that pushing Kant's judgment forward in time can provide but an inadequate reason, especially since the temporal sequence leads to no final judgment of Kant about Swedenborg, even if one assumes that at the beginning of the year 1780 he took a more tolerant stand on Swedenborg than toward the end of the year 1780. For up to the commencement of the critical period Kant had already revised his initial reception of Swedenborg twice: the first change of feeling occurred between the years 1763 (letter about Swedenborg to Ch. v. Knobloch) and 1766 (*Dreams of a Spirit Seer*), the second must then have been between 1766 and the commencement of the year 1780, when according to Pölitz and Mrongovius he again took a positive position to Swedenborg's teachings. There was then a third change of feeling between the start and the end of the year 1780. This too did not allow Kant's judgment on Swedenborg to appear any more final than did the change from his positive attitude toward Swedenborg in his letter to lady Knobloch, to his critical attitude in his polemical tract, whose hard judgment of Swedenborg's person and gift of seership he again retracted in his lectures in the early years of the 1780's.

Besides this, the dating of the lecture notes is not certain and exact enough to be able to fix the point of origin of particular sources, such as the source L1 used by Pölitz and the notes of Mrongovius, unequivocally prior to the composition of the other, as is likewise the case in regard to L2 and K2. On the basis of these reasons the temporal sequence appears to me to supply no sufficient explanation for Kant's obviously vacillating attitude toward Swedenborg and his gift of seership, which shows itself in the successive revisions of his assessment of Swedenborg as well as in each one of his writings on Swedenborg.

I would much more make the tension in his feelings between rational cognitive theory and outright "occult" moral theory responsible for the

fact that he obviously could not free himself from Swedenborg, but cited him again and again and at the same time, in all available sources of his lectures on rational psychology, put his own speculations about an ethical hereafter alongside the esoteric teachings of Swedenborg.

How Kant envisions such a moral, intelligible world can be gathered reliably from Pölitz' notes because Kant's teachings about a moral constitution of the spirit world contained in them is given independent confirmation by Mrongovius's notes.

On account of this double testimony of Kant's speculations, which in both these mutually independent lecture notes express a sympathy with Swedenborg's visions "ex auditis et visis," I incline to the thesis that in his critical period Kant has returned to the initial, interested and well-disposed view of Swedenborg and occult phenomena that he had taken in the letter to lady von Knobloch.

But quite independently of this, whatever position each interpreter may take on it, Kant was in any case at pains to use a quite different, more polite and factual tone in dealing with Swedenborg than in his polemical tract.

In these lectures from the 1780's as Pölitz has recorded them, but also in Mrongovius's notes from the year 1783, Kant actually draws what is for me the conclusion his system demands, namely, that besides granting awareness of the moral-law as a fact of pure reason and the existence of morally determined free will, he also grants that the intellect possesses a perception of "things in themselves," and likewise that there are actions in the sensual world that originate in the intelligible world. Here Kant himself makes the correlation in his system between his moral theory and its logically necessary possibility of a mental or intellectual observation:

Through reason we are now already consciously present as in an intelligible realm; after death we will see and know it, we will be in a quite different world, but one that has changed only as to its form, namely, one where we recognize things as they are in themselves.⁴⁹⁰

⁴⁹⁰ *Kants Vorlesungen über die rationale Psychologie*, nach Mrongovius, 219.

With this view Kant returns to his original interest in Swedenborg and adapts his own metaphysical ideas to the esoteric teachings of the seer. He again takes up his early ideas on the possibility of infinitely many different worlds and inclines to the spiritistic conviction that an interaction between the spirit kingdom and the human kingdom must in principle be possible in the inner mind of a medium. In these lectures Swedenborg's ostensible contact with spirits is not only justified by Kant in a very personal manner, but is even given an *a priori*, theoretical explanation.

But in spite of this extensive concession to Swedenborg and occult phenomena Kant is unable to draw the final inference from his own metaphysical assumptions: On logical grounds not only a solitary, but also repeatedly inducible change of sensual to mental observation already within the physical existence of the immortal soul appears to him to be impossible,

because in that case spiritual observation would have to begin already in this world. But since in this world I still have sensorial observation, I cannot at the same time have spiritual observation.⁴⁹¹

Thus Kant views sensual and spiritual observation as mutually exclusive, as non-complementary modes of observation, while Swedenborg and spiritualism understand both modes of observation as overlapping in abnormal states of mind. But if in principle such a change of the modes of observation appears possible by death, as Kant claims, then in principle there is nothing more against a repetition of this change of observation before death, provided one assumes death-like states of trance, into which a seer or a medium could possibly enter at any time.

Kant, however, does not seem to have been aware of these somnambulant trance-states that resemble hypnosis, and so he lacks the key to the explanation of spirit contact and occult phenomena. Strangely, despite his sweeping concession to Swedenborg, in placing this limitation of the change in observation exclusively at the final moment of death, he falls

⁴⁹¹ *Kants Vorlesungen über die rationale Psychologie*, nach Pöhlitz, 259.

short of his bold speculations in his earlier lectures on metaphysics from the years 1762—1764, where he assumed such gradual uncouplings of the soul as taking place in sleep.⁴⁹²

In regard to his lectures on rational psychology I would claim that in his psychology Kant has not drawn the final consequence of his extensive *a priori* assumptions about the state of the soul after death and also about the change of the modes of observation, on account of his not wanting to endanger the universal use of reason:

If it is supposed, however, that it would be possible that the soul could still appear in this world, or that such spiritual observation would be possible already here—seeing that we cannot prove the impossibility of this—, still the maxim of sound reason must be weighed against it. But the maxim of sound reason is: Do not allow, but reject all experiences and appearances that are of such a nature that if I accept them, they make the use of my reason impossible and set aside the conditions under which alone I can use my reason.⁴⁹³

This condition is precisely the general space-time-causality continuum into which supra-sensorially received and extra-sensorially produced actions would abruptly break in as occult phenomenon. Sensorial and intellectual observation could not exist together, in Kant's opinion, because they would so interfere with and thus damage each other that the general use of reason would no longer be possible. And therewith the synthetic unity of transcendental apperception, the identity of the consciousness of self in "I think," would also be jeopardized. In so doing Kant deliberately overlooks the fact that his categorical imperative of free will breaks in from the intelligible world into the world of appearance in just the same occult manner as do the spirit contacts of Swedenborg here discussed.

In this passage the influence of Kant's critical cognitive system, in which he made the conditions for the appearance of consciousness of self dependent on the conditions of the constitution of the object, shows itself.

⁴⁹²Cf. *Kants Vorlesungen über Metaphysik*, nach Herder, 1762-64, 184 f., cf. also Chap. 3.1.3.

⁴⁹³ *Kants Vorlesungen über die rationale Psychologie*, according to Pölitiz, 259 f.

Here the tension between his secret inner longing for a contact with the intelligible world already during lifetime and his own critical review of these hidden speculations reaches its high point. In his psychology, where he finds the immortal soul fundamentally capable of intellectual observation, he does indeed consider the possibility of spirit contact already during earthly life; however, in order to preserve his cognitive theory at least for the earth bound sensorial man, he inconsistently straightway rejects it. As I see it, this hesitancy of Kant to accept an intellectual observation in the exceptional case already also in the soul's earthly life can only be based on the fear that in so doing he would have to completely sacrifice his critical cognitive theory, and therewith in this case the guarantee of the consciousness of self as well. That this apprehension need not hold true in every case, however, is best shown in the counter example of Swedenborg, who in his phase as seer was in fact always still capable of normal communication with the people around him. Notwithstanding, in the normal world of perception a deep involvement in super-sensorially received information does necessitate a high inner stability of the sensitive faculty, because otherwise, as Kant apprehends, the consciousness of self can actually be lost. There are sufficient examples of this in the field of occult research.⁴⁹⁴ In any case, the question to be put to Kant is how he would picture the formation of the consciousness of self after death and thus after cessation of the sensorial formation of objects. But since such a consciousness of self obviously presents him with no problem, it is impossible to understand *a priori* why the soul should not also be capable of intellectual observation during earthly life too, without its identity thereby being endangered.

Kant has here logically seen only two possibilities: he must either accept the possibility of the change of the modes of observation from sensual to intellectual observation already during man's lifetime, or he must entirely give up the thought of a bodiless soul. But if he were to let the thought of an intelligible soul fall, he would therewith also pull away the foundation of his moral philosophy, because then a subject would no

⁴⁹⁴ A collection of such "mediumistic psychoses" are found for instance in Bender's booklet *Telepathie, Hellsehen und Psychokinese*, Munich, 1972, 94-124.

longer exist that had access to the intelligible world of reason and that thus had an awareness of the moral law.

If, on the other hand, he had retained the idea of an intelligible soul and also drawn the last consequence of his own assumptions in his rational psychology, namely, the allowance of an overlap of the modes of observation already during lifetime, occult phenomena would thereby be given a theoretical explanation. By assuming an intellectual observation by the intelligible soul already in the state of its commerce with the body, the possibility of all three kinds of occult phenomena (extra-sensory perceptions and actions as well as contact with spirits) in the first two categories would be possible *a priori*:

OC A: Extra-sensory perceptions, actions and spirit contacts without a transfer medium.

OC B: Extra-sensory perceptions, actions and spirit contacts without a material transfer medium, as for instance, through a "more finely organized body," as Kant had supposed in his earlier lectures on metaphysics.⁴⁹⁵

And for the third category of the possibility of occult phenomena:

OC C: Extra-sensory perceptions, actions and spirit contacts with a physical transfer medium. For these the only possibility that still remains open is that of a transfer by infinitely rapid activity.

The concession of the possibility of intellectual observation in Kant's rational psychology forces a fundamental expansion of his first postulate of cognition CP 1 that restricts the capability for human cognition exclusively to sensual perception. Nevertheless both his other postulates of cognition, CP 2 and CP 3, and therewith furthermore the cognitive powers of the CPR, still also remain valid and usable as *a priori* conditions for the possibility of sensorial cognition.

⁴⁹⁵ Cf. *Kants Vorlesungen über Metaphysik*, nach Herder, 1762-64, 185.

I.7.3. Reviews of Kant's Lectures on "Rational Psychology"

It is precisely the "odd components" of Kant's lectures that should awaken the attention of the researcher, even if they disturb the calm and in so doing require a revision of Kant's conception of Swedenborg in *Dreams*. This circumstance was in fact precisely what induced du Prel to publish Kant's lectures again.

Du Prel's commentary awakened a response from P. von Lind in his publication, *Kants mystische Weltanschauung, ein Wahn der modernen Mystik* (Kant's Mystic Philosophy, a Mania of Modern Mysticism)⁴⁹⁶. As Henry Richard shows, however, even considering the then omnipotent materialism von Lind's arguments are unusually shallow.⁴⁹⁷

P. von Lind battles against common spiritism, and in this battle the denominations humbug and conjuring suffice as arguments. Consequently the book lies far below the level proper to a thinker like du Prel, not at all to mention Swedenborg and Kant. Indeed, von Lind's starting point, that with du Prel spirit appearances are a prerequisite, is incorrect, for one can affirm the existence of spirits without ever having seen a spirit or felt its influence. Furthermore, it is possible that du Prel's proof of a "turnabout" by Kant did not succeed to the extent that he presumes.

Whether the factual questions du Prel brings forward are valid, research must determine. In my view it remains to du Prel's credit to have substantiated the "superb Pölitz" by relating Kant's college lecture-notes to the remainder of his works.⁴⁹⁸

In spite of the appropriate circumspection in dealing with the notes on Kant's college lectures one finds it necessary to ask, Is it permissible and in harmony with the self-evident importance of scientific knowledge that the thoughts of Kant be withheld from the world? Hardly.⁴⁹⁹

⁴⁹⁶ P. von Lind, *Kants mystische Weltanschauung, ein Wahn der modernen Mystik*. Munich 1892.

⁴⁹⁷ Cf. zum folgenden Heinrich Richard, "Unbeachtete Vorlesungen Kants." Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Swedenborg-Forschung, in: *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte*, Band 9, 1957. S. 280-283.

⁴⁹⁸ Cf. Carl du Prel, *Kants mystische Weltanschauung*, Leipzig, 1889; this view is also shared by Heinrich Richard in his essay "Unbeachtete Vorlesungen Kants," 280-283.

⁴⁹⁹ Heinrich Richard also is of this opinion in his essay "Unbeachtete Vorlesungen Kants," 280.

On this point I concur with von H. Kritzinger's judgment of Kant's college notes, which follows and agrees with Ernst Benz in his fruitless search for a final judgment of Kant in regard to Swedenborg:

That Kant's divergent judgments on Swedenborg could still not be his last word has been repeatedly emphasized by Ernst Benz. For years he has sought in vain for Kant's decisive comment... Here [in his lectures on rational psychology] he admits the projection of our being into the spirit world, and his earlier, contemptuous judgment of Swedenborg is transformed into high approbation. This is Ernst Benz's so long sought judgment of old Kant.⁵⁰⁰

I.8 SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF PART I AND CRITIQUE

As shown in the first chapter of this treatise, Swedenborg was in no way the fantasizer and spirit-seer that Kant has titled him in his polemic tract *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*. Swedenborg's achievements in science and literature and also in commerce and statesmanship, won in the first half of his rich life as scholar and Assessor of Mines in Sweden, border on the immeasurable and for thematic reasons could only be pointed to in this philosophic inquiry. The history of his influence, too, which played out chiefly in a hidden fashion, due to his having been rationally banished by Kant, has had to be limited to a few major examples in the first chapter.

In the second chapter Swedenborg's influence on Kant is taken back to the quite strong agreement between the two scholars, as for instance in cosmology, where Swedenborg had anticipated Kant by twenty years, and also in rational psychology, where in the end Kant became reconciled with Swedenborg.

In the fourth chapter Kant's polemic tract against Swedenborg was analyzed and put into relation to *The Critique of Pure Reason*. There are surprising parallels in form and content between the polemic against Swedenborg and the metaphysicists, and Kant's chief work. In the third chapter, with the unfolding of the historic controversy between Kant and

⁵⁰⁰ H. H. Kritzinger: *Zur Philosophie der Überwelt*, Tübingen 1951, 55 f. (Additions in parenthesis mine.)

Swedenborg, it comes out that at the start Kant had not at all stood in a hostile position to the Nordic seer and also that he did not maintain his polemic tract's categorical denial of all extrasensory effects of the soul throughout his whole life. On the contrary, in his early writings Kant speculated quite readily over the possibility of transcendent cognition and took an interest in Swedenborg, because from the Nordic "seer" he obviously hoped for a confirmation of his own rational hypotheses about an interaction between the sensual and intelligible world. In Kant's position what must be stressed, in contrast to the categorical rejection that secondary-literature incorrectly usually maintains, is the indecision, even the division in his judgment on occult phenomena.

In the fifth chapter in the evaluation of occult phenomena within pure reason's critical cognitive system there resulted *a priori* no possibility for the existence of occult phenomena. This *a priori* impossibility is due to the restrictions of Kant's cognitive theory, which limits the capability for human cognition exclusively to sense perception as the basis for cognitive experience.

This categorically negative thesis in opposition to occult phenomena in the sixth chapter then receives an antithetical counterpoint, since Kant's own doctrine of morals forces a crossing of the boundary into the intelligible world, in order to provide free will its *a priori* place.

In the seventh chapter the logically drawn antithesis is given its factual historical confirmation. In his later lectures on rational psychology Kant now also gives a theoretical base to the interaction between the sensorial and intelligible world that was logically developed in the course of his doctrine of morals. To the human soul free of the body he concedes the transition from sensorial to intellectual observation. Here again he approaches Swedenborg's doctrine so closely that he calls it "sublime" and matches his own metaphysical conception of the soul's state after death with that of Swedenborg.

Here, twenty years later, the polemic imitation he made of Swedenborg's doctrine receives a solemn philosophic garb. Kant also again takes up the possibility of an interaction between the world of the senses and the world of the intellect and carries this to its high point, in that to the soul freed from the body he grants the capability of intellectual observation.

The last of his own premises that Kant presents in his “Psychology,” namely, the possibility of a purely spiritual state already during earthly life and therewith the fundamental capability of intellectual observation in abnormal states of consciousness seems to me—precisely in the sense of his occult doctrine of morals—to be logically convincing. Even if historically Kant denied this logical consequence of his own premises, one can assess his premises in the “Psychology” (using the rules of literary criticism) as a theoretical foundation for the *a priori* possibility of occult phenomena, their factual reality aside.

(To be continued)

