

EMANUEL, IMMANUEL: MAGIC, MIRACLES, AND MORALS IN ENLIGHTENED RELIGION[†]

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INTRODUCTION

As enlightened men, Emanuel Swedenborg (1688–1772) and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) made remarkable claims. Their two systems share many features¹ and philosophical and theological positions.² Even their personal lives contain similarities.³ Despite the similarities, one finds major differences between the two.

Swedenborg asserted that, as a servant of the Lord, he experienced the life after death,⁴ revealed the key to unlock the Bible,⁵ saw the commencement of a New Church,⁶ the true Christian religion,⁷ and was taught by the Lord Himself. Kant asserted that his moral theory was revelation,⁸ that in the future we would no longer need historical sacred scriptures (Rel. 121–22; 151–52), that he found reason's own eternal and unalterable laws,⁹ and that his natural religion was the pure, true, universal one (Rel. 101–102, 154–163; 136, 177–184). After 1750, each points humanity in a different direction. Swedenborg points us to the God-Man Jesus Christ, to the Word of God,¹⁰ and he points us, in general, away from the self. Kant, on the other hand, points us to the self, to the books of the Critical Philosophy, and he points us away from Christianity (both from its books and Christ).¹¹

In this essay I focus on the similarities and differences between the two thinkers concerning magic, miracles, and morality. I conclude that both men link the rise of magic to immorality (in a broad sense of that term) and condemn its use. However, while Kant tries to banish the magical and miraculous from human experience, Swedenborg offers a metaphysical and theological explanation of both.

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IMMANUEL KANT ON MIRACLES AND MAGIC

By looking at Kant's attitude toward the supernatural, at a very general level, we see that he opposed any practice or concept associated with religion that stands in the way of moral improvement undertaken by an individual using his own reason. This includes supernatural concepts such as magic and miracles. While Kant became progressively clear about the need to oppose naturalism, he consistently rejected supernaturalism. Pre-critical works such as *Universal Natural History*¹² and *The Only Possible Argument*¹³ show him trying to walk the fine line between the two extremes. His *Dreams of A Spirit-Seer*¹⁴ is an excellent example of his fascination with, and rejection of, supernaturalism and Swedenborgian theology. Also, early in his career he rejects the authority of the Bible.¹⁵ One reason for this rejection is that he thinks the miracles of the Bible are indefensible (UNH 96; 146). Kant devises many arguments to show why we cannot allow the finger of God to be in nature (at least not in a specific open way) (UNH 145–167; 169–179; OPA 100–113; 143–155). For the most part, Kant replaces the Hand of God with the Hand of Nature (UNH 29, 153; 115, 172).

In his 1793 work, *Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, Kant appends to each of the four parts a general remark that addresses a religious supernatural topic. His reason for including these in the work is that it is a task of reason to remove difficulties that obstruct moral progress when these difficulties touch upon transcendent questions. He begins by saying that "reason does not contest the possibility or actuality of the objects of these [supernatural] ideas; it just cannot incorporate them into its maxims of thought and action" (Rel. 52; 96). Furthermore, he says that when reason is aware of its insufficiency, it even counts on supernatural help from a reflective, but not dogmatic, faith. He appears to say that he will not categorically deny the possibility or actuality of magic and miracles. But he does. He asserts that the existence of God in space is a contradiction (Rel. 138–39; 165), that any claim to knowledge of the supernatural is dishonest and impudent (Rel. 52; 96), and, by showing how they interfere with the advancement of science and morality, he denies the practical usefulness of supernatural concepts (Rel. 88; 125–25). Just as the younger Kant in his *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime*,¹⁶ had

criticized people's religious use of the supernatural, so the old Kant repeats the classic Enlightenment condemnation. His labelling of the consequences of the four parerga as enthusiasm, superstition, illumination, and thaumaturgy makes this clear (Rel. 53; 96).

Swedenborg is also quite critical of, for example, the enthusiasm of the Quakers, the superstition of the Papists, and the thaumaturgy of the Egyptians.¹⁷ The essential difference between Kant and Swedenborg is Swedenborg's claim to have experiential knowledge of, and rational enlightenment concerning, the supernatural, his insistence that it is needed for the salvation of humankind, and his assertion that the supernatural is constantly part of human experience. Kant's philosophy rests on a knowledge of the supernatural workings of the mind, but he is coy about giving this ontological status to his transcendental idealism. For him, supernatural experience is a contradiction in terms (CoF 57; 279). He calls the mind and the moral realm the "supersensible." Although the supersensible is inconceivable, it is practical (CoF 59; 280). We should not confuse the supersensible with the supernatural, which he characterizes as "the influence of another and higher spirit, something not within our power and not belonging to us as our own" (CoF 59; 280). As he says in one of his last works, "*Supernaturalium non datur scientia*": There is no science of supernatural matters (CoF 65; 285). We must keep a respectful distance from the supernatural "lest, under the delusion that we do miracles ourselves, or that we perceive miracles in us, we render ourselves unfit for all use of reason, or let ourselves be tempted into a state of inertia" (Rel. 191; 207).

I now turn to the general remarks (parerga) in Kant's *Religion*.¹⁸

The First Remark

The first general remark concerns works of grace. Works of grace cannot be admitted as maxims into our reason because they are supernatural, and in this realm the use of reason ceases (Rel. 53; 96). Reason cannot use the supernatural theoretically because the use of the concepts of cause and effect cannot be extended beyond the bounds of experience, and hence beyond nature (ibid.). This is consistent with Kant's banishment of the paranormal, or supernatural, from the realm of experience given in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (A222/B270). In the first *Critique* Kant argues that

the concepts involved in paranormal claims are baseless because we cannot found their possibility “on experience and its familiar laws. But without this experience and these laws that possibility is an arbitrary combination of thoughts” (A223/B270).

Note well that Kant’s argument in the first *Critique* rests on the assumption that the relationship between the human mind and the natural world has always been as we find it now (or as Kant found it in 1780). If this relationship was different in the past, then, contrary to Kant’s belief, the possibility of the concepts involved in paranormal claims may be based on experience (perhaps unfamiliar to us) and so not on an arbitrary chimera. According to Swedenborg, the relationship between the human mind, nature, and God was indeed different in the past, and this difference plays an important part in many subjects, including miracles and magic. I will return to this topic later.

The Second Remark

It is in the second general remark that we find Kant’s definition and classification of miracles along with a comment on magic. He defines a miracle as an event in the world the causes and effects of which are absolutely unknown to us and must remain so (Rel. 86; 124). He classifies miracles into two general categories, theistic and demonic. Demonic miracles are then further divided into angelic and satanic miracles. He characterizes a natural wonder as a sufficiently attested, though irrational, appearance, or unexpected quality of a thing (Rel. 88; 125–26). If natural wonders are real miracles, then, Kant observes, the human mind is dejected. Why? Because a miracle extinguishes the hope of finding new laws of nature and the mind fears that its confidence in what it has accepted as known shall be lost (Rel. 88; 125–26). When reason is severed from the laws of experience, it is of no use in a bewitched world, for even changes in our moral incentives may take place through miracles!

Besides pointing out various problems with the idea that miracles occurred only long ago, that governments do not allow supernatural excuses in courts, and that the use of the word “miracle” is a mere turn of phrase (as when a doctor says “It will be a miracle if he lives”),¹⁹ Kant gives what I take to be his final position on the matter. His argument is a

dilemma (and a false one at that). Either (A) miracles must be admitted as occurring daily (though hidden under the guise of natural events), or else (B) never. That miracles should occur daily is, Kant asserts, incompatible with reason (Rel. 89; 126). Thus we are left with (B), miracles never occur. This is Kant's moral maxim for making judgments.²⁰

As for his view on miraculous claims, Kant lumps them with magic, saying that it is a common ruse of those who dupe the gullible with magical arts that they appeal to the scientist's admission of ignorance (Rel. 88; 125–26).

Now Kant is not such a rationalist, or a naturalist, to believe that we can understand everything in nature, or that life can be explained mechanistically. Kant was always ambivalent about a mechanistic biology of living forms. Here he takes the position that while we must make it a moral maxim that miracles never occur and that we must not fall for magical tricks based on scientific ignorance, still, we do encounter mysteries. He is critical of holy mysteries, yet he admits that the ground of our freedom is a mystery (Rel. 138–39; 164–65) and so is the phenomenon of life. We do not know, he muses, if the direct influence of the Creator is needed on each occasion of the reproduction and quickening of life in the plant and animal kingdoms (Rel. 89; 126).²¹

The Fourth Remark

Finally, the fourth general remark concerns thaumaturgy, that is, attempts at influencing the supernatural by natural means. Kant examines four alleged services of God which function as alleged means of grace for people in this delusory faith: private prayer, church-going, baptism, and communion (Rel. 193; 208). This fetish faith occurs when people undertake a religious ritual, not in a purely moral spirit, but instead as a means in itself capable of propitiating God and thus of satisfying all our wishes (Rel. 193; 209). Kant then offers a definition of the persuasion of thaumaturgy, which could also serve as his view of magic. Belief in magic is the conviction that "what cannot effect a certain thing, either according to nature or the moral laws of reason, will through it alone nonetheless effect the thing wished for, if only we firmly believe that it will indeed effect it, and we accompany our belief with certain formalities" (Rel. 193; 209). Kant's point

is that these religious rituals should be used to enliven our moral disposition, that their ritualistic elements really do not matter in themselves, and that the right way to make progress is not from grace to virtue, but from virtue to grace (Rel. 202; 215).

What is the cause of belief in miracles and magic? “All such artificially induced self-deceptions in religious matters [such as faith in miracles, mysteries, and means of grace] have a common ground”: our propensity to do whatever it takes to avoid the hard work of moral regeneration (Rel. 200; 214). Human beings, Kant observes, busy themselves with every formality they can think of to show how much they respect the divine commands, in order that it will not be necessary to actually observe them (Rel. 200; 214). We are satisfied with a slothful trust in magic and miracles so that we become favorites of God’s mercy without having to conform to the conditions of God’s holiness. Kant, as usual, strikes shame in the heart of his reader with his cogent insight into the darker side of human nature. Kant’s analysis of the moral causes of magic has, as we will see, something in common with Swedenborg’s.

EMANUEL SWEDENBORG ON MIRACLES AND MAGIC

To understand Swedenborg’s view, one must begin with a few metaphysical propositions as axioms: God is Divine love, wisdom, and Use; God created two planes of existence from His Love, by means of His Wisdom, for eternal Uses; these two planes of existence, or worlds, are the natural and the spiritual.²² The relationship between the two worlds is one of correspondence. In other words, the spiritual world and the natural world are related as prior is to posterior, or internal as to external: “nature has been created for clothing the spiritual and for presenting it in a corresponding form in the ultimate of order” (HH 102). The two worlds are distinct, neither draws anything from the other. Yet they are created so that they may communicate with each other, and even be conjoined, but this does not happen by continuity.²³ Instead it happens by correspondence (DLW 83,88).²⁴ Heat in the natural world corresponds to good in the spiritual world, and light in the natural world corresponds to truth in the spiritual world (DLW 83). This is because heat in the spiritual world is actually good (an effect of Divine love) and light in the spiritual world is

actually truth (an effect of Divine wisdom). Good and truth are formed substances. The natural and spiritual substances in the two worlds are kept in continuous harmony by the infinite force of God. What correspondence is may be seen from the human face.

In a face which has not been taught to dissemble, all the affections of the mind come to view in a natural form as in their image. This is why the face is said to be the index of the mind; that is, it is man's spiritual world presented in his natural world. (HH 91)

We will approach the subject of magic by beginning at a very general level, for magical events are events which form a subset of a larger class. The largest class of Divine action is creation of the two worlds which are ordered in such a way that they correspond. Next is God's government of creation, that is, Providence. God's Providence is the perpetual sustaining of creation from moment to moment.²⁵ In Swedenborgian metaphysics, God is an infinite source of formative energy which ceaselessly flows into what has been created. Thus, there is never a moment when God is not acting. Neither the natural world, nor the spiritual, runs on its own like some self-winding watch (a concept of creation popular with Deists like Kant). Because of the influx from God through the spiritual world into the natural world, everything that takes place in nature, in itself, is a marvel.²⁶ God's action occurs, from our point of view, in two ways: His regular, or usual, action and His unusual action. The marvels of nature, due to their perennial recurrence, are not counted as miracles. It is the unusual events in nature that are dubbed miracles.

Swedenborg describes miracles as the bringing in by means of influx the things of the spiritual world into the corresponding things of this world (Inv. 60) A miracle is the use of the laws of creation, that is, correspondences, to bring about an unusual event for an end. Miracles have not been produced from natural causes, "according to the insanities of certain of the learned at this day," but from supernatural causes (ibid.) God's unusual actions in the natural world (and spiritual world for that matter) are miracles.

Now we come to Swedenborg's classification of miracles. Correspondences have all force, so that what is done on earth according to correspon-

dences has power in the spiritual world; for all correspondences are from the Divine (AC 8615). All the miracles in the Word were effected through correspondences.²⁷ A Divine miracle is the use of the laws of correspondence for a good end. A Divine miracle is done from the Divine omnipotence and is called in the Word “the finger of God” (AC 7430). Humans who either have the cooperation of God, or have a knowledge of correspondences, can also be means for miracles. A false, or diabolical, miracle is the abuse of the laws of correspondence and the perversion of order. This is known as magic or a magical miracle (AC 6692). By definition magic is always evil. Evil is the perversion, or twisting, of what is good and orderly. Magic occurs when a person applies his or her knowledge of correspondences to an evil end.

Swedenborg gives the following example to illustrate his point (AC 7337): It is according to order that states of affection and thought cause the idea of place and distance in the spiritual world, and that people appear to be distant from each other in proportion as they are in diverse states. This law of order is from God to the intent that all who are in heavenly societies may be distinct from each other, yet still in communication. Magicians in the spiritual world abuse this law of order. They induce in other people changes of state, and so move them at first up to great heights, then down into the depths of strange societies. The magicians do this to gain power over people and make subjects of them. Other magical abuses of this law include being able to appear to be with many people simultaneously, disappearing suddenly, and speaking as though they were somewhere else. These are just a few of the tricks that sorceresses, witches, and sirens in the spiritual world use to worm their way into other people’s affections in order to manipulate them to satisfy their own desires (AC 831).

This does not mean that people referred to as magi, or wise ones, are always evil. “Magi” denotes people who are learned in the causes of things, both natural and spiritual. The three magi who visited the infant Jesus, for example, are rightly called wise men because they were learned in natural and spiritual matters and they had a good end, namely, the selfless building up of the goods and truths of religion. By contrast, the “wise men” of Egypt whom Pharaoh consulted to prevent the Israelites from leaving the country to worship Jehovah were magicians. Why? Be-

cause they used their knowledge of correspondences as a hindrance and to maintain power over their subjects. Even though Moses and Aaron, and Pharaoh's magi, performed (some of) the same miracles from an external point of view, the Egyptians' actions were magical because of their internal nature. Swedenborg writes that their external forms are similar, but their internal forms differ as do heaven and hell (AC 7337).

TWO APPROACHES TO THE CAUSES OF MAGIC: HISTORICAL AND PERSONAL

The Historical Approach

To understand the causes of magic, one must also understand the causes of miracles. To do this, one must know something about Swedenborg's view of the religious history of humankind. According to Swedenborg, magic is the result of the progressive alienation of humans from God due to their increasingly selfish and worldly choices. In the "which came first, religion or magic, debate" Swedenborg says religion came first.

Swedenborg discusses four churches in the religious history of the human race: the Most Ancient, Ancient, Israelitish, and Christian churches. The people of the first, or Most Ancient church, learned what was good and true for eternal life by means of an immediate communication with angels. The true thoughts and good loves of the angels flowed into the minds of most ancient people either through internal conversation, or by means of visions and dreams (AC 10,355; AC 597). From this interior enlightenment they had a perception, or we might say intuition, about how to be good and love the Lord. This perception was concretized by their sensory perception. In all objects they saw something representative and significant of the Lord's kingdom. "Their eyes—still less their minds—did not dwell upon the visible objects; but to them they were the means of thought concerning celestial and spiritual things of the Lord's kingdom" (AC 2722). Nature for them was a theater representative of the Divine. For example, Swedenborg reports that when they looked at a mountain they did not receive the idea of a mountain, but of height, and from height they

had a perception of heaven and the Lord. Hence it came to pass that the Lord was said to dwell on high, and that He was called the Highest, and that worship was offered up on mountains (AC 920).

The people of this church flourished before the Flood. After this church reached its peak, it successively worsened with each generation.²⁸ It is at this point that people began choosing the loves they had in common with animals over the loves they had in common with angels. When this happened, the spiritual world continued to flow into the natural world, but now this also included hell. Just as the kingdom of heaven is within each person, so is the kingdom of hell.

The evil spirits in hell associated themselves with evil people here and the law of correspondence continued to operate, but now it perverted natural substances into noxious and harmful things among animals, vegetables, and minerals (DLW 343). Animals, such as crocodiles and owls, vegetables, and poisons in the earth that are deadly or harmful to humans and the things that they depend upon to survive, are called evil forms of use (DLW 338). They are called uses because they are of use to the evil in doing evil and are also serviceable in absorbing malignities and thus as remedies (DLW 336). Swedenborg lists several animals and plants to illustrate his point, but two will suffice here.

First, crocodiles, like poisons in the earth and in plants, may have existed since the creation. Crocodiles, as predators, are not evil forms of use. In fact, since they help maintain a balance of life forms in nature, they are just forms of use. It is not the predatory nature of the crocodile per se that makes it an evil form of use. Instead, it is when the crocodile preys upon humans that it becomes evil. Prior to the fall of the Most Ancient Church, humans were vegetarians and they knew, by instinct, what things in the three kingdoms of nature were good for them and what could harm them. As these most ancient people became more like animals and less like angels, they lost not only their spiritual perception, but also their natural perception. They also became meat-eaters, that is, predators. This changed their relationship to animals, including the crocodile, from one of relatively separate harmonious existence to one of competition and domination. At this point the crocodile's predatory quality became an evil form of use, not because God created it to harm people, but because people changed their relationship to it and the Divine providence allows people

to exercise their freedom, even if it entails harmful consequences for humans.

The second example is the owl. It seems strange to include owls in a list of evil forms of use. After all, they not only help maintain a balance of life forms in nature, but they prey upon other animals (such as mice) that can harm humans (by destroying food necessary for survival). An owl became an evil form of use not because of its predatory quality, but because its ability to see at night has a bad correspondence. "Birds" in the Word in general signify rational things and things relating to thought (AC 40; 745). Gentle, beautiful, clean birds signify true spiritual and celestial thoughts. Fierce, ugly, and unclean birds signify false thoughts (AC 866). Owls signify gross and dense falsities because they live in the darkness of night. In other words, owls are an evil form of use because they correspond to evil people who live in spiritual darkness, ignorant of heavenly truths. For example, people who have used the sciences as means for annihilating the things of faith have destroyed the higher part of their mind. So, like owls, they live in thick darkness, seeing falsity for truth, and evil for good (AC 8628). The angels liken naturalists²⁹ to owls which see in the dark, but see nothing in the light (HH 102). Magic is also associated with owls.³⁰

A dead nature that in itself is nothing more than a tool for the spiritual (DLW 340) is Swedenborg's explanation for how so-called "natural evils" arose. Although the Lord permits the existence of evil forms as a function of the laws of Divine providence, they did not derive their origin from the Lord. They were not created from the beginning, nor did they spring from nature through the natural sun, but they arose because of influx from hell twisting what was already created (DLW 399). Thus, the free-will defense to the problem of evil is combined with a supernatural understanding of the relationship between God, humans, and nature to provide a new perspective. As we will see, the process whereby natural evils occur is similar to the one that produced magic.

After the Flood, the second church, the Ancient Church, represented by Noah, did not have an intuitive perception concerning goods and truths. The people of the Ancient Church collected and organized, from the people of the Most Ancient Church, the signification of earthly objects. From a love for the neighbor and truth, the people of the Ancient Church

learned about charity by means of correspondences and representatives. Their communication with heaven was more external than that of the Most Ancients. Furthermore, whereas the Most Ancients intuited what was true and good—or we might say they experienced the meanings of both worlds—the Ancient Church people had to cognize these meanings first and then apply them in a more roundabout way. It was when these ancient people chose to abuse their knowledge of correspondences that magic arose.

The Egyptians provide us with an excellent illustration.³¹ The Ancient Church existed in Egypt, and the Egyptians loved to acquire knowledge of correspondences, representatives, and the causes of things. They called the sciences of things “wisdom” (AC 7296) and became famous for it. They should have used their knowledge of correspondences and representatives to, in general, maintain an understanding of truth to develop genuine conscience and promote order in the church. Specifically, they should have used their wisdom to understand the revelations of the most ancients in order to live a good life. But some did not. Instead, some used their knowledge of correspondences to communicate with evil spirits and thereby learn deceptive arts by which they performed magic (AC 5223). It is this same kind of thinking that Kant was criticizing when he wrote about effecting things wished for, not by natural or moral laws, but by a firm wish accompanied by certain formalities (rituals). This is close to a Swedenborgian view of the abuse of correspondences.

Other Egyptians lost interest in knowing correspondences, and they did not care for the mystical knowledges of the magicians. They became known as the “wise men,” for “they solved difficult problems and taught the causes of natural things” (AC 5223). These people were the forerunners of today’s scientists.

In Providence, the Israelitish representative of a church was raised up so that the Old Testament could be written and external order maintained, even if there was no internal worship with these people. In order for the Israelites to represent celestial and spiritual things in their statutes, rituals, and laws, they had to be ignorant of internal things, especially of correspondences; otherwise they would profane them, and their lot would have been even worse than someone who knew nothing of religion. Swedenborg’s view is that as humans became increasingly corrupt from

the inside out, the Lord had to remain connected to humans and had to maintain the connection between heaven and humans on this planet in increasingly external ways. The Israelites insisted on being a chosen people, and the Lord accepted them because they were external. Whereas people of the Ancient Church knew what it meant spiritually to worship on a mountain, or in a grove, and knew what it meant to face the rising sun, or look upon the stars, the Israelites did not. Instead they worshiped the mountains, groves, sun, and stars themselves, thereby making what had been holy, idolatrous (AC 4288). Yet what counted was their obedience and the fact that the external order furnished a basis in the natural world that the Lord could use to hold the natural and spiritual worlds in holy communication (AC 4311). To maintain this order with external people, the Lord repeatedly used captivities, scourges, threats, and miracles (AC 4281).

This provides an opportunity to make a point that relates to the issue of morality and religion. Kant consistently supports a moral theology, not a theological morality. In other words, one moves from the duties that reason knows to theology; one does not begin with a supernatural written revelation to see what our duties are. In the *Religion*, Kant writes that when the Israelitish religion of rites and observances is done, it is conformable to the ordinary human way of thinking that the new moral spiritual religion (Christianity) be introduced and adorned with miracles. As a fulfillment of Providence, these miracles announce the end of the old religion and the beginning of the new (Rel. 84; 122–23). Kant believes that the new moral religion, namely Enlightenment natural theology, can now hold its own on rational grounds without the Bible and without the supernatural. This means that belief in the miracles of the Old and New Testaments is superfluous. Why? Because we already believe in the commands of duty, and to seek for signs and wonders (Kant uses Jesus' words from John 4:48) betrays our unbelief in the duties of morality (Rel. 84; 122).

Here Kant is saying that people can be moral on a purely rational basis; they have no need for the supernatural, either in a written revelation or in the form of miracles. In fact, he is using a piece of the New Testament against those who, on the basis of miracles, believe in morality. This has a profound effect on Kant's theology. Not only is it a mystery for Kant what God may do to help us be better, but God cannot do anything! Kant may

need the idea of a supreme being and the ideal of a morally supreme being to make his philosophy complete, but Kant's God is not free to be Himself. All his actions are dictated by human (that is, Kantian) reason. In a series of poor arguments concerning miracles, Kant controls God because he controls God's power to act.³²

Swedenborg agrees that seeking for signs and wonders betrays our unbelief, but not our unbelief in morality. Instead it betrays our unbelief in God, spirituality, and the Divine origin of what is good, true, and useful. In his final work, *The True Christian Religion*, Swedenborg writes:

There is not a nation in the whole world which does not know that it is evil to kill, to commit adultery, to steal, and to testify falsely; and that if these evils were not guarded against by laws, the kingdom, republic, or established order of society of whatever form would perish. Who then can conceive that the Israelitish nation was so senseless beyond others that it did not know that those things were evil? One may therefore wonder that these laws...should be so miraculously promulgated from mount Sinai by Jehovah Himself. But listen: they were thus miraculously promulgated, that they might know these laws are not only civil and moral laws, but also Divine laws; and that to act contrary to them is not only to do evil against the neighbor, that is, against the citizen and against society, but also to sin against God. Therefore these laws...were made also laws of religion. (TCR 282)

The decalogue is a summary of all the things of religion by which conjunction between humans and God is effected. Therefore, it is so holy that nothing is holier (TCR 283). Swedenborg then goes on to cite many passages from the Old Testament to support this point, including the miracle that the Commandments were written upon two tables of stone by the finger of God (TCR 283).

The difference between Kant and Swedenborg here is that Kant believes that a theological ethics is not good, while Swedenborg does. An experience that Swedenborg had with a person in the spiritual world, recorded in his diary, reminds one of Kant.³³ Swedenborg encountered a man who, in his youth, had read the Bible diligently, but afterwards, because he did not understand it, banished it from his mind, saying to

himself that moral or natural theology was a better teacher. Wherefore he abandoned the Sacred Scriptures. When he came to the angels, they told him that moral life apart from theological life does not effect any use, does not purify from evils, and by itself does not conduce to life eternal. On hearing this, he assented. The angels gave him a white neckband, or necktie, and the man was delighted. Yet when he returned home the necktie made him nearly blind. Inquiring into the cause he learned that because he had burst asunder the bond between heavenly and moral things, he could see only with the necktie off. The reason was that the white necktie and the neck represent conjunction, and in this case, the things of heaven and the church constitute the head, and moral and natural things constitute the body. By rejecting the Scriptures and the Divine origin of what is right, Kant effectively choked off the influx of good from the Lord, thus blinding his followers to what is true in moral and spiritual matters (as is evident from the revisions and corrections that today's Kantians make to their master's ethical code).

We will return to the angels' statement that the moral life apart from theological life does not purify from evils. For now we explore the way in which Kant and Swedenborg agree that people's dependence upon miracles and magic is the result of their not wanting to be good and do the work of regeneration.

The Personal Approach

The personal, or we might say spiritual, causes of magic are, in general, the same as the roots of all evil. According to Swedenborg, these roots are two: love of self and love of the world placed above love of the Lord and love of the neighbor. One finds in Kant the same idea stated in terms of the subordination of incentives that are adopted into a maxim (Rel. 36; 82–83). More specifically according to Swedenborg, magic originates from a trust in one's own prudence to the exclusion of trust in Providence (HH 488). Disorderly love of self and the world lead to the denial of Providence and the ascription of causality either to the cunning of one's own reason, or to chance and nature (AC 6692). It is because a person does not trust in Providence to take care of the indeterminacies of life that the selfish person finds ways to achieve his or her ends through the manipulation and

control of others (AC 7298; 7397). Interestingly, the experience of success reinforces the belief that there is no Divine providence as it increases the ascription of success to one's own prudence (AC 7296).

Two examples will illustrate the point. Once Swedenborg encountered women (apparently from the upper and middle classes) who, while in the natural world, loved only their reputations and the things of this world. They manipulated other people's thoughts by means of their affections. These women were quick to learn magical arts in the spiritual world and Swedenborg cites ten magical devices that they used (AC 831). They became sorceresses and witches. The reason this occurred is that one who loves the end, loves the means, and these women enjoyed doing in the next life exactly what they delighted in doing in this life.

The second example concerns those who have contrived many arts and cunning devices in order to elevate themselves above others. These people are especially prone to magic (AC 6692). False prophets, soothsayers, diviners, jugglers, and pythons want to raise themselves above others, either by having people worship them, or by subjecting people to them by posing as intermediaries of a false god (AC 3698).

It should now be clear how Swedenborg relates magic to morality. If people were morally and spiritually good, they would not indulge in magic. Indeed, they would not give credence to modern miracles. "The good," Swedenborg writes, "do not desire miracles, but they believe those recorded in the Word; and if they hear anything concerning a miracle they give it their attention only as an argument of no great weight that confirms their faith; for their thoughts [i.e., their faith] are derived from the Word, consequently from the Lord, and not from miracles" (DP 133).³⁴ It is different with the wicked.

When a person does not receive goods and truths according to order from the Lord, but believes that all things are "blind currents, and if anything shows direction to an end, that it is due to his own prudence, he [then] perverts order" (AC 6692). When a person does this, he applies what belongs to the Lord's order (the Divine providence) to himself, "so that he may consult his own interest alone, but not that of the neighbor, except so far as the neighbor favors him" (AC 6692). When we are in this state of mind, we are exceedingly prone to magic. I think this is true in two

ways: first, we are prone to working magic upon others; and second, we are susceptible to magic's effect on us.³⁵

This is a crucial point: a person ought not to attribute everything to chance, nature, or one's own prudence, but ought to instead attribute what is good and true to the Divine providence. Without the conscious effort to humble oneself before the Divine love and wisdom, the human mind remains in its default setting, which is one of ascribing all to self and nature. In this default setting, human reason becomes a prostitute to the corrupt will and a factory for rationalizing self interest.

This is the crux of the matter between Swedenborg and Kant. Both agree that we are predisposed to good and evil. Both reject a universe ruled by chance. Kant says that we can venerate the supernatural historical revelation and the miracles of Jesus only as an external cover which once served to manifest the commands of duty already in our souls, but that it should not be a tenet of religion that knowing, believing, and professing these miracles makes us well-pleasing to God (Rel. 85; 123). Swedenborg heartily agrees that the mere knowing, believing, and professing of miracles does not make us pleasing to God. But Kant has presented a false dilemma. It can be a tenet of religion that one ought to believe in the miracles of God without making that either the basis of one's faith or the basis for being pleasing to God. A good person accepts the miracles of the Word because they testify to God's omnipotence and care for the salvation of human beings. All the healing miracles of Jesus, for example, represent the ways that the Lord can restore our ability to see truth, to hear what is good, to walk in justice and so on.

Swedenborg and Kant differ when it comes to two things in religion: the authority of the Bible and reason; and the idea that we can do good apart from God without taking merit for it.

Swedenborg's view is that God is real (ontologically independent of us) and His commandments are real. Supernatural revelation is continually needed from God because humans keep distorting the previous messages. Yet without a clear communication from God about what is good and evil, humans will not know the truths that enable them to become heavenly. God and His commandments are good and we do good *as if* we did it on our own. Yet we are to acknowledge that this is a useful appear-

ance, otherwise we fall into the trap of taking credit for the good we do and then it is no longer good (for us) but is actually a form of theft. This leads to a denial of Providence, and thence to the ascription of success to one's own prudence and of failure to chance. Such a mind is prone to magic.

Kant's view is that the self is real, reason's commandments are real, and the commandments that the higher rational self gives to the lower animalistic self are good. The rational self did not really need a supernatural revelation such as the New Testament then, and reason does not need another one now. In religion we do our duties *as if* they were commandments from God when in fact they are not. We are to acknowledge that God is an idea constructed by reason in order to justify our hope in living a good and happy life; otherwise we fall into the traps of pseudo-service, subjugation to the clergy, and laziness regarding moral progress and the advancement of science. This is the extent of "God's" power.

A SHORT DIALOG

I will conclude with a short dialogue between Swedenborg and Kant, based on texts, which provides additional insight into their views on miracles and religion.

Immanuel: Some rational people, in theory, believe that miracles occur, but in practice they never use this belief. Wise governments grant that miracles occurred in *ancient* times, but they don't tolerate *new* miracles.

Emanuel: A wise government should, indeed, grant ancient miracles and not tolerate new miracles. Miracles are not done at this day.

Immanuel: What? You, the arch spirit-seer, say that miracles are not done at this day? Sir, you have become caught in your reasonings like the Prussian orthodox. I, like Herr Pfenniger and Herr Lavater, raise the accusation of inconsistency, for you cannot prove from Scripture that miracles ought to cease (Rel. 85n; 123n).

- Emanuel: There is no inconsistency. Manifest miracles are not done at this day.
- Immanuel: What about all the wonders that have taken place in Catholic monasteries and the miracles of Francois de Paris?
- Emanuel: These are not miracles but magic. In fact the Lord predicted that this would happen when he said that false christs and prophets would arise and show great signs and wonders (Matt. 24:24) (Inv.39). The so-called miracles of Anthony of Padua, Francois de Paris, and the three wise men of Cologne, what other purpose have they than that they may be invoked as gods, collect money and gifts, and attain power? What have these so-called miracles taught concerning Christ, heaven, and the truths of the church from the Word? Not a syllable (Inv. 52). A miracle always represents some truth about the Lord, or the state of the church, and it happens for the purpose of building up the church, not for building up self and the world.
- Immanuel: But you believe in a limited age of miracles, and it is inconsistent to say that miracles happened then, but not now, or seldom. Why should an orderly rational God engage in miracles at one time but not at another?
- Emanuel: For the reason that at one time they were a useful means to achieve His end, the salvation of human beings, but that now they are not. You yourself noticed that the Christian religion was supposed to be a more interior religion than Judaism.
- Immanuel: True, I did say that Judaism was so external that it was nothing more than a polity (Rel. 125; 154).
- Emanuel: God does miracles to compel external people to do what He says, to at least come into external order for a time. But God gradually abandoned miracles because He knew that they would work counter to His efforts to build up a more interior spiritual church. The Lord knew that manifest miracles were only a temporary measure. Miracles are actually impotent when it comes to getting evil people to change their ways. Look at all the miracles Jehovah did for the Jews and all the miracles Jesus did for the Jews! How many of them lived good

lives worshiping only Jehovah afterwards? Although evil people may be compelled to worship and piety by miracles, it is only for a short time (DP 130–33; Inv. 46). For their evils are shut in, and the lusts of their evils continually act upon their external of worship. In order that their evils may emerge from their confinement, they reflect upon the miracles and at length call them amusing artifice or natural phenomena, and so return to their evils. Miracles are especially dangerous for interior people because when they return to their evils they become profaners, and their last state is worse than their first.

Immanuel: So you admit that the age of miracles is over?

Emanuel: No, I said that God no longer does *manifest* miracles, such as raising the dead, at this day. I still believe in miracles, but they are miracles that are not obvious to everyone independent of his or her spiritual state. They are miracles which do not take away a person's freedom.

Immanuel: What nonsense! Who can tell whether something is a miracle when it looks exactly the same as a natural phenomenon. You are relying on scientific ignorance to foster a superstitious cast of mind.

Emanuel: Not at all. I am merely saying that people in a state of charity toward the neighbor and love to the Lord can see the Lord's Providence at work in the past (SD 2434). Good people do not desire miracles, they should not desire to contact the dead, and they should not engage in magical practices which attempt to make what is good look like evil and vice versa. Just because *you* cannot tell the difference between Providence and nature doesn't mean that other people can't. The problem with your use of nature is that it links one unknowable—nature in itself—with another unknowable—God-Providence—so closely that there is little to differentiate it from pantheism.³⁶

Immanuel: I never wanted to adopt Spinozistic pantheism. I always fought against metaphysical theories that abrogated free will and that replaced it with necessity. Besides, my idea of God is based on morality and includes a divine understanding. So I

can consider the connection of purposes in the world to be intentional and thus not fatalistic, but providential.

Emanuel: This is a nice thought and perhaps you are well intentioned, but when you write about purposes in the world and teleological causes, you seem to have forgotten that you put purpose not in the world, but only in the human mind. When one holds your own standard for making judgments, one must conclude that there cannot be a God who providentially intends that natural events link together to form a cosmic teleology. Your insistence that the concept of causality through purposes has objective reality fails both your established senses of "objective."³⁷

Immanuel: Look, I believed in a general Providence and I used the term "nature" as an accommodation to my readers. All I rejected was a special, or particular, Providence that was used to allow religious stupidity to parade as profundity. Miracles, like the kind that you yourself performed, distract the mind from its purpose in life: doing one's duty.

Emanuel: I never claimed that I did miracles!

Immanuel: Didn't you, like myself, write that miracles were present at the start of every new church?³⁸

Emanuel: Yes, but I did not apply that to the start of the New Church. My spiritual experiences are not miracles.

Immanuel: And why not?

Emanuel: First, because all human beings, not just me, are in the spiritual world as to their spirit already, except without separation from the body. I have been in the spiritual world only with the intellectual part of my mind, but not with the voluntary part or my natural body. Second, it is not a miracle because my experiences have brought spiritual light to people by revealing the spiritual sense of the Word. My experience has been one of revelation. Humans need revelation. If you count it impossible for God to communicate to humans what they need for their salvation, you have a very problematic God. Third, I say that my spiritual experiences are better than all miracles (Inv. 39, 52, 55). Intromission into the spiritual world

has not been granted to anyone since the Most Ancient Church. The Most Ancients conversed with the angels, but it was not granted to them to be in any other than natural light. To me it has been granted to be in both spiritual and natural light at the same time. If you want evidence, just read my books.

Immanuel: I have not only wasted money on your fantasy-filled books but I have also heard about your miraculous powers: how you revealed a secret to the Queen of Sweden, how you knew about a fire in Stockholm when you were at Gothenburg, and how you found a missing receipt.³⁹ Perhaps you would like to do something wonderful now?

Emanuel: No, I would not do miraculous things for spirits in the other world and I will not do them now (CL 535). It is a shame that people are more interested in the messenger than the message. As I told F.C. Oetinger, I will not provide a sign or a wonder because they compel externally and do not convince people.⁴⁰ The only sign given at this day will be enlightenment.

Immanuel: Enlightenment, that is something I agree with! Now you are talking sense.

Emanuel: No, not your kind of enlightenment, but the enlightenment that comes with the acknowledgment and reception of the truths of the New Church. With some people there will be an enlightenment which speaks, and this will be more than a sign.⁴¹

Immanuel: What a self-serving definition of enlightenment! I maintain that to be enlightened is to use one's own reason. It is reason alone that is the touchstone of judgment. We must orient ourselves around a rational faith and not resort to compulsion when we can use conscience.⁴²

Emanuel: Talk about a self-serving definition of enlightenment! While I agree that it is not good to let other people make decisions for us or to let others keep our understanding blinded by saying "You must have faith," there is a right way and a wrong way to use one's reason. Yes, people should be free to enter with the understanding into the mysteries of faith, but one must

pay close attention to the spirit in which the inquiry is undertaken. One must ask if one has adopted a negative attitude or an affirmative one. I fear for you when you say that reason cannot be subject to any laws except those which it gives itself. For since the fall of humankind, reason is inclined to make an Eden out of self love and love of the world. Thus, the east becomes west and the west becomes east (AC 130). Your own reflections on the radical evil in human nature should give you pause. □

Endnotes

1 Examples of features that their systems have in common are: criticism of Roman Catholic and Protestant theology and practices; criticism of “bookish” learnedness; association of their systems with ancient wisdom and the notion that philosophy was originally and primarily a way of life; the use of appeals to reason and freedom to support positions; and an emphasis on taking action to improve one’s character.

2 Philosophically, both reject materialism, necessitarian Spinozism, Leibnizian pre-established harmony, and Wolffian rationalism. They agree on the need for increased use of freedom and reason, the need to view God in human terms without indulging in a crude anthropomorphism, the existence of life on other planets, the cognitive and affective duality of human nature, the predisposition to both good and evil in human nature, and the importance of moral duties and virtues to the purpose human life. Theologically, both reject the traditional understanding of the vicarious atonement, the Protestant doctrine of faith alone, and the belief that a human being can be saved only by being a Christian. Both sought to promote a kind of world-wide religion that made being good its central tenet. I have in mind Swedenborg’s concept of the universal church and Kant’s concept of the one true natural religion.

3 Both men lived in 18th century Baltic port cities; were bachelors who worked for the government; were very learned in the sciences and philosophy and worked to advance those fields.

4 See his work *Heaven and Its Wonders and Hell; from Things Heard and Seen* (1758; London: The Swedenborg Society, 1966). Subsequent references to this work will be given parenthetically using the abbreviation HH followed by the paragraph number.

5 See his *Arcana Cælestia [Heavenly Secrets] contained in the Holy Scripture of Word of the Lord Unfolded Beginning with the Book of Genesis* trans. J.F. Potts (1749–1756; London: The Swedenborg Society, 1977). Subsequent references to this work will be given parenthetically using the abbreviation AC followed by the paragraph number.

6 See his work *The Apocalypse Revealed, Wherein are Disclosed the Arcana there Foretold which have hitherto Remained Concealed* trans. John Whitehead (1766; New York: Swedenborg Foundation, 1975).

7 See his *The True Christian Religion*, trans. John Chadwick (1771; London: The Swedenborg Society, 1988). Subsequent references to this work will be given using the abbreviation TCR followed by the paragraph numbers.

8 “Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason,” trans. George di Giovanni in *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Religion and Rational Theology* (1793; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 121–22 (Akademie edition pagination); 151–

52 (this translation). Subsequent references to this work will be given parenthetically using the abbreviation Rel. followed first by the page number in the Akademie edition [*Kant's Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Königlich Preußischen (later Deutsche) Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902–)] then the page number of the English translation. This is common practice for citations to Kant's works.

9 *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett, 1996), Axi; 8.

10 I use the phrase "Word of God" instead of "Bible" because of the Swedenborgian teaching that only certain books of the Bible contain the Word of God, that is, a continuous internal sense. The Epistles of Paul, for example, are said by Swedenborg to be useful books for the church, but they are not part of the Word like the four Gospels are (see AC 10,325).

11 In "The Conflict of the Faculties," trans. Mary J. Gregor and Robert Anchor in *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Religion and Rational Theology* (1798; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 5–116; 233–327; subsequent references will be given using the abbreviation CoF), Kant says he wants to avoid attributing the Bible's existence skeptically to mere accident or superstitiously to a miracle, both of which would cause reason to run aground. He says the Bible deserves to be put to moral use and assigned to religion "just as if it is a divine revelation" (CoF 64–65; 284–85). What he means is that it is not revelation and that it is to be used as a tool by reason to advance reason's understanding of morality.

12 *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens*, trans. Stanley L. Jaki (1755; Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1981). Subsequent references will be given parenthetically using the abbreviation UNH.

13 "The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God," trans. David Walford and Ralf Meerbote, in *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy 1755–1770* (1763; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 63–163; 107–201. Subsequent references will be given using the abbreviation OPA.

14 "Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics," trans. David Walford and Ralf Meerbote, in *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy 1755–1770* (1766; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 315–373; 301–359.

15 Kant first rejects the Bible as an historical authority in two essays of 1754: "Investigation of the Question Whether the Earth in its Rotation on its Axis...has Undergone any Alternation since the Earliest Times of its Origins" and "The Question Whether the Earth is Aging considered from a Physicalistic Point of View" both are in the Akademie edition, volume 1: 183–213. See also his April 28, 1775 letter to J.C. Lavater for his view of Jesus, miracles, revelation and morality (volume 10 of the Akademie edition, pages 176–80; and *Kant: Philosophical Correspondence 1755–99*, ed. and trans. Arnulf Zweig (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 79–83).

16 See *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime*, trans. John T. Goldthwait (1764; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), 214–15, 221–22, 245–53; 55–57, 66–67, 100–110.

17 See "Continuation Concerning The Last Judgment," trans. John Whitehead, in *Miscellaneous Theological Works of Emanuel Swedenborg* (1763; New York: Swedenborg Foundation, 1951), paragraphs 56–67, 83–85.

18 Although there are four general remarks in the *Religion*, I consider only numbers one, two, and four in this paper.

19 Swedenborg agrees that such terms for the supernatural had become mere turns of phrase: "That the things which happen (in other words which are ascribed to chance or fortune) are of the Divine Providence, the church indeed acknowledges, but still does not believe; for who does not say, when apparently by chance he comes out of some great peril, that he has been preserved by God, also gives God thanks?" (AC 5508)

20 This is not a theoretical assertion. If it were, Kant would be caught in an inconsistency, for he claims that this kind of theoretical objective insight "presumes a greater insight than any human being ought to be thought capable of" (Rel. 85; 123).

21 Ironically, at another point in the *Religion* Kant uses our admiration of creation as the work of the “hand of God” to argue against the need for spoken prayer (Rel.197; 212).

22 See the work *Angelic Wisdom concerning the Divine Love and the Divine Wisdom* trans. John C. Ager (1763; New York: Swedenborg Foundation, 1976). Subsequent references to this work will be given using the abbreviation DLW.

23 An analogy, although imperfect, may still be helpful in understanding correspondence: the spiritual world corresponds with the natural world as a human hand relates to a glove.

24 Of the popular metaphysical theories of his day (namely, physical influx, pre-established harmony, occasionalism, and Cartesian spiritual influx), Swedenborg accepts spiritual influx. With this he combines his theories of degrees and correspondences, or co-established harmony.

25 See the work *Angelic Wisdom concerning The Divine Providence* (1764; London: The Swedenborg Society, 1949), paragraph 3. Subsequent references to this work will be given using the abbreviation DP.

26 See the posthumous work “Invitation to the New Church” paragraph 60, also referred to as “Concerning Miracles” in *Posthumous Theological Works of Emanuel Swedenborg* trans. John Whitehead (New York: Swedenborg Foundation, 1954). Subsequent references to this work will be given using the abbreviation Inv.

27 This does not mean that all the miracles in the Word actually took place as they are described in the literal sense. Here, for example, is Swedenborg’s explanation of Joshua 10:12–13 from his work *The Apocalypse Explained*, trans. John Whitehead (1786; New York: The Swedenborg Foundation, 1976): “That the sun is said to have stood in Gibeon, and the moon in the valley of Aijalon, signifies that the church was altogether vastated in respect to all good and truth, for a battle was then going on...” “It is said that the sun and the moon stood in their place, that is, before the sons of Israel, that they might see their enemies; but this, although it is told as history, is a prophecy, as is evident from its being said, ‘Is not this written upon the book of the Upright [Jasher]?’ which was a prophetic book from which this was taken...” “This is evident also from the fact that if this miracle had occurred altogether in this way, the whole nature of the world would have been inverted, which is not the case with the other miracles in the Word.” However, Swedenborg adds: “And yet it is not to be doubted, that there was given to them a light out of heaven, a light in Gibeon like that of the sun, and a light in the valley of Aijalon like that of the moon.” (AE 401:18)

28 I wish that I could say that the rise of evil forms of use can be exactly correlated with the text of Genesis 3: 17–18 in which the ground is cursed and it brings forth thorns and thistles, but I cannot. Swedenborg’s explanation of that text does not explicitly make the connection. All that AC 272 says is that “thorn and thistle” are used to mean curse and vastation, and that “he was to eat the plant of the field” means that humans were to live as wild animals. At best, the correlation can be made in a general way since what is described is the beginning of the fall of the Most Ancient Church.

29 By “naturalist” I mean a person who does not believe in the reality of any world except the natural world of natural space and time, that is, a person who rejects the reality of the spiritual world and the transcendent aspect of God.

30 According to Swedenborg, dullness as to the perception of truth is induced by magicians in the other life by the abuse and perversion of order, for magicians have the skill to take away the influx from heaven. They also have the skill to induce fallacies and to obscure truths by injecting what is persuasive (AC 7298).

31 For an historical treatment, see Christian Jacq’s *Egyptian Magic* trans. Janet M. Davis (Chicago: Bolchazy-Carducci, 1985).

32 Kant argues this way: Either Christianity can now hold its own on rational grounds without the Word and the supernatural, or we have to accept that mere faith in mysteries and their repetition is the only way pleasing to God (Rel. 84; 123). This is a false dilemma, for holding that Christianity cannot be based simply on rational grounds without the Word and

the supernatural does not entail the idea that we can only please God by means of faith in mysteries and their repetition. Indeed, Swedenborg set out to show why, and how, the Word is supernatural and that its message is one of salvation through good intentions, true thoughts, and useful deeds, not through faith alone or rituals. Another argument from Kant runs: If moral religion is established, then belief in the miracles of Jesus, the New Testament, and miracles in general is superfluous. Moral religion is established (we believe in the commands of duty). Therefore, belief in a supernatural Jesus and the miracles of the New Testament is superfluous. The truth of the argument turns on our being persuaded that moral religion is established. While Kant probably thought that he was establishing moral religion, I doubt that even he could sincerely defend the proposition that it is established. Given Kant's concerns over, and observations of, people's hypocrisy (Rel. 190n; 206n), moral laziness, and sentimentality, one must conclude that this proposition is a statement of faith, not of fact.

33 *The Spiritual Diary of Emanuel Swedenborg* trans. George Bush and John H. Smithson (London: James Speirs, 1883), paragraph 6073.

34 One notices that here Swedenborg is saying that a good person's faith is derived from the Word, thus from the Lord, and not from miracles, which implies that revelation from God to humans by means of the written word is not a miracle. Kant, of course, would never accept this.

35 After the first Advent, however, this does not mean that we can magically be controlled against our will. The Lord no longer allows people to be possessed by spirits as to their external (speech and action) self. This is one of the results of God having taken on a Divine Natural. But people today can still be possessed as to their internals with their cooperation.

36 The textual support for this paragraph, the next one, and others throughout the dialogue that summarize Kant's view can be found in my dissertation, "Kantian Religion: Relating Humans, God, and Nature," diss., Temple U, 1997, Chapter 4.

37 See John H. Zammito *The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 222, 251, 255, 316.

38. See SD 4770; AE 815:9.

39 I refer here to three paranormal incidents of Swedenborg's with which his contemporaries were familiar. Kant wrote to Charlotte von Knobloch (in 1763) about these events and his letters reveal his lack of doubt concerning them. See the factual notes to "Dreams of a Spirit-Seer" in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, *Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770*, pp. 451–55.

40 "Theological Extracts from Swedenborg's Correspondence" published in *Posthumous Theological Works*, Vol. 1 New York: Swedenborg Foundation, 1954, p. 571.

41 Ibid.

42 "What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?" trans. Allen W. Wood, in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: *Religion and Rational Theology* (1786; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 137–143; 10–15.